

## Emerging Moral Issues and their Influence on African Studies: An Interpretative Outlook

Richard Muema Muasya

*The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, Kenya*

**ABSTRACT:** The discourse on the incipient ethical themes is not novel in the context of African studies. The moral issues that this paper interests itself with are abortion, capital punishment, and euthanasia. The employment of the locution *emerging moral issues* is in the loose sense tintured with caveat as some of these societal quandaries are as antique as humanity itself. The underlying tenet of these three subjects' candidature threshold qualification for deeming is due to their vitiation of the core of human life. The comprehension at this juncture ought not to be that they are the exclusive ones. Whenever we are faced with this realism, the nagging enquiry endures being what the conceivable approaches through which the African studies could ameliorate the status quo are? The problematic facet is that there appears to be a privation of a viable approach by which these two sorts of cultures might fertily interact with a *telos* of nourishing each other instead of being in a melee of antagonism. In pursuing the conceivable mode out to this, the exposition utilizes the phenomenological method coupled with hermeneutic in the deciphering of the available literature. The upshot of this endeavour realized that the apt resolve to this competition of these two cultures which are alien to each other is through the doctrine of interculturality. The intercommunication of values, consequently, remains to be the most apposite remedy in the preservation of African culture(s) since the point of departure of any culture ought to be the pursuit of truth. It is this veracity that unifies humanity as the human intellect is predisposed to the verisimilitude whose sequel is human emancipation. Additionally, human beings derive the gist of their lives from values.

**KEYWORDS:** *African studies, moral issues, interculturality, African culture.*

### I. INTRODUCTION

The disquisition discourses some of the contemporary moral issues, which are contextually christened as *emerging moral issues* and their influence on the African Studies. The usage of the theme 'African Studies' merely connotes the quintessence of the African culture(s). It is germane to accentuate that the core of the discursivity is anchored on the African values. Values are such imperative as they are the very ingredients that delineate a culture. The heart of a culture are the values upon which cultures ride. Values are, consequently, the fountain of oxygen for any culture *ipso facto* while the latter is the oxygen of the society.

The African worldview is construed to be cyclical. On the other hand, the fascinating facet in this deliberation is the mode via which the emerging moral issues interact with the African culture *per se*, precisely averred, indigenous African culture. In the interrogation of the approach forward for these two utterly alien realities, this paper shall concern itself with only three embryonic moral issue, precisely, abortion, capital punishment, and euthanasia. These three extant emerging moral issues dare the doctrine of the sanctity and dignity of human life as well as the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, thus, attracting a noteworthy attention for this exposition. The tenet of interculturality will be mooted in this clarification as a feasible panacea for the subject matter of focus.

### II. ABORTION

#### 2.1 *The Moral Status of the Fetus*

The question of fetal personhood is pertinent to the rationale that persons have rights that we ought to respect. Is a fetus ever a person? If so, is there a distinct juncture when embryos or fetuses realize personhood or do they gradually attain this status based on developmental criteria? John Noonan contends that there is no distinction between biological humanhood as well as personhood (Boss, 1999, 116). We have moral value merely since we have a human genotype, no matter what our age or stage of development. Consequently, even the zygote is a person with moral standing. Mary Anne Warren, in contrast, holds that at no stage does the fetus meet the criteria of personhood. A blastosphere does not grow into a person until sometime subsequent tonatality when the newborn grow into a communally receptive affiliate of an anthropological public (Boss, 1999, 116).

### **2.2 The Right and Autonomy of the Mother**

Some people think that the emphasis in the abortion debate on the personhood of the fetus has been at the expense of concerns about the rights of the woman. Judith Jarvis Thompson shifts the debate from the moral status of the fetus to the rights of the mother (Thompson, 1971, 47-66). She agrees that trying to prove that the fetus is not a person is fraught with difficulties; therefore, she gives the fetus the benefit of the doubt. From here she contends that even though the fetus could have ethical gist, the claims of the child-bearer in furthestmost instances overshadow those of the embryo (Thompson, 1971, 50).

Mary Anne Warren likewise maintains that a woman's liberty rights or autonomy are paramount; women ought to have the right to make decisions appertaining to their own bodies. To deny women this fundamental right, as per Warren is to treat them as a means only. Opponents of abortion in rejoinder argue that autonomy is not an absolute right. Callahan contends that while women have a moral right to regulate their bodies, this right does not extend to abortion, for the underlying precept that abortion entails destroying the body of an unborn child (Callahan, 1970). The extent to which women have a right to control their own bodies is an issue not just in abortion. It similarly arises in the discourse over whether women have a responsibility to refrain from prenatal behaviours, such as drug along with alcohol use, which could harm fetuses (Callahan, 1984).

### **2.3 Justice**

As per Callahan, we need to move from focusing on the rights of women to a more inclusive ideal of justice (Callahan, 1970). Pitting women's rights against fetal rights, she argues prevented women from entirely developing since the rights of women, as well as children, are concomitant. The tenet of justice calls for all persons comprising the unborn children to be given equal considerations. So long as abortion is legal and freely available, unjust social structures that drive women to pursue abortions will not be transformed.

Advocates of abortion, nevertheless, point out that as long as we have a patriarchal society in which pregnant women and mothers' are socially and economically disadvantaged, abortion must endure as a legal recourse. To have it otherwise is to deny women full and equal participation in society. Since women need to have the option of abortion, justice is correspondingly an issue in access to abortion services. Restrictive abortion laws, lack of money to pay for an abortion, unavailability of a clinic in one's area and the presence of pro-life harassment outside of abortion clinics all contribute to a situation in which certain females especially poor womenfolk do not have the same access to abortion.

### **2.4 Consequentialist Arguments**

Those who favour a permissive public policy on abortion point to the harmful consequences to women along with the society in general of restrictive abortion policies. These comprise complications and deaths from self-induced as well as illegal abortions, overpopulation, the burden on women of mandatory motherhood and the burden on society when unwanted children are neglected or abandoned.

On the flip side, Judith Boss contends that permissive abortion policies could be contributing to a devaluation of children (Boss, 1999, 118). While not arguing for the outlawing of abortion, she points out that we need to take into consideration the viable harmful ramifications of abortion on children. Callahan similarly argues that permissive abortion policies rather than contributing to the liberation of women have held women back (Callahan, 1986, 232-238).

### **2.5 The Question of Rights**

In advancing the argument about rights, it is germane to deem the moral along with the legal rights. However, not all legal rights could be grounded in moral rights, the right to life could plausibly be so construed. The methodology is contentious. Some equalist theorists have been analytical of ethical evaluations founded on birthrights. Carol Gilligan (1982), Nell Noddings (1984) besides others have contended that the women folk have a propensity to adopt a dissimilar approach to morality, one that emphasizes care and responsibility in interpersonal relationships rather than abstract rules, principles or conflicts of rights.

Moral rights are complementary to feminist ethics of care and responsibility, not inconsistent or competitive with it. Whereas caring relationships can provide a moral ideal, respect for rights provides a moral floor, minimum protection for individuals which remains morally binding even where appropriate caring relationships are absent or have broken down. Moreover, social relationships are part of the foundation of moral rights.

Some feminist philosophers have suggested that the very concept of a moral right may be inconsistent with the social nature of persons. Nonetheless, is the concept of a moral right necessarily incompatible with the social nature of human beings? Rights are indeed individualistic in that they can be ascribed to individuals along with groups. However, respect for moral rights need not be based upon an excessively individualistic view of human nature. A more socially perspective account of moral rights is possible, provided that we reject two common suppositions appertaining the conjectural underpinnings of ethical claims. Mainstream philosophers widely accept these assumptions, nevertheless rarely stated and still more rarely defended.

The intrinsic properties assumption is the view that the only facts that can justify the ascription of fundamental moral rights or moral standing to individuals are facts about the intrinsic properties of those individuals. Philosophers who accept this view disagree about which of the intrinsic properties of individuals are relevant to the ascription of rights. They agree, nonetheless, that relational properties such as being loved or being part of a social community or biological ecosystem cannot be relevant.

The single criterion assumption is the outlook that there is some single property, the presence or absence of which divides the cosmos into those things which have moral rights or moral standing as well as those things which do not. Both the intrinsic properties along with single criterion assumptions preclude any adequate account of the social foundations of moral rights. The intrinsic properties assumption requires us to regard all personal or other relationships among individuals or groups as wholly irrelevant to basic moral rights. The single criterion assumption requires us to deny that there can be a variety of sound reasons for ascribing moral rights and a variety of things and beings to which some rights may appropriately be ascribed. Both assumptions are inimical to a feminist approach to moral theory and to approaches that are less anthropocentric as well as more environmentally adequate. The prevalence of these assumptions helps to explain why few mainstream philosophers believe that birth could in any mode alter the infant's moral rights.

### III. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Putatively acquiesced, the matter about the definition of punishment is both complicated along with being controversial. Guided by this caveat, a by and substantial characterization ought to suffice here for our intended purposes. As such, punishment refers to the intentional imposition of some pain, unpleasantness or deprivation for an offense committed by a culprit (Boss, 1999, 331). Having tendered a definition of punishment, it behooves us to define its other facet of which is the interest of this discursivity, that is, *capital punishment*. By capital punishment, it refers to the legally sanctioned killing of someone as punishment for crime.

Appertaining to the enquiry on the authority that permits us to punish, it is of extreme import illumined by the thoughts of Morris on whom the inkling of death penalty exposition is silhouetted to note that, once a man irrespective of the milieu of operation reduces himself by his delinquencies repugnant to the civic, he is chastised through the edicts in his properties. Moreover, individuals along with the conventional rubrics of fairness are concerning him deferred for a moment, it turns out to be equitable to mete out on him, for the value of the public what or else he could not agonize devoid of wrong or injury (Hume, 1977).

Albeit punishment violates the moral right of wrongdoers, it does adversely affect the interests of wrongdoers; it is not lucid that it assaults or violates their rights. More germane, to purport that punishment violates the rights of persons would suppose that one contends anti-punishment. Instead, it might be avowed that punishment justifiably infringes upon the rights of wrongdoers. Nonetheless, this seems implausible. Deterrence, retribution as well as education might be some of the *telos* of our punitive practices. What may be vocalized of the moral gradation of wrongdoers?

#### 3.1 Moral Justification of Punishment

According to Morris, wrongdoers do not possess moral rights that stand in the way of their being punished, thus, the punishment of wrongdoers will not be unjust (Boss, 1999, 331). Criminal punishment will usually be authorized as well as carried out by the state, though this need not be the case, to make it part of the proper characterization of the notion would be to beg the question against anarchists (Boss, 1999, 331).

Criminal penalties are often recommended or defended as effective deterrents or appropriate modes of retribution for certain offenses or at least of expressing the seriousness with which we view them. It is usually and quite naturally presumed that such penalties must consequentially be justified, that is, morally reasonable if they are to be inflicted. It is usually thought that a particular category of moral rationalization is called for in the standard cases of punishment, validation concerning justice.

It is conventional to deliberate on ethics as having multifarious fragments of intrinsic worth. It is provocative exactly how to comprehend these parts or even how to distinguish them. Nevertheless, it is widely thought that justice is diverse from the virtues of friendship, courage, moderation *inter alia*. Justice is usually distinguished from charity or benevolence; the former is understood regarding about what individuals are owed, to what they might claim in addition to what they have a right (Boss, 1999, 331).

Benevolence, by contrast, is a virtue that attaches itself directly to the well-being of others. It is epitomized by taking an interest in others' welfare independently of that to which they have a claim (Boss, 1999, 331-332). Benevolence and justice often do not conflict, however, they can. Attachment to someone's good can lead us to refuse to give them some harmful possession, for instance, a drug to which they have a claim (Boss, 1999, 332) or it may make us restrict another's liberty for his or her own good.

However, we opt to handle the apparent squabbles between justice and other virtues, it appears that there is a distinction between acting from a concern for another's well-being and from a concern for another's moral rights (Boss, 1999, 332). Infringements of liberty or intentional infliction of pain violate moral rights to be free and not to be harmed. Thus, it would normally be thought that punishment calls for a rationale regarding justice.

The State's involvement, it is usually thought will only buttress this requirement. The moral rights of criminals do not stand in the way of punishment if we may justifiably infringe or override them.

### 3.2 Justice by Convention

Justice is the moral virtue which is concerned with what is owed or due to individuals (Boss, 1999, 332). It is that to which individuals appeal when they claim that to which they have a moral right; it is noteworthy to accentuate here that the domain of rights does not exhaust that of justice. Justice consists of principles, rules, and norms that superlatively serve to advance the interests as well as aims of all in certain situations. The tradition is termed as *contractarian* as it often interprets the terms of justice to be the sequel of a hypothetical bargain or social contract. Contemporary representatives of this tradition could be thought of proffering a rational choice conception of morality after John Rawls' famous remark, 'The Theory of Justice is a part, perhaps the most noteworthy portion of the philosophy of judicious preferred' (Rawls, 1971, 16).

The account of justice offered by this tradition is designed to reply to two traditional enquiries: what does justice require? and why be just? The retort which members of this tradition give to the first question is determined by that which they give to the second. Justice requires of us only that which we have *raison d'etre* to accept. When then is it rational to be just? The principles of conduct that would emerge from the hypothetical bargain that rational choice ethicists use to determine the requirements of justice are those to which it is rational to agree. For such principles, if complied with, secures everyone's advantage (Boss, 1999, 332).

We have a rationale to be just since if we have reason to accept certain tenets of conduct, then, we have motives to comply with them, provided the conditions under which we acknowledged the principles remain unchanged. The practical reason is to be understood as enabling rational agents to commit themselves to plans or policies (Boss, 1999, 333).

One of the conditions, the circumstances of justice, giving rise to the need for justice is the feasibility of mutual benefit. Additionally, others are the capacity and willingness of rational beings to impose constraints on their behaviour. In the absence of such conditions, one has no reason to abide by the constraints of justice in one's conduct toward others. The afore is imperative for it effectively connotes that in the absence of mutual benefits or of the aptitude or willingness to be just, individuals are not constrained by justice in their behaviour toward one another (Boss, 1999, 333). Turning to the reply of contractarian theorists on 'why be just?' commits them to the preceding view, thus, we may term it, the *doctrine of the circumstance of justice*.

On the moral objects, a moral object is something that is an object of moral consideration. A direct moral object is something to which or to whom that consideration is paid or owed, an indirect moral object is something about or concerning which moral consideration is paid. The latter is a beneficiary of moral consideration (Boss, 1999, 333). To have moral standing is to be owed some moral consideration, that is, to be a direct moral object. In terms of this notions and distinctions, people typically are direct moral objects and have moral standing.

Amoral substance is something that has virtuous uses or might be expected to give moral considerations to direct moral objects. We usually comprehend adult humans to be moral subjects while non-human animals, as well as young infants, are so regarded, presumably agency would be indispensable to being a moral subject (Boss, 1999, 333). It is of relevance to point out at this juncture that having moral standing is a relation; something has moral standing in its relations to some other entity.

### 3.3 Wrongdoing and Loss of Moral Standing

Justice consists in part of a set of moral rights; the most essential of which we might suppose are those of life, liberty, and property (Boss, 1999, 334). To lose some of such right is to lose some of one's moral standing. When these rights are lost as is the case with the wrongdoers, the fact of the loss serves as a fecund ground for their punishment. The forfeiture account in tandem with the contractarian version of moral standing is employed to be the canon of determining the loss of some rights or rights when tackling the theme of wrongdoing and the unwillingness to respect the constraints of morality that might be manifested by such transgression (Boss, 1999, 334). Furthermore, this is either acting in violation of the constraints of morality or merely being unwilling to respect these constraints will suffice to cause a wrongdoer loss of certain rights. The normal rights of individuals are put at abeyance whenever they violate the constraints of justice.

The want or forfeiture of certain moral rights opens up the way for punishment. In inflicting pain or some deprivation on a wrongdoer, we commit no injustice against this individual for he or she has a privation of the relevant moral rights that would otherwise make such treatment unjust. Moreover, there are other reasons that we would for punishing: retribution, deterrence and moral education (Boss, 1999, 335).

### 3.4 Death Penalty

An application to the death penalty might illustrate the forfeiture account. A deliberation on capital punishment in the light of the forfeiture thesis may provide a poles apart comprehension of the issues than is customarily found in the extant worldview. Considering the cases of contract killers, war criminals, tyrants and specific

terrorists who are willing to abide by the constraints of justice in their conduct towards others; such people palpably are starved of moral standing on a contractarian account of justice (Boss, 1999, 337). They display by their conduct that they are unwilling to abide by the constraints of justice with most others. Punishment is justified if it is not unjust and if there are compelling reasons to exact it.

The moral justification for an act intentionally inflicting harm or some loss of liberty on another must be one that refers to justice. However, in the case of the contract killers, war criminals, despots and genuine terrorists, a reference to justice is obviated; for placing themselves outside the protection of justice, these individuals relieve others of justifying their conduct toward them by reference to justice (Boss, 1999, 337). Justice gives us our fundamental moral rights to life and liberty. Whenever we intentionally take another's life or interfere with their liberty, we must justify our actions concerning justice, given their rights to life along with liberty.

When we justly restrict someone's liberty, their right to be free is superseded which is to assert that a right is defensible. On the other hand, it is core to mention that the right to life is not defeasible. This notwithstanding, it should not be construed as if the moral rights to life and liberty of the contract killers, war criminals, martinets and genuine terrorists are overridden. The rationale for the execution of people who could be associated with the afore-highlighted groups is that they once obligated or on no occasion had such moral rights of life and liberty.

Inasmuch as Morris' thesis of contending for punishment and death penalty hinges on his stance on justice that informs his contractarian theory along with the forfeiture argument, it calls for further deciphering of whether justice takes precedence over human rights or otherwise (Boss, 1999, 330). Moreover, this ought not to sound as if someone is on an enterprise of disparaging justice along with its corollary benefits, the hub of the concern is, which defines the other? The enquiry on the matters appertaining to the one that serves as a playground for the other between moral rights such as human life and liberty and justice attracts corresponding attention as per the intended measure.

Human life is, by all means, a substratum for the other sorts of rights that are associated with human beings. Additionally, it is due to this outlook that one might be justified to assert that the sanctity of the human life is a non bargainable theme whatever the situation at hand. Even the state which might be interpreted as wearing diverse hats: partisan actor and guardian, should not purport to legislate on the subject matter of the death penalty.

Furthermore, certain rights such as the freedom of expression is an example of an inalienable right that should not be trammled upon by the state. If freedom of expression is restrained devoid of apposite regulation on the part of the state, this could be inferred to be placing human dignity on trial. However, it is of urgency to keep in mind that many human rights do not have a luxury of enjoying an absolute status, thus, if a given right is perceived to violate another person's right, a meaningful elucidation is inexorable.

The foregoing fetches the acceptance of the relativity of certain rights apart from the right to life. Buttressed by the standpoint of the right to and sanctity of human life, it may not be circumspective for Morris to seem to have a preponderance of denotation on justice at the expense of that which defines its operations. Could there be justice devoid of human life? What then shall be its purpose bearing in mind that beings attain sense that human beings come up with? Illumined by these surfaced issues, it becomes intricate for any democratic State to legalizethe death penalty.

Morris belabours the fact that punishment is justified in part since wrongdoers lose the ethical claims that would or else be an encumbrance to theirbeing maltreated in the mode that we do when we punish. Moral standing is to some nuance lostand moral rights are to some tinge forfeited by wrongdoers. The forfeiture account links in a certain way being a direct moral object with being a moral subject. Rational humans who are not willing to impose the constraints of justice on their conduct toward others are not themselves protected by these constraints.

## IV. EUTHANASIA

### 4.1 Moral Issues

The subsequent are some of the moral issues that arise in the euthanasia debate: the sanctity of life, autonomy and self-determination, nonmaleficence and the principle of Ahimsa, the principle of mercy, death with dignity, quality of life and pain along with suffering. Additionally, there is ordinary versus extraordinary treatment, the principle of double effect, the physician's role as a healer, patient competence, justice and the principle of equality, burdens to society, a duty to die and slippery slope argument (Boss, 1999, 249-254).

The word *euthanasia* is emanated from the Greek *eue* and *Thanatos* signifying, good death (Boss, 1999, 244). In the extant usage, euthanasia has come to connote painlessly conveying of the death of an individual who is being tormented by a life-threatening or incorrigible illness or disorder. Euthanasia could be categorized into active or passive, voluntary or involuntary:

*Voluntary euthanasia* is manifested when a competent, rational person requests or gives informed consent about a particular action or withholding of treatment that will lead to his or her death.

*Involuntary euthanasia* has to do with the bringing of people's deaths devoid of their consent, albeit the consent of relatives could be obtained.

*Active euthanasia* is the taking of direct action, such as a lethal injection, to kill a person; correspondingly known as a mercy killing.

*Passive euthanasia* refers to the permitting of patients to die by withholding life support or medical treatment that would prolong their lives.

The contemporary philosophical discourse on euthanasia has been influenced primarily by ancient Greek and Judeo-Christian viewpoints on death. Greek physicians regarded health as human ideal par excellence. For that rationale, human worth, as well as social usefulness, depended on one's state of health, chronically sick people were expendable. Their lives could be terminated with or shorn of their consent. Plato favoured euthanasia of deformed along with sickly infants since they would be a burden on the polis. (Boss, 1999, 245).

The discrepancy between dynamic and inert euthanasia is alleged to be decisive for curative ethics. The notion is that it is allowable, somewhat in some instances to withhold treatment as well as permit the patient to die, nonetheless, it is never permissible to take any direct action silhouetted to kill the patient. The doctrine gives an impression of being embraced by numerous doctors as it is validated in a declaration espoused by the *House of Delegates of the American Medical Association* on December, 4<sup>th</sup> 1973. For instance, the intentional termination of the life of one human being by another, that is, mercy killing is contrary to that which the medical profession stands and is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Association (Boss, 1999, 255).

The termination of the service of outlandish means to protract the life of the body when there is indisputable proof that biological death is looming is the verdict of the patient and or his direct relatives. The counsel as well as the judgement of the physician ought to be freely available to the patient and or his immediate family.

Nonetheless, a strong case could be made against this doctrine. It is not exactly apposite to assert that in unreceptive euthanasia the physician makes sure of naught, for he acts a solitary thing that is very pertinent, he lets the patient die. Letting someone die is undoubtedly dissimilar in some respects, from other sorts of action, mainly in that it is a category of action that one could perform by mode of not performing specific other actions. For instance, one might let a patient die by the manner of not giving medication, just as one could insult someone by way of not shaking his hand. On the other hand, for any purpose of moral evaluation, it is a brand of action nevertheless. The resolution to let a sick person pass on is contingent on ethical assessment in the similar approach that a resolution to exterminate her would be to subject to moral review, it could be assessed as wise or unwise, compassionate or sadistic, right or wrong. If a doctor deliberately lets a patient die who was suffering from a routinely curable illness, the doctor would unquestionably be liable if he had inessentially executed the ailing. Indictment alongside him would then be apposite. If so, it would be no justification at all for him to maintain that he did not do anything. He would have done something dire for he let his patient die.

Fixing the cause of death could be germane from a legal standpoint, for it might resolve if illicit allegations are levelled touching the medic. However, this conception could be utilized to depict a moral divergence between active and passive euthanasia. The *raison d'être* why it is deemed bad to be the cause of someone's death is that death is considered as a great evil and so it is. Nevertheless, if it has been decided that euthanasia even passive euthanasia is desirable in a given occasion, it has likewise been decided that in this scenario death is no greater an evil than the patient's continued existence. Additionally, if this is true, the usual rationale for not wanting to be the cause of someone's death merely does not apply.

Doctors must be concerned about the legal ramifications of what they do as well as active euthanasia is succinctly prohibited by the law (Boss, 1999, 259). However, even so, doctors ought to also be concerned with the fact that the law is coercing upon them a moral doctrine that could well be indefensible and has a considerable effect on their practices. Noticeably, most doctors are not now in the position of being compelled in this matter for they do not regard themselves as simply going along with what the law requires. Consequently, whereas doctors could have to discriminate between active and passive euthanasia to satiate the law, they ought not to proffer the distinction any added authority as well as weight by writing it into official statements of medical ethics (Boss, 1999, 259).

## V. INTERCULTURALITY

The prime enquiry must be what is culture? How does it stand in correlation with the contemporary emerging moral confrontations as well as in what mode could it be in contact with the surfacing forms which were pristinely alien to it? Firstly, we may note that it was current Europe which first originated a notion of culture in that culture seems as its specific domain distinct from or even in antagonism with a core component of culture, that is religion. In all known historical cultures, religion is the essential component of culture, certainly, it is its decisive central facet. It is a religion which defines the structure of values as well as thereby forms its inner logic.

Nonetheless, if this is the construing, inculturation of our African indigenous culture(s) in other emerging cultures seems all the more intricate task. For it is intractable to realize how a culture, living along with breathing the religion with which it is interwoven could be transplanted into another culture devoid of both of them going to ruin. If one removes from a culture its own religion which begets it, then one robs it of its heart. Ought someone implant in it a novel heart, the extant heart, it appears inexorable that the organism which is not ordered to it shall repudiate the foreign body. An affirmative sequel of the process is grim to envisage. The progression could only gather gist if avant-garde culture and other African indigenous culture(s), together with the culture which lives from it, do not stand in absolute divergence from each other. It only gathers a clout of gist if both of these cultures are interiorly open to one another. Inculturation, thus, presupposes the potential universality of each culture. It supposes that in all cultures the similar human nature is at work. It postulates that pursuing union is a universal veracity of the human condition abiding in cultures. Inculturation only then is sensible if no injustice is done to a culture when due to the universal human propensity toward the verisimilitude, it is opened up and further developed by a new-fangled cultural clout. The emblem of an extraordinary culture is its candidness, its aptitude to offer and receive, its influence to develop, to permit itself to be purified as well as become more conformed to the truth and man. Culture could, consequently, be defined as the historically advanced mutual procedure of mien of the insights as well as values which tincture the life of society (Ratzinger, 1993, 2). The term interculturality merely denotes the intercommunication of cultures. Culture has to do with knowledge as well as values. It is an endeavour to comprehend the universe along with human beings' existence in the cosmos, however, it is not an effort of a merely theoretical category. Nonetheless, it is systematic to the essential interests of man's subsistence. Construing ought to illustrate to us how to be human, how to human beings are to take their apt place in this universe as well as a riposte to it to realize himself in their pursuit for achievement and bliss. Man can succeed only with others, the enquiry of right knowledge is thus similarly a concern appertaining to the apt formation of the society. The society for its part is the precondition for individual contentment.

In cultures, we are tackling a comprehension which is the knowledge that gives rise to praxis, to be exact, we are handling knowledge which encompasses the indispensable dimension of values or morals. The individual transcends himself in culture and is carried along in a more significant social subject whose insights he could borrow, continue as well as develop further. Culture is continually bound to a social subject which, on the one hand, assumes the experiences of the individual while on the other facilitates silhouette them. The typical subject preserves and develops insights that exceed the aptitude of the individual, insights which could be christened pre-rational and super-rational. The crunch of a culture supervenes then when the culture is no longer capable of bringing this super-rational endowment into a convincing connection to novel, critical knowledge. In such an instance, congenital verity turns out to be questionable, what was one-time veracity turns into sheer custom and mislays its vivacity.

Society marches onward, thus, culture cooperates with the past. On its voyage viamoment, culture matures thruit'scoming across of novel reality as well as the arrival of newfangled insights. Tot sealed off, culture stands in the dynamic stream of time, which contains a confluence of currents moving toward unity. A culture's historicity as its capability to advance and depend on its capacity to be open as well as permit conversion via happenstance. The concern is about how cultures could meet and intermingle. A culture's attachment to a cultural individuality to a particular cultural expression is the underpinning for the array of cultures along with their respective physiognomies. Guided by culture's historicity, its movement in and through time embraces its openness. By necessity, culture encounters on its way and must come to terms with other cultures with their typically diverse experiences.

Thus, to the gradation to which it is open or closed, internally broad or narrow, a culture comes to deepen and refine its own insights and values. The foregoing could lead to a profound evolution of its earlier cultural configuration and such a transformation call for not to be in the least a question of alienation or violation. The potential universality explicates a successful transmogrification of all cultures made substantial in a given cultures integration of the supplementary as well as its specific interior transmogrification. Such a process could even lead to the resolution of the latent alienation of man from the truth and himself which a culture could harbour. The connotation at this juncture could be the healing pass over of a culture. Owing to the preceding rationale we should no more aver of inculturation however of the meeting of cultures or interculturality. The considerations so far have presented the phenomenological stances of how cultures operate and grow. The meeting of cultures is feasible since human beings, despite all the discrepancies in their history as well as social constructs, remains the same thing. The profundity of their existence touches the same human beings by veracity. The hidden fact could only elucidate the elementary openness of each person to the other that our souls have been touched by the truth which explicates the essential agreement which subsists even between cultures, which are alien to each other. There is none of us who construes the whole, to be utter, everybody needs each other. Human beings approach the unity and wholeness of their being only in the reciprocity of all great cultural achievements.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The paper has delved into the varied issues correlated to the emerging ethical topics and their influence on African studies. In engaging in this, the exposition could not humanly tackle the entirety of the emergent ethical matters owing to their enormity. The only ones that have been looked into here are: abortion, capital punishment, and euthanasia. The *raison d'être* for this is for the impact on the core of the human life. Nonetheless, it must not be couched to denote that these are the only ones who influence the heart of the human beings negatively. There are others, such as drug and substance abuse. Nonetheless, the illumination finds it pertinent to interest itself with these three for the intent that they have continued to silhouette the African-political-legal versus the Western-political-legal discourse terrain.

Abortion, death penalty and euthanasia are, thus, at this juncture deemed to be *avant-garde* tripartite human confrontations as they continue to engender fecund milieus for research in Africa from an African belvedere which possibly will vitiate the globe as what is African is human. Guided by the nagging query of the approach forward stemming from the nature of the interaction between the three ethical issues of concern and their influence on the African studies, the methodology utilized was phenomenology fused with hermeneutics. The corollary for this was the realization of interculturality as a possible resolution for the competing of these two cultures brewed by the influence of the current surfacing ethical subject on the indigenous African culture(s).

## REFERENCES

- [1] Boss, A. Judith. *Analyzing Moral Issues*. London: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1999.
- [2] Callahan, Daniel. *Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality*. New York: Macmillian, 1970.
- [3] Callahan, Sidney. "Abortion and the Sexual Agenda", *Commonweal*, Vol. 25 (April 1986):232-238.
- [4] *Value Choices in Abortion*. In *Abortion: Understanding Differences*. Sidney Callahan and Daniel Callahan, eds. New York and London: Plenum Press, 1984.
- [5] Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- [6] Hume, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. New York: Hackett Publishing Co., 1977.
- [7] Noddings, Nell. *Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1984.
- [8] Ratzinger, Joseph. *Christ, Faith and the Challenges of Cultures* (Hong Kong, 1993).
- [9] Rawls, John. *A Theory of Justice*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- [10] Thompson, Judith Jarvis. "A Defense of Abortion", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1971):47-66.