

Military and Civil Action in Combating Terrorism in the North East

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ABSTRACT: After a successful military operation in a combat area, lasting peace is achieved through complementary effort by civil actions. In the Northeastern area of Nigeria, military action has considerably degraded Boko Haram terrorist activities. The terrorists are drastically reduced. They have been flushed out of their enclaves including a greater part of Sambisa forest. Their arms and sources of funding have shrunk. Civil actions have now become expedient: to reorientate the remnants of terrorism, to return children back to school; to embark on reconstruction of roads, schools, homes, markets, electric supply create jobs and empower youths. This study is important due to its contribution to knowledge of the history of north eastern Nigeria.

I. INTRODUCTION

The main aim of many terrorist groups is to seek to replace the existing socio-political order with the one they consider more just. They adopted the most destructive tactics in realizing their objectives. Such destructive tactics include suicide bombings, assassinations, kidnapping, bank robberies, arming people and plundering of communities, and small towns, destruction of specific and soft targets like government buildings, national and international monuments and places of worship in addition to attacks on military and internal security agencies units, posts and stations. The ultimate aim of most terrorist groups is to replace the existing socio-political arrangement with the one they perceive to be more acceptable. The more they find it difficult to achieve their aim, the more they indulge in the employment of the most destructive tactics,¹ such as sudden attacks or guerrilla warfare, and using explosive devices and other tactics for mass destruction of people.

Some governments of the world have crushed terrorist groups ruthlessly. For example the government of President Shehu Shagari in 1980-1982 crushed the Maitatsine uprisings in Bulumkutu, Yola, Kano, Kaduna, Gombe and Bauchi. Loss of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein routed the guerrilla fighters in both the Southern and Northern Iraq.² It must be admitted that the war against terrorism is a difficult war to fight. It is a non-conventional warfare. It is also a non-symmetric warfare, for which the military and other internal security agencies do not have adequate training exposure and necessary weaponry that could be adapted in the prevailing circumstance for terrorist war. In Nigeria, the military and the security agencies had engaged the Boko Haram terrorist group in fierce counter terrorism through varied military responses between 2010 and 2015. But the terrorist group could not be crushed within the five years of incessant terrorist attacks which within the period, spread to other parts of the country. While acknowledging the successes recorded by the military and internal security agencies within the period, other short and long term approaches also need to be put in place as part of the counter terrorism strategies that could bring terrorism to its total eradication.

This paper is divided into three sections, apart from the introduction. Section One is on Boko Haram Group, identifying its ideology, tracing its evolution and growth and examining its mode of operation and tactics. Section Two discusses the government's counter terrorism responses. It chronicles the various operations such as the Nigerian Military Joint Task Force (JTF), Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and African Union's Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Section Three provides an array of additional counter terrorism which could be applied to suit the specific dynamics of Nigeria as a country and the northeast in particular. Two major points that this paper stresses are: One, that in addition to the efforts of the military and the internal security agencies, there are cultural, religious and societal sensitivities of the north of Nigeria and; two, that attention should be given to addressing essential needs of the people and restoring the structural functions of the state.

Boko Haram Group: It's Ideology, Evolution, Mode of Operation and Tactics.

Boko Haram is a popular nomenclature given to the group of an Islamic sect known as Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li Dawah wa li Jihad. The name of the sect refers to people committed to ways of the Prophet (Sunnah), the proselytization (Dawah) and Holy War (Jihad).³ The general public in Maiduguri refer to members of the sect as Boko Haram due to the sect's public condemnation of Western education as forbidden.⁴ With regard to the

ideology of the sect, Abu Musab Al Barnawi, the former spokesman of the movement⁵, identified the ideology of the sect thus;

We are warriors,... carrying out Jihad (religious war)... based on the traditions of the holy Prophet. We will never accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam... We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws in the holy Qu'ran... adulterated conventional education (Boko) cannot replace Islamic teachings...⁶

According to Moses Echon, Boko Haram draws deeply on Islamist theologies.⁷ These theologies are described as "an electric collage of belief cobbled together from controversial medieval Salafi sources, from Wahhabi doctrines, from expedient idiosyncrasies and from ideologies modeled by the Afghan Taliban."⁸ Broadly speaking, these theologies reflect the Wahhabi/Salafi school of thought from which Boko Haram from the days of erstwhile leader Mohammed Yusuf, has sought inspiration. Wahhabis seek the establishment of a pure Islamic State (Caliphate) a return to Tawhid (pure monotheism) and a return to the Sunnah (Prophetic way) in practicing Islam which they believe has become the dominant practice of most Muslims.⁹ In short, they preach a pristine version of Islam as practiced in the age of the Salafs (Rightly Guided Caliphs).¹⁰ Mark Amaliya and Michael Nwankpa viewed Boko Haram as a group fundamentally opposed to secular statehood and western political ideology and engaging in a Jihad-inspired perpetration of terror as its principal means to establish a Nigeria state rooted in Salafist proselytism.¹¹ According to Femi Owolabi, in the first seven years of its existence, Boko Haram's operations were "relatively" peaceful. They only criticized northern Muslims for participating in what the group considered to be an illegitimate, non-Islamic State¹².

Thus the period 2004 to 2009 was termed the proselytization i.e. Dawah phase¹³. Dawah, as fined by Emmanuel Sivan, connotes a combination of propaganda, education, medical and welfare action, and its practitioners¹⁴. This marked the period of the gradual change in the philosophy of the group. They began to the part of violent extremist group and were attracting people as members. In addition, the leadership of the group mapped out a kind of welfare programme for the comfort survival and health to the new members of the group.¹⁵ It was in a seminar way that Hamas and Hezbollah carried out extensive social service networks which local governments proved incapable of doing.¹⁶ Boko Haram's evangelism also took the form of a Muslim social movement such as catering for orphans, the widows and the vulnerable. Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the group, regularly fed his followers,¹⁷ provided start-up capital for them in form of cash, motorcycles wheel barrows and other means to members to enable them become self-employed. Several new-comers into the group were offered enticing and encouraging means of livelihood that had nothing to do with ideological indoctrination, initially¹⁸.

Mohammed Yusuf acquired enormous wealth and funds by ensuring that his members who are workers, paid levy or tites to the purse of the group. Also traders the wealthy sympathizers made regular donations to the group coffers. He encouraged young bachelors to marry with little bride price so as to restore the dignity and responsibility of the north eastern Nigerian youth who, due to low income, indulged in eating in the house of neighbors, friends, relative or superiors who have wives¹⁹. Widows and orphans who were members were taken care of. Also the almajirai (itinerant students) and yanciran (itinerant workers) were vulnerable for mobilization. In addition, a large number of unemployed youths also joined the group. Since the state could not care for them, they remained loyal to their beneficiary and to whom they transfer their allegiances.

But in 1995, the group was led by Abubakah Lawan and handed over leadership to Mustapha Modu Jon who was popularly known as Mohammed Yusuf. The transfer of leadership of the sect in 1999 coincided with a crucial time in the political history of Nigeria, when there was transfer of power from military rule to a democratic dispensation, with the guarantee of human rights. Mohammed Yusuf changed the leadership style and so positioned the sect on the path of radicalism, and extremism of a fundamentalist sect. The first indicator of change in leadership style was a change in the tone of preaching and teaching of the Qu'ran. He took to violent preaching, directing attacks on the Salafist and other Muslim sects that criticise his interpretations of the Qu'ran²⁰. By 2003 the sect began incessant attacks and strikes on the police, which was the closest security agency to the common people and which represented government's first attempt to repress the group's activities. It was also the only effective presence of the state in the slums and the remote Villages. The group attacked the mosques and Muslim scholars who criticized their moral authority.

The group initially had cordial relationship with some politicians who supported it,²¹ and financed it. Soon both sides fell out and the group assumed a campaign of civil disobedience against the laws of the state. The height of the disobedience was the refusal of the group to wear protective motorcycle helmets as stipulated by the Borno State government. The violators were arrested and put in detentions while some of their members were in a funeral procession.²² This led to altercation between the sect members and security forces. It resulted in the shooting of some of their members by men of operation flash, the Borno state security team charged with implementation of the helmet.²³

Mohammed Yusuf then on his Friday sermon in Maiduguri, called on his followers to "retaliate for the shooting of his men... to confront all security agencies and government."²⁴ Consequently between 11 June - 30 July 2009 there were clashes between the group and security forces in Bauchi, Kano and Maiduguri, especially at police stations and at Boko Haram's operational bases. The clashes led to the arrest and killing of Boko Haram members including Mohammed Yusuf.²⁵ With the quelling of the violent clashes, the group went underground, regrouped, restructured and resurfaced in 2010 with new tactics and bold efforts in ruthlessness. Their operations were suicide bombing, prison breaks and bank robberies. The new leader was Abubakar Shekau. He was the deputy to Mohammed Yusuf before Yusuf's death. The group acquired sophisticated combat techniques and technology. The group formed cells in many states in the north while its operations spread to many states especially in the Northeast, north central down to Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. The members engaged in suicide bombing of targets such as Police Stations, Army units, public buildings, open and crowded places for mass destruction. The group became fragmented, with the Ansaru group which rejected Boko Haram's tactics which involved killing of Muslims. This group focused on kidnappings especially foreign nationals in Nigeria and Cameroon. Again in April 2016, ISIS designated Ansaru leader, Abu Musab Al Barnawi as the new leader of Boko Haram.

II. STATE RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM.

The Joint Task Force (JTF)

The primary and constitutional responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force is to ensure internal security. But over the years, due to incessant threats to security in different parts of the country, the Nigeria Police Force has not proved itself equal to the challenges. There has been frequent communal clashes, ethno-religious conflicts, militancy, herders-farmers clashes, kidnapping, assassinations, political crises and lately terrorism. In addition, conflicts involve the use of high caliber weapons with strong fire power which often neutralizes the weapons of the Nigeria Police Force and often caught them napping. And so in every case of crisis, the police force was always over whelmed and over powered thereby necessitating drafting the military to the spot.

In the case of Boko Haram terrorist activities in the Northeast of Nigeria, it became necessary for the federal government to form a stronger force than the capability of the Police. Thus on 12th June 2011, a Joint Task Force was formed with its Headquarters in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital. The Joint Task Force was codenamed Operation Restore Order (ORO I), it comprised the Army, Navy and Air Force, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The total strength of the force was 4000 troops and its mandate was to restore peace and maintain order in the northeast.²⁷ The JTF, ORO I was initially commanded by Brig. General Jack Okechukwu Nwagbo between July 2011 and January 2012 while Major. General Ewanisha commanded the force between January 2012 and May 2013.²⁸ ORO III was formed between 13 December 2011 and 15 May 2013 with its headquarters in Yobe state. The force was made up of 2,000 soldiers. The task was to contain the advances of the sect.

But in spite of its numerical strength and composition the JTF could not match the fire power of the Boko Haram high caliber and sophisticated weapons. While the JTF had the Mark 4, AK 47 rifles the Boko Haram paraded their rocket-propelled grenades, general purpose machine guns and explosives. So, in spite of the efforts of JTF, the Boko Haram continued its attacks on police stations, public buildings and even on soft targets in rural communities and remote areas in Borno, Kano, Adamawa, Yobe and Plateau. With greater intensity of violent attacks on communities and towns, the Boko Haram group made territorial gains in Bama, Gwoza, Konduja, Madagali, Mubi, Michika, Kumshe and about ten other local government areas, in both Borno and Adamawa states. The deteriorating situation forced the government to declare a State of Emergency (SOE) in the three most affected states of the northeast i.e. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.

Consequently, a new Joint Task Force known as BOYONA which was made up of about 3,000 troops was constituted.²⁹ It was merged with the troops of ORO I and III. And so, on 19th August 2013 due to a new strategy the operational Command of Operation BOYONA was taken over by the newly established Army Division 7 with Operation Zaman Lafiya (peaceful coexistence) which had 10,000 troops.³⁰ Another step taken by the military was on 19th July 2015, when Acting Chief of Army staff, Major General Tukur Buratai reviewed the counter-terrorist operations and changed the name to Operation Lafiya Dole (peace by force). The new name signified the determination of the military to step up the war against terrorism and restore normalcy to the northeast as fast as possible. It was in the realization of this fact that the government gave a marching order for the base of military operations to move from Abuja to Maiduguri, on May 29th, 2015.³¹

III. CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF)

In spite of the incorporation of Civilian Joint Task Force and the change in the strategy of military operations introduced by the new government of President Buhari in May 2015, it was again realized that there was need to widen the intelligence gathering network, of the military for more useful and authentic information on the identity and location of the members of the Boko Haram. This became imperative more so that the

members lived among the generality of the people. The military recognized the formation and reorganization of the various vigilante groups in some parts of the northeast, so that they could complement the efforts of the military in places where military presence and efforts were inadequate.

Vigilante groups were formed in various towns and communities as response to security challenges³² such as criminality, social deviation and conflict. They are selected among the old and young inhabitants of an area and are armed with bows, arrows, swords, clubs, daggers and cutlasses. As indigenes or inhabitants of a particular area, they had good knowledge of the area and the people and could more easily identify criminals, miscreants and strange faces. Thus the vigilante groups in parts of the northeast were organized by the military and were named civilian joint task force³³. They identified suspected terrorists and had stopped many attacks through swift identification of strange faced and even arrested them. It was also confirmed that they provided information and intelligence reports to the military. Thereby they played important roles in pushing Boko Haram out of Maiduguri. By so doing they gave people a chance to reconnect with the government for protection instead of being exposed to Boko Haram members³⁴. The successes of the civilian joint task force (CJTF) in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi etc informed the need to establish similar CJTFs in Cameroon and Chad and are known as *comites de vigilance*³⁵.

By August 2013, the army's Joint Investigation team appreciated the level of contributions of the CJTF to the success of the efforts of military operations in the northeast.³⁶ but in spite of its contributions, not much was achieved. The social and economic activities of the major commercial towns were not yet restored. Also the operational environment of the civilian joint Task Force was still small and limited to their areas of inhabitation and origin. There was still a very large part of the area that was ungoverned and so unsecured but which was controlled by the Boko Haram group. In addition, there was a very large portion of the northeast that remained open to force movement.

Incidentally the three countries that were most effected by Boko Haram terrorism shared borders with Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The borders were very porous, poorly manned and mostly unmanned. It is important to also state that these three countries share linguistic, social and cultural affinities and similar historical experiences with towns and communities on the Nigerian side of the border. For instance, there were Kanuri speaking communities on both sides of the border in Nigeria as well as Niger republic. Similarly, there were Hausa communities both in Nigeria as well as Chad. Boko Haram took advantage of the closeness to launch attacks on Nigerian communities across the border. Similarly members of the Boko Haram launch massive recruitment drives among the border communities. Also a faction of the Boko Haram group, known as Ansaru, succeeded in kidnapping French expatriates in Cameroon in February 2013.

The Cameroonian government was forced to pay a ransom of \$3.14 million (dollars) before Moulin Fournier and his families of seven were released, in April 2013. It follows that border communities also served as hiding places as well as places of the raising of funds for the propagation and prosecution of the activities of the group³⁸. In addition were the close neighbours such as Libya and Algeria which shared border with Niger and Chad. Libya after the fall of Ghaddafi in 2011 became the abode of armed groups and the point of connection between Boko Haram group and several terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; the Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia; the Ansaru-Dine in Mali and the Islamic State (IS). With connection to these terrorist groups the activities of Boko Haram had taken to regional and international levels.

To this extent, the operations of the Joint Task force even though heightened, proved ineffectual as a response to international terrorism which Boko Haram outlook became. Other logistic problems which the JTF faced, were cases of soldiers absconding on AWOL i.e. absence without leave or leaving the military without permission, low morale.

Consequently, the Africa Union (AU) agreed to set up a Multinational Joint Task Force. The force was made up of troops from the affected countries namely, Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Although a similar Multinational Joint Task Force was set up in 1998, it was to combat transnational crime around the Lake Chad region³⁹. But the Joint Task Force was inactive before 2012. It was reactivated in 2012 primarily to deal with the Boko Haram terrorism in a combined effort of troops from the Niger Republic and Nigeria working together to counter the activities of Boko Haram at the border town of both countries.

The Multinational Joint Task Force has the following mandate : to create a secure environment along the borders, to restore state authority and facilitate humanitarian assistance in the affected areas, to conduct military operations; border patrols order to find abducted persons; to stop the flow of arms; to reintegrate insurgents into society and bring those responsible for crimes to justice⁴⁰.

Chad and Cameroon were particularly worried about the escalation of terrorist activities in the Lake Chad area because of their economies. Both countries needed to protect oil supply routes, to the port of Douala through pipelines from Chad and passing through Yola in Nigeria. The African Union authorized the deployment of 8,700 troops to the area, comprising military and non-military staff, for an initial period of 12 months. Nigeria and Chad provided most of the troops; 3,250 from Nigeria and 3000 men from Chad. Cameroon provided 950 men; Niger provided 750 while Benin republic provided 750⁴¹. These figures included infantry troops, artillery, gendarmes' and police squad including engineering logistics and civilian units. The

task force was commanded by a Nigerian general, Major General Iliya Abbah. He was appointed on July 31, 2015⁴². The Headquarters of the MNJTF was at N'Djamena, Chad.

Before Buhari came to power, the government of Jonathan was reluctant to cooperate with the MNJTF and the international dimension to the terrorism. Also Nigeria still tried to play the big brother role in West Africa. Therefore Nigeria confined the MNJTF's operation to the outskirts of Niger's refugee camp area and Cameroonian borders. This implies that only very small portion of Boko Haram controlled area, was secured by the MNJTF. The larger portion of the area was left unprotected. These areas were therefore at the mercy of Boko Haram. Each time Nigerian military intensified its push on the group, they descended heavily on the defenseless communities along the Nigeria border.

When Buhari came to power, he showed interest in the ability of MNJTF, at a time when the Nigerian military did not make much progress in their operations. But the combined operation of the MNJTF with the Nigerian military in March 2015 recorded considerable successes. Boko Haram terrorists were degraded in their attack and were dislodged from their hideout in Sambisa forest.⁴³ Even though the operation is still ongoing, but the combined action of the MNJTF and the Nigerian military became the deciding factor in the counter offensive. A considerable number of Boko Haram fighters have been killed while hundreds of them have been in police custody and still others have been jailed.

IV. CIVIL ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM.

There is no doubt that the strength of Boko Haram in terms of number of fighters and their arsenal has been drastically reduced. Also many of their strong holds in Sambisa forest have been destroyed. However there are still many more members who fled from attacks and there are sympathizers who never fought but who accepted the doctrine, ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram. This set of people are presently scattered all over the Northeastern state and some other states in Nigeria. Particularly significant among this group are the youths, the almajirai members or students of Abubakar Shekau and other leaders of the terrorist group.

Among the identified groups, military action can no longer be used against them because they are no longer armed neither do they engage in any form of criminality. They are potential threat to security in that they have been orientated; they have imbibed the doctrine ideology and philosophy of Boko Haram. Even though they are now engaged in other forms of activities, the philosophy and doctrine of terrorism may remain with them for some time. Therefore, it is only a civilian action that should be set in motion to reorientate this ruminant of the terrorists. The origin of Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah Li Da'wahma-l-jihad, was traced its origin to the almajirai of the Maitatsine group of the 1980s. Though they were in the age bracket of between 6 - 12 years, since they had been indoctrinated and had imbibed the philosophy of Maitatsine or Muhammadu Marwa, the founder; it was easy for them to continue to live by it for a long time especially since there was no dramatic change or transformation in their lives which affected their orientation. It was this process that gave birth to the Boko Haram group. This narrative linking Maitatsine to Boko Haram is reinforced by the meaning of the two Hausa words: Maitatsine and Boko Haram.

One of the big weapons that the civilians are using to fight the remnants of Boko Haram group, their doctrine and philosophy is in preaching and teaching. This strategy is not left with the Sheikhs Muslim leaders or Ulama alone, the Christian preachers, Pastor and leaders have also joined. In order to make this effective, there is synergy or coordination in the approach to this campaign by leaders of both religions. It is on record that some religious leaders have expressed condemnation of the activities of the terrorists. For example Ja'far Adam and the Sultan of Sokoto have publicly attacked the ideology of Muhammed Yusuf and have described Boko Haram members as common criminals. Similarly Dr. Muhammad Abdul Islam Ibrahim, in 2012 stated that terrorism rejects what Islam stands for, and it is the ignorant, jealous and malicious that go for militancy in Islam. They are rebels and they will go to hell⁴⁴. It is important to note that there are different factions and sects within Islam in Nigeria. This may affect the Ulama coming together and carrying out common action. In addition, the Muslim community in Nigeria has developed into the crowded religious splinter groups by which each group is struggling for followership and influence⁴⁵.

Christian religious leaders also came out strongly on the Boko Haram terrorists describing their actions as ungodly. They condemned the killing of defenseless people in remote communities, in places of worship and the abduction of innocent school girls, from their schools. Also reacting to the killing of Muslim worshipers in the mosque, President Muhammadu Buhari said that those who kill fellow Muslims in the name of religion are not religious and we do not know what they do. But condemnation in whatever spoken and strong terms and however frequently the reactions are, they have little or no effect on these few Boko Haram followers. The all round condemnation would have no effect on them, their future activities and determination to revive terrorism, in fact all the condemnations on them over the years never stopped them from further attacks.

Therefore the action is stronger than mere words and it, is more effective. To this effect action by religious leaders should be more comprehensive and all encompassing. It should start with religious philosophy and doctrine of unity in a multi religious country and the freedom of worship. Also the religious leaders should uphold moderation as against extremism, in religious practice. Preaching by all religions as a process of

religious orientation should be community-based with emphasis on inter relationship irrespective of religions, creed or culture. Indeed preaching should give the attention to inter-faith and inter-doctrinal messages which should also be passed on to the populace especially the youth through social media channels.

The media, both electronic and print media have important roles in the de radicalization and re orientation of all religious adherents. There should be regular Jingles to emphasize moderation and eliminate extremism and fanaticism in religious preaching and practices. Elaborate programmes on religious tolerance and the unity of Nigeria should be preached regularly. Outstanding and outspoken religious leaders should be invited to feature in these programmes. Apart from the media, religious leaders should be encouraged to conduct open air preaching which places emphasis on unity, religious tolerance, inter faith and inter doctrinal messages, moderation and freedom of worship.

Community leaders and traditional rulers must be part of this crusade. They must lend their voices to the efforts of the religious leaders by educating their subjects on the need for coexistence, unity among all men and women irrespective of religious and ethnic divide. Community leaders and traditional rulers have greater responsibilities than this. They are the security officers of their communities. They have the ways and means of keeping watch over their subjects. When youth begin to misbehave, the community leader must know through his junior chiefs, the elders and the land lord. Also when a stranger arrives into his domain, he is made aware by the junior chiefs, elders or by the landlord of the home the stranger settles in. when a man begins to misbehave by breaking regulations, constituting himself into a law breaker, a miscreant, or a criminal, his misbehavior is brought to the attention of the community head. Similarly when a violent religious preacher comes to town, local security men in the community must alert the state security agencies. In a nutshell the community head or traditional ruler must be close to his subjects in formal and informal meetings. In this may he makes his views known to them, he passes to them instructions from the government and he, as the father notes their views on common or general matters.

This brings out the issue of youths on the streets. There are children in their tender ages of between 6 years and 12 years who are not in school but roam about the streets, a large portion of them were in school. A large number of them form the almajirai and so devote their lives to the care of the malam or religious preacher and teacher. A lot of them are thrown into the streets where they are engage in begging for alms. But the extremist, fanatical and criminally minded religious leaders like MuhammaduMarwa El Zakzaky, Muhammed Yusuf and AbubakarShekau have turned the noble institution of almajirai (itinerant students) into criminal gang or armed youths. Apart from the almajirai there are other youths who, for reasons of poverty or loss of both parents have taken to the streets engaging in menear jobs (yancirani or itinerant workers) or serving as house boys have become vulnerable to all forms of criminality. By the year 2015, over 85% of the youth population who were supposed to be in school were out of school. The percentage was about 74% by 2012 and 40% of 72% of the children never went to school⁴⁶ which the remaining 32% were out of school due to mounting activities of Boko Haram terrorist in the northeast.

Consequently the civilian action must be geared towards moving these groups of youth out of the streets, so as to engage in education, the large population of out-of-school children. Focus must be on the propagation of education with the massive construction of schools in all towns and communities in the northeast. Primary and secondary schools serve as the spring boards upon which children must bounce to higher education and attain skills in their chosen disciplines. Reconstruction of schools are going on in towns and communities where schools were destroyed. Also new schools are being constructed. A notable Girls Schools was built by the government of Borno State to accommodate about 1200 girls who lost their parents to Boko Haram terrorists. The development of education also includes training of teachers through the colleges of education and university education. This training must be on regular basis, and for teachers in government schools, it must be a compulsory training at various levels which determines promotion of teachers. It is also important to review the curriculum of schools especially in the area of civic education or social studies. Issues like freedom of worship, doctrine of unity in diversity of culture; inter faith and inter doctrine messages in Nigeria should be taught. The time has come that education should become free and compulsory to all children at the local government, area state and federal levels. The three levels of government must implement the need for free and compulsory education. This will force parents of the poor to release their children for education in schools. But the campaign for free and compulsory education in all parts of Nigeria to be successful, government at all levels should invest heavily in construction of schools massive employment of teachers and the provision for training and retraining of teachers.

Another important civilian action against terrorism is a comprehensive programme to eradicate poverty not only from its northeast but also from the whole country. As a comprehensive programme, it involves the government of the country and the private sector. The indicators of poverty in Nigeria include acute food shortage, population explosion, low level food production, low per capital income, low technology development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic unemployment.⁴⁶ Since agriculture is the biggest employer of labour, the three levels of government must still invest more on agriculture which include farming, cattle rearing, livestock keeping and fishing. In addition, government should encourage agro chemical

production, the training of veterinary workers and production of agro technological equipment. The government should encourage investment and collaboration with foreign companies on agriculture. The provision of more food at cheaper prices, is a giant step in eradicating poverty. Also with more elaborate programmes which promote agriculture, more people will be attracted to engage in one form of agriculture or another. In this way, more job seekers will be self-employed in agriculture all over the country. Genuine efforts are directed in improving agriculture. For instance, several states in the country, as well as the Federal government are carrying out extensive programmes which are yielding positive results in farming, fishing and in agro allied industries. Today the Federal government has banned the importation of rice because Nigeria is self-sufficient in rice production. Also Nigeria is exporting cassava, millet and ginger due to self-sufficiency.

Added to this, is the need for more elaborate programme of establishing vocational education and institutions nationwide. The vocational education should incorporate large area of training, with comprehensive curricular. The vocational training institutions should be as large as universities, offering various courses and offering admission to large number of students but the programmes should be short duration and at token fees. The trainees should have access to loans and other forms of assistance to enable them establish small and middle scale enterprises that will enable them engage in production and services. Vocational education will engage a large group of school dropout, the uneducated adults and a large number of house wives.

Government should also strive to create more jobs and improved the per capital income of Nigerians by encouraging investors in Nigeria wide range untapped natural resources which abound in all parts of the country. This will improve the Nation's technological development, public utilities and employment. It will also improve the skills of labour.

Consequently civilian action will go a long way in complementing the ongoing military action against terrorism. In fact it is a safe guard against future emergence of any other terrorist group or threaten the corporate existence of this country.

V. CONCLUSION

Terrorism in Nigeria as is all over the world can only be crushed and degraded when military operation. However even when the last terrorist with arms and in the terrorist enclave has been killed. That may not put a permanent end to terrorism. The ideology and philosophy of that terrorist group will still linger on, in the minds of those terrorists who were arrested; charged to court and Jailed and also in the minds of those who escaped while the military was on and who finally settled down to a new life. With time some of them, due to the transformation of their condition in life for the better way totally turn a new life, there will be others who circumstances in life remain the same, who still remain poor, no Job, no improved well-being are likely to go back to crimes, fanaticism and extremism. It is from such individuals that there can emerge another group of terrorists with another name and in another form. But with the involvement of the state, the people and the leaders, using carefully designed programmes, to re orientate the individual and also improve his well-being. Terrorism can be a large extent, be eliminated and completely eradicated not only from the northeast of Nigeria but from the entire country.

NOTES

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