

## Arendtian Perspective of the State and Sovereignty Nexus: A Contemporary Interpretation

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**ABSTRACT:** The political-legal precepts of the State and sovereignty have occupied a center stage in the realm of political theory. The State as an organized political community under a solitary system of government is construed to be concomitant with sovereignty in its *modus operandi*. In the discourse of this nature, the facet of concern graduates into being that which underpins these actualities. It could be enunciated that the State and sovereignty are two incomplete dashes of realism which are ever ready to receive the other for either to be complete for apropos functioning. The subject of concern of this exposition is what is it that institutes the ostensible efficacy or efficacy *per excellence* in the functioning of these two co-realities? The approach utilized in the pursuit of conceivable panacea to this quandary was critical phenomenology coupled as well as guided by a hermeneutic propensity. Upon the employment of the previous methodology, the sequel was that power, precisely, the ascendancy of the subjects delineates the symmetry between the State along with sovereignty. Furthermore, it is this sway of the led that is liable to the linkage that subsists between these co-realities. The caveat, as well as the mode forward in maintaining this brand of rapport, is via the apposite conscientization of the citizenry in matters appertaining to the legal aspects as a sort of appropriate empowerment.

**Keywords:** Sovereignty, the State, citizenry, political theory

### I. INTRODUCTION

The titillating disquiet that this disquisition aspires to settle is of that reality upon which both the State and sovereignty derive their linkage. Arendt has formulated a severe appraisal of the concept of sovereignty. One could even adjudge deprived of hyperbole that much of today's intellectual antipathy against the concept of autonomy draws upon her denunciation of it. *First*, it is imperative to illustrate that Arendt's critique is not only questionable from the history of ideas and of the philosophy of law but also internally indecisive. Moreover, it shall be relevant to deliberate on the connotation of the concept of sovereignty and its link to constitutionalism and totalitarianism as instances of delving into the doctrine of constituent power. In tandem with the preceding, evaluation of some of the viewpoints of the advocates of cosmopolitanism and global governance will be apposite.

### II. SOVEREIGNTY, THE STATE, AND EMANCIPATION

An enquiry on the role of the sovereign State in multilateral relations is vital in developing some reflections on the import of citizenship and nationality in a pluralistic society alongside the fourth estate and its relationship with the State. The one-sidedness of Arendt's interpretation of sovereignty could be explained in the light of her conjectural philosophical vision on politics, which leans heavily on the famous distinction between labour, work, and action. Arendt's *quasi-existentialist* vision of politics conceived as the creative momentum where equal persons are spontaneously acting together in a typical public space and are experiencing political freedom in words and deeds leaves miniature room for taking into account the legal and institutional aspects of the political realm.

Arendt's rebuff of sovereignty is particularly categorical in her essay *What is Freedom?* Where she contends that the eminent self-rule of political bodies has continuously been a delusion, which, moreover, could be sustained only by the contrivances of violence, that is, with essentially non-political approaches. In social circumstances that are regulated by the palpability which not a man nonetheless men live on the earth, freedom, and sovereignty might even not exist simultaneously. Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual will with which one forces himself or the general will of a systematized assemblage. If men desire to be emancipated, it is accurately self-sufficiency they ought to capitulate.

For Arendt, the identification of freedom with sovereignty is one of the most maleficent and precarious sequels of the interpretation of the metaphysics of the free will into the political conception of freedom. It leads almost by design to despotism and ruling over others for the reason that sovereignty, the idea of obdurate self-sufficiency and mastership of one man or a body politic, might be procured only at the price of the subordination of the individuals and the denial of their freedom and plurality. Not only is sovereignty an illusion for the reason that the intrinsic contingency of human action and the plurality and volatility of human affairs, nevertheless, it is also unwarrantable for the reason that the impracticality of binding the sovereign.

Consequently, any community founded on a conception of the sovereign would be built on quicksand for Arendt. The intrinsic exigency, capriciousness, and indeterminacy of human action which are ontologically engrained in the fact of natality may be alleviated by mode of the human aptitude to project one's freedom in the future by promising and honouring promises. In spite of what has been christened *quasi-existentialist* vision on politics, Arendt explicitly states that the political couched as the manifestation of human liberty in action. The prior is continually articulated within an ornate context of ties and bonds such as laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances, all of which derive in the last illustration from the propensity and mutuality of promise giving as well as promise honouring.

### III. NOTION OF POWER

The term *power*, as conventionally employed, is not at liberty of haziness. Power, principally in the context of the State, is usually regarded as the aptitude to mete out physical damage. The police and the military are the principal State institutions wielding power. Others, such as burglars and plunderers, frequently have and often use such power. Though physical power is routinely utilized to enforce arbitration resolutions, the essential execution prerequisite is the capability to reprimand and enforce costs. Physical power is only one of the approaches employed for that purpose.

The lexicon definition of this term power edifies us to the broader import, comprising, besides force, such notions as authority and capacity to execute one's will. People can impose a change in a diversity of techniques, entailing rolling a sarsen into one's path, alienation of affection and cutting off trade routes, as well as the use of spiritual power, that is, banishment and even putting on a hex. The substantial amount of power, ostensibly spiritual, that the pope had during the Middle Ages in countries beyond the borders of the Vatican is a sample of power not involving force (Joseph Stalin, 1879-1953). It does not appear apposite, then, to equate power with the ability to use violence. The delimitation that is adopted here is, *the outright will's aptitude to bring into being as well as impose change on that which is*.

Power is most useful to its owner when the threat of its use is adequate to achieve the desired *telos*. Imposing change uses up resources. The wielder of power and his target will do well if they can come to terms and avoid the actual imposition of change where necessary. If they estimate each other's power accurately, they know who has the advantage and by how much. They could then similarly assess the change of the assailant, and the victim will suffer if the latter opts to counter-attack. They are aware, then, of a range of terms that will make both of them better off than if they use their power. Reaching agreement is problematic for the reason that the need to bear with the rate of change between the parties, although the severity of the difficulty is abridged when power and resistance to it apply slightly.

The power of the contemporary State is an order of gradation greater than that of any individual. Individuals may opt to resist the State by hiding, by legal gamesmanship as well as even by civil disobedience. As a consequence, the State does not continually opt to prevail. Furthermore, in earlier eons, single individuals did have a substantial amount of power. Power is multifaceted and the straightforwardness of evaluating it diverges. The grander the intricacy in appraising a specific sort of power, the more significant the review inaccuracy, thus, the peradventure that power will undoubtedly be deployed intensifies.

#### 3.1 POWER OF THE STATE

The State is ordinarily delineated regarding its exclusive control of power. Weber's pioneering definition the State has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1922). According to Nozick, who proffers a variation on Weber's definition, an indispensable condition for the state is that "only it may decide who could use force and under what conditions ..." (Nozick, 1974, 23). The particular power situation in these definitions, nevertheless, is too strong to be expedient. It sidetracks thoughtfulness from other essential facets that the definition ought to capture. As the State is conventionally comprehended, its actual regulation over power is certainly not comprehensive. Many people and institutions not regarded as States have power too. Parents have power over their small children. Individuals who own weapons, legally or otherwise, have some power. Illicit groups have a great deal of power and use force to execute crimes (Nozick, 1974).

Indeed, if the State truly had such domination, then, among other things, police officers would not have to fear felons. Even what institutes the geographic jurisdiction of the State, that is, the area over which the State is recognized to have exclusive power is not succinct. The power that states have is not continuously confined to their putative precincts. For illustration, for the past several decades, Israeli and asymmetrical Lebanese forces

have been able to operate intermittently inside each other's territory. Exclusive power appears to suggest an amalgamated regulation of that power, sometimes in the hands of one person.

If we waffle about the extent of exclusiveness, the exclusive-power definition may apply to tyrannical states in which the tyrant is the sole regulator of power. In some rule-of-law States, nonetheless, a doctrine of separation of powers triumphs. Deem a region in which individuals with collective power employ their defender. An essential facet of the circumstances fundamental to the agreement between the two parties is that neither of them has exclusive power; somewhat, each set has some supremacy, correspondingly, there is a balance of power between the two (Jones, 2015). The rationale for the existence of a balance of power between clienteles and guardian, as elaborated later, is that the former will enter into a treaty with the latter only after they guarantee themselves that he will not be able to conquer them.

Regulars possibly will form numerous associations, each with some power, to proffer diverse forms of security, consequently, plummeting the fortuitous that they could be trounced. More prominently at this point, the influence that the collective-action contrivance regulates is not usually regarded as part of the State's clout (Weber, 1922). The exceptionality definition appears inept of muddling through with the instantaneous existence of some power cores (Wittfogel, 1957). It is not useful to define the State regarding the locus of power if such a locus does not necessarily exist. Wittfogel is cognizant of the two major points made here, *first*, that the State does not have exclusive power even under despotism and *second*, that constraints on the employment of power must be imposed for constitutional States to exist. The enforcement of the constraints correspondingly calls for power. He does not, though, define the State. By and large, it is of import to accentuate at this point that power is an indispensable component of the State. The gamut of the State has been comprehended as the segment of the dealings it imposes comparatively to all transactions within its precincts.

### 3.2 ROOTS OF POWER

Albeit it is ostensible and acknowledged that speech and action form an inseparable pair in Arendt's work, this same link between speech and power is seldom recognized in the universe of political theory. Hitherto, it would not be incorrect to assert that her categorization of power comes closer to expressing the discursive component of action than any of the other sorts that she meticulously links with action. These comprise the space of appearance, public realm, and the web of relationships, all of which have a decidedly spatial and or visual connotation. Indeed, under proximate scrutiny, Arendt's discussion of power can be seen to be informed almost entirely by categories of language, more specifically, of language implicit according to a hermeneutic paradigm. Furthermore, the qualities essential to Arendt's unique description of power can be reduced almost entirely to the qualities of speech construed as a conversation within the sublime horizon of language.

The mutual activity of speaking and hearing has primacy over both the spoken and the speakers, and such activity depends ultimately on the fact that its users can entirely objectify language. Consequently, our concern is with speech as a medium of human interrelation, which, though it continuously gives the impression within specific semantic and pragmatic configurations, is not reducible simply to any of these (Aristotle, 1984, 1253a). The argument for this correspondence between power and speech will take the form of a weaving together of the many strands that make up Arendt's inimitable comprehending of power. By taking up each strand, in turn, we can clarify an additional aspect of the correspondence between power and speech. No one point of comparison carries the full weight of the argument. Comparatively, the correspondence of a series of aspects, some interlaced filaments, form the argumentative rope from which the deduction hangs.

As a preliminary pointer of the speech-clout linkage, let us ruminate on the crucial portrayal of power as it foremost appears in *The Human Condition*, its link with the space of manifestation (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229). Arendt perceives this space from the perspective of the twofold quality of human plurality distinction and equality. It is, in consequence, hemmed in by the poles of unique lucidity as well as communality, the dialectic of the *who* and the *we* of all true political action. Space is an expression of the idea of the *in-between*, which, according to the general sense given it by Arendt, relates and separates men at the same time (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229). Power, unlike strength, force or violence from which Arendt specifically and unequivocally distinguishes power, is neither a property nor an instrument, nor does any genus of the monadic phenomenon, nevertheless, rather have its existence *inter homines*, when people act together in public. It is that which constitutes the public space between those in action.

Power is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229). Power can perhaps be pigeonholed as the medium of the original political being together of human beings in action, the lifeblood of human artifice, whose *raison d'être* is the web of human affairs and relationships (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229). It can be further categorized as the essential human in-between, first as to its experiential localization and then, more largely, as to its apposite phenomenological moniker (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229).

As localization, the in-between expresses both the horizontal plane of power, in contradistinction to the usual vertical grasp in addition to its relative independence from the relation between which power is located. Power is not power over, as the average usage suggests, but power with, for the reason that it constitutes the space of action essentially. In a general hermeneutic sense, all speech is localizable in precisely the same mode as a horizontally directed conversation with, out of the center of language. The localization of power between, rather than in agents, emphasizes at the same time the essential ontological condition of plurality, the condition Arendt defends as essential to the realm of action. The fathoming coincides with the plurality that is a condition of language and conversation.

Since power also has to correspond to the indispensable human and political condition of plurality, it is decisive to take leave of the notion of power as a possession. The reconfiguration has its complement in the notion of speech as the actuality of human plurality. Arendt explicitly mentions both relationships to plurality (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229). A conversation can belong to someone merely inauthentically if it is truly a dialogue and not an epilogue. Correspondingly, it is, according to Arendt, purely emblematic to accredit power to an individual. Additionally, she designates authority as the place marker of action that perseveres through time. It subsists as the erect prospective to act in the midst of those not yet acting or of those who have heretofore acted (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229).

Moreover, it is precisely the being there of power that far from encumbering auxiliary action or merging past action, clenches open the prospect of novel action and promotes it (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229). To utilize a metaphor of Arendt's, though this time an optical rather than her usual spatial ones, this phenomenon is the *brightness* of power, the transparency of supremacy for the action within it. The view of language as the furthestmost innovative human *in-between* appears (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229), though, not only to furnish the paradigmatic origin for the in-between idiosyncrasy of power, however, but also to be itself the overarching human reality that is capable of grounding the role Arendt ascribes to power. It can be eminently averred of language about the conversation that it both conjures and brooks any actual discourse. The fortification at this point is in the German origination, where Arendt notes that influence gifts or donates the space of appearance as well as preserves it after the moment of action (Arendt, 1958, 199-207; 1996, 210-229).

### 3.3 LANGUAGE AS POWER

Language is, at once, the continual potential for conversation and the *conditio per quam* of actual conversation. Albeit language precedes conversation and outlasts it, it is transparent for the conversations that appear in it, however, at the same time, it does not itself appear in unmediated fashion in any specific conversation. It is probable to trace this same configuration concerning the other facets of the notion of power as explicated by Arendt. These take account of the unique nature of the potentiality of power, its spontaneous generation and limitlessness, the fact that it cannot be saved or stored up, besides, eventually, its liaison to tradition (Penta, 1985). Power for Arendt resides in a class of wherewithal that can only be objectified however never entirely actualized, as a consequence, making it to a dumbfounding gradation independent of material factors, either of number or means (Arendt, 1958, 200). The accentuated appertains to despite the material dependency of the nonidealized space of appearances.

If we take into account, her strict exclusion of the mental activities, that is, thinking, willing, and judging, as well as human labour, from the space of appearances, then we are forced to have recourse to language itself. The underlying principle here is to find content for the category of potentiality to which Arendt is referring. Only a conversation actualizes the spoken without reifying it while at the same time being inseparable from the embodiment of the discussants. The conversation has an actuality in the execution of embodied speaking and listening, however, cannot itself be considered to be merely corporeal (Arendt, 2002, 36-46). Intimately connected to the question of potentiality is Arendt's contention concerning the spontaneous generation of power that typifies the moment of power's actualization.

Arendt repeated formulation of this is power springs up (Arendt, 1970, 52). The moment of actualization of power is also connected with the already mentioned topos of the procreative in addition to the additive utility of power and points to the bond between power and liberty. Conversely, power supposes the space of appearances, which it marmalades as it is thought to generate this space. From the acuity of action, the equivalent is spot-on, that is, power brands action possible; action, nevertheless, engenders power. In the milieu of the anomaly of free will, this circle takes the form of the question of the comparatively unrestricted commencing of a sequence that transcends the mere act of the will. The edifice of the hermeneutic circle gives the impression to epitomize the paradigm for this parallel (Arendt, 1996, 210-229).

The hermeneutic circle is noteworthy regarding language as the location of human being in the world and concomitant openness for the world. We stand already within the original discourse of language, that one could be able to begin any conversation and before any particular conversation begins. It is a conversation that introduces us to itself and that holds the dialogue, conducts the discourse, as we already, from the outlook of language, stand within the conversation (Maraldo, 1990). Power springs up just as a discussion starts in that the



vista of the feasible activity both heralds the actual incident and lingers after it. Power creates, and at the same time supposes, that which is spawned, just as the exchange of ideas in virtue of language itself crafts and presupposes itself in the same moment (Arendt, 1996, 210-229).

A further trait of power for Arendt is its essential limitlessness once actualized. For power, like the action is boundless. Its only inadequacy is the actuality of additional persons (Arendt, 1958, 201). This same sort of delimitation can be postulated for the idealized, though not thereby mentalized, conversation insofar as such discourse can be considered in abstraction from the physical limitations of the participants and its own accidental conditions as fundamentally unbounded about its potential continuation. A conversation is of itself never closed since the ultimate upshot, the final word, each time remains to be articulated, must continually remain outstanding as long as the conversation exists as a conversation and not as a firm and unchangeable outcome. To have the last word implies to put an end to the conversation as conversation.

The participants do not carry the unlimited likelihood of continuation of the actual conversation, on the other hand, language itself grounds the limitlessness of the conversation (Arendt, 1968, 26-31). Once again, this element of discursive speech permits us lawfully to smidgeon finiteness of supremacy back to the silhouettes of the principal unrestrained certainty of dialogue. The distinctly transitory essence of hegemony, its reliance consequent to the self-procreant enlargement as well as the distribution of sway, leaves for Arendt an auxiliary imprint simultaneous with the rule. It cannot, as power, be hoarded or stowed up. As an alternative, it ought to be incessantly revived. The burdens of continuousness and circadian life coerce us to endeavour to preoccupy supremacy in some mode in forms of party-political institution. In Arendt's work, this denotes predominantly to the archetypally modern query of the political constitution and legitimization of the State (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). Such fixation of power, and the mistaken equivalence of power with violence and its instruments as indispensable as it might appear in the world of real politic is never original power, but at best a borrowed power in need of continuous renewal (Arendt, 1970, 47-56). It remains at all times dependent upon the foremost mountain of sovereignty propagation for the edifices to endure as supplementary souvenirs.

The disdain of this essence of reign implies the eventual but inevitable demise of the structures erected upon it. The temptation to circumvent the demise of such empty structures by resorting to violence cannot save power, however relatively carries the forms of organization further from their roots. A consistent striving for the reification of power leads to its inevitable loss. At this point as well, we can draw a comparison to language. What is spoken, what is communicated in conversation, is continually something new-fangled as well as exceptional that is nowhere to be found virtually as momentarily as it is enunciated.

The dialogue banks on the unremitting replenishment of what is vocalized, whatever is each time novel, even when the terms are similar. The discourse in the milieu of the conversation cannot be captured and stored except as memory devoid of some form of reification. These remain products that can never entirely recover the original and never lose their dependence upon the never-to-be-repeated spoken word (Arendt, 2002, 115-119). For that reason, such products become not as much of precise and less easily comprehensible the more they are detached from their derivation. Such yields could by the same token on no occasion supplant the alive interaction with dialogue and the surrendering of such connection to endure at a specific logged stance of the conversation, opens the way for the loss of the thread of the argument and to the eventual breakdown of the living conversation.

Moreover, the historical force that Arendt attributes to power what we could term the remembered in-between. This characteristic rewrite shorn of the mediation of things and that denotes starved of the resort to *homo faber*. Such ancient efficacy of power relates to, consequently, not to the sorts of the institution of supremacy, nevertheless somewhat to the prospect of a straight transitory of unique clout over the period. Subsequently, hegemony as a past dynamism could barely be unglued from custom as a linguistic event, the connection here between power and language is immediately evident.

The power of memory implies not a final fixation of the living conversation, nevertheless rather the passing of what is reminisced into the unavoidable conversation with the past in which we stand and in which that which is recollected can itself remain alive and effective. The construing is not a history of ideas, much less an idea of history, nonetheless political history as an assortment of narratives which, even though they reach us now only as fragments, have passed inextricably into our language (Arendt, 1996, 210-229).

At work now is the reign of language through time, an appreciation of which Arendt engenders us in her treatise on Walter Benjamin. In the least epoch to which its peculiar historical has grown into as moot as it has to us ought to ultimately come up in contrast to the portent of phonological, for in it the ancient is confined indelibly, thwarting all endeavours to annihilate it once and for all (Arendt, 1968, 204). The fragments of language, which are comparable to pearls and coral are deformed, sedimented and fragmented. They remain powerful, however, as long as they are still able to inform collective, public action. Our comparison has sought to display that an extraordinary convergence obtains between the constitutive elements of Arendt's notion of power in addition to a hermeneutic conception of language. Shorn of exception, this point-by-point inspection of the Arendtian properties of power points to a linguistic paradigm which is their common point of departure.

However, beyond this, the comparison uncovers the qualities of a language that ultimately ground the claims made for power (Habermas, 1981).

The stronger claim of our comparison, from which we will proceed, maintains that there is an essential agreement between power and language and proposes that power in Arendt's gist of the term is equivalent to the hegemony of language. The previous robust assertion could be grounded upon the nature of the elements used in the previous comparison. The points of comparison do not pertain to any merely accidental characteristics of language, on the other hand, reasonably lift up rudiments that pertain eminently to language as such. They are interrelated to the original, inalienable traits of language which return to a derivative mode in power (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). To buttress this position, we must, however, illustrate how it complements the reconstruction of a notion of a politically constituted self in Arendt. For that reason, our comparison can be understood as a first step toward freeing power once and for all from an instrumental, then again also from a monological, subjectively based framework of the political.

### 3.4 POWER VARIATIONS

In order better to elucidate the ramifications of such a relationally entrenched notion of power in the demesne of political action, let us compare some of its significant facets with those of what we might christen the classic modern perspicacity of power (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). It is implicit here as a point of departure that there is an *ideal type* of power that is distinctive of modernity and that has remained mostly the same, despite various nuances that have appeared in its formulation (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). This *ideal type* is rooted in the paradigmatic displacement of the notion of the political by Thomas Hobbes. Through Manfred Riedel, we can describe the upshot of this displacement as the centrality of human beings as productive subjects, who make themselves citizens (Riedel, 1975). The features of such a modern *ideal type* of power yield the foci around which the contours of a communicative-relational theory of power, which is here christened power, can become visible by contrast.

## IV. RELATIONALITY

If we turn now to the enquiry of the exposé of the *who* via action, the other cradle of power in Arendt's thought comes to be apparent (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). The essential sorts here are those of plurality and solidarity. Arendt unequivocally affirms the plurality and particularity of human beings over universal categories. She writes, "Not Man but men inhabit this planet" (Arendt, 2002, 19). At the equivalent moment, nevertheless, she contends for the mere verity... that no man can act alone, that all true action is action in concert (Arendt, 2002, 19). Neither totalitarianism nor any other political or metaphysical subsumption into the one, nor individualism and its accompanying doctrine of sovereignty or rulership are acceptable within these fundamental parameters for the political. Under this premise, Arendt's argument of action can also be viewed as that of the constitution of the political self in the tension between human distinctness and human collectivity.

Nevertheless, this is so the formulation of the power question when it rewrites the in-between of power, precisely insofar as therein both the unique *who* of plurality and the common *we* of solidarity must be constituted (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). Accordingly, the question is one of the constitutive relations in power that reciprocally grounds both the uniqueness and communality of political agents or selves. Posing the enquiry in this approach repudiates both atomism and organism in favour of a subjective interpersonal stance intermediated by the hegemony of deed in recital. When realized from the aspect of the interest in the individual as a thespian, we have at this point the probe of the interpersonal constituents of the political self (Arendt, 1996, 210-229; Fraser, 1989).

Though Arendt does not directly address the issue of the constitution in her work, it is of import to believe that her deliberation of power and action lead to it as well as it is probable to reconstruct the outlines of her rejoinder to such a question. We can begin *ex negativo* by tracing her exclusion of the two typically modern alternatives of the constitution, that is, self-reflection and socialization or social construction of the individual. Neither approach, for Arendt, can lead us to an appreciation of a self that could be genuinely called political nor is it precisely the latitude and dignity of the political that inspires her thought.

The first option is clearly vetoed in Arendt's critique of modernity and its liaison to the loss of the political. The denunciation can be traced in its theoretical dimension through her critique of *Bewußtseinsphilosophie* in all forms (Arendt, 2002, Chap. XII and XIV). In its practical, historical dimensions, this rejection is again visible in her analysis of imperialism (Arendt, 1951). The second option is ruled out from her analysis of totalitarianism. The crux here is her demonstration that totalitarianism ultimately attempts to ground public relationships by indistinguishable parity (Arendt, 1956, 59-114). Furthermore, as can be demonstrated by Arendt's critique of Heidegger, an acceptable paradigm for constitution must overcome the egoism of transcendental intersubjectivity (Arendt, 1978, 172).

A dialogical construction of the self, which might put forward itself from this critique and Arendt's contiguous ties to Jaspers, points us in the right direction, even though it falls short in several crucial aspects. It is conceivable to link elements of Arendt's position on the mutual constitution of the self in reciprocal relation to

another, as Jaspers' existential communication and Buber's Ich-Du have done. The stance is helpful since it transfers the question of constitution outside of the reflexivity of the subject to the middle of, which is for Arendt power as speech. Such a paradigm falls short, however, of Arendt's demand for a multiplicity in action that is more than dyadic and for a publicness of deed that motivates her rebuff of love as a political factor (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). These criteria of plurality and the publicness of action and power, lead us beyond a dialogical conception toward one that grasps the self within a field of mutually constituted others, within a *you*.

There is for Arendt no political self-prior to the supremacy liaison with others or from the outlook of the public, no *we* of action before the authority affiliation between the self and the others (Betz, 1992, 379-422). The personal in Arendt, however, must be separated from the subjective as self-constituting and self-controlled and is, hence, much more analogous to the notion of a public *persona*, through which sounds the character. Such a person, a *who* rather than an *I*, appears in public and is perceived better by others than by the person herself. Neither *homo naturans* nor atomic subjects populate the Arendtian political realm. However, personal idiosyncrasies instituted not surreptitiously and singly from the inside out as it were, however publicly and mutually from the intermediary of the in-between outward (Betz, 379-422).

The aspiration to get behindhand suchlike disguises, to treasure trove a few subjects, some *hypokeimenon*, something that grounds appearance devoid of itself appearing, destructively intrudes upon the political actor for the reason that behind the person is not some *true self*. However, the natural human being as a similar species being or the individualist thinking ego, which by its very nature cannot appear (Arendt, 1956, 106-108). The personality is comparable for Arendt to the Greek *daemon* and the source of humanity, which could be realized merely by one who has flung his life and his being into the course into the civic sphere. In the progression of which he perils divulging a little of which is not idiosyncratic plus which for that very rationale he can neither distinguish nor regulate (Arendt, 1968, 73-74).

In antithesis to the feudal inkling of a person as incommunicable intellectual substance, this notion is based on the presupposition that man can communicate himself (Arendt, 1958, 176). The mediation of personal uniqueness is the actual communication of this inimitability as its realization in action. That which transmits the civil is neither underneath, over, nor in it, nonetheless reasonably, solely transitional to those who are allied and brought into being through it (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). Through this assertion, nevertheless, we have closed the circle and come once again to power in Arendt's sense and to the linguistic paradigm through which, as we have contended in the preceding, it functions. The discursive dimension of action and the relational constitution of political persons dovetail in the alternative notion of power presented by Arendt.

## V. POSSESSIONS VERSUS AFFINITY

Contemporary models of power irrespective of their accidental variances proceed from the conjecture that power is a disposable property of a substance envisioned as a transferor (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). In initial modernity, Hobbes thinks of this hauler in a moderately sheer gist in that he incorporates human act underneath the classification of the *res extensa* to be able to proffer a systematic interpretation of authority (Hobbes, 1651, Chap. X). Nonetheless, the notion of command as one-use possession is useful autonomously both of the theoretical construction of the carrier besides of whether power is considered as a substantial property or as an external-relational property with relation to the object over which power can be exercised.

Moreover, this conception of power extends also to those later modern theories that construe substantiality as subjectivity. In every incident, power is encircled in a self, in a mutual or in an embodied concept as a subject that has power. The factuality applies when a given transcendental intersubjectivity is ratified or when the prospect of becoming the determinant of the human (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). The structure of possession of power in an agent that stands in an actual or virtual, nevertheless, in any case, external liaison to the object of its power is theory-determinant. Numerous ramifications flow from this (Arendt, 1996, 210-229). *First*, power is conceived as operating according to the model of efficient causality. For the reason that the subject supervises over supremacy, has influence or could term it its own, clout could be utilized as an operational approach to an end according to the instrumental pattern of making.

Power could be perceived, in a sense, as the *efficacy quotient* of a political subject, hence, for example, Max Weber's classic definition of power as "the peradventure that one performer in a mutual correlation will be in an aptitude to execute his willpower despite confrontation" (Weber, 1922, 53). *Second*, power at all times appears in connection with the proficiency of the acquisition, accumulation, and application of this possession at will. The power calculus can accordingly be realized, even before the principles of civil frugality or beside them, as the pecuniary configuration of the civic (Hobbes, 1651, 76). The conception leads to the extreme reification of power; its potential for an efficacious premeditated feat is unfolded as the evolution from sovereignty to corporeal ferocity. The variance between authority and fierceness becomes one of mere quantity.

Power, in contrast, does not inhere in the actors, nevertheless exists between those who act as the condition of their action. It arises and exists neither as a property nor as a possession at the disposal of the actor, but rather as a phenomenon of reciprocal relationality. We have traced this to a notion of the reciprocal constitution of the interpersonal of the political itself. Power, as the power of exemplified discourse, is generated in the communicative relation, which is concomitant with the rule of law of the governmental ego as a person out of the *we* of action. The determining relation of power is hence unique that does not suppose at present instituted relations nevertheless reasonably concurs with their constitution. It does not suppose the configuration of *having in* or of insubstantiality however rather withdraws from the instrumental regulator in virtue of its insertion into the openness and unpredictability of the communicative relationship. For that reason, not any constituent of effectual causativeness endures a portion of it. It does not fit to the *telos*-mode algebra, nevertheless as a substitute could be comprehended, given the personal nature of the political relation, as an end in itself.

Instrumentalization or reification must then be analyzed as pathologies that are symptomatic of the deformation of the communicative relation and not as inherent physiognomies of an increase of power. Power and violence remain qualitatively dissimilar and in consequence not transformable into one another.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The exposition has delved into a myriad of themes related to the nexus between the State and sovereignty. These two concepts have contributed to incalculable extents in the construing of power relationships in the realm of political theory as well as legal philosophy. There could be other perspectives appertaining to the query of the *ousia* of both the State and sovereignty regarding the construing of power relations. Since the reference at this very juncture is on the substratum of these two contributory constitutional doctrines that of their linkage is correspondingly imperative. Through this milieu, the construal is twofold.

The notion of power is not as succinct as it sounds, consequently, the term power has innumerable deciphering; it has been utilized here to denote, *the will's aptitude to impose change on that which is*. In tandem with this comprehension, attention has been channeled to the power of the State as a brand of exemplified power. Further, the roots of power happen to be the constituent individuals who decide on the sort of regime that they are to be identified with or recognized. In this train of thought, it is a matter of potentiality and actuality, to imply that the foremost duty of the subjects is to come up with the idea(s) of the brand of rule they wish to be associated with acknowledged. Later on, they ought to pursue its actualization through the enactment of laws that shall eventually put in place the government of their expectation.

The instituting of a government is determined by the subjects and not the government defining itself, this sounds paradoxical. The people who possess power are before the government. Furthermore, power is expressed through both action and speech. The rationale for this is to maintain the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking. Faced with the reality of plurality it here turns out that power becomes relatable for generation and preservation of political gist. Power like the action is boundless; its only limitation is the existence of other people.

Relationality is intended to regulate both pluralities in addition to solidarity as appertaining to power variations, it is geared towards clarifying the sequels of relationality rooted conception of power in the sphere of political action. Power variations are manifested through possession versus affinity. The findings of this illumination moot for a proper conscientization of the citizenry as a sort of empowerment for there to be a unique category of correlation between the led and leader as contractual political actors. The erstwhile could buttress the political-legal mechanisms of societal power symmetry.

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