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## EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH IN A MULTI-POLAR WORLD (1971): ROLE OF USA AS A SUPER-POWER

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### ABSTRACT

One of the great interests of writing and research of Bangladeshi intellectual is the great War of Liberation, 1971. Though after decades of independence, most of the time reliable writings about Liberation War of Bangladesh has perverted. It is high time to highlight various events of liberation war on the basis of factual information. This study aimed to be find out these kinds of information.

It was the time of cold war, the very beginning of Bengali's (citizen of Bangladesh) liberation struggle, multi-polar forces of political equation played influential role in the Indian-subcontinent (1970s). But the study emphasizes on one of the most important super power, USA played a more complex and somewhat negative role in the 1971 war; anti-Bangladesh (former East Pakistan). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the US society's response was one of positive support contradicting the state's negative role. They has interest in settlement of Pakistan for their own interest. It is cleared by the diplomatic activities of USA in the early part of the liberation war of Bangladesh. Moreover, the National Security Council (NSC) of America declassified some very interesting documents relating to the Liberation War of Bangladesh.

They clearly show America's policy during the war of Bangladesh in 1971. These documents offer many useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made important decisions during the war of 1971. They show in detail how U.S policy, directed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, followed a course that became infamously known as "The Tilt" and sending the 'US Seventh Fleet' towards the Bay-of-Bengal.

This paper has been prepared by using secondary sources considering books, reports, articles, research papers, websites, national documents etc. The study is identified the role and policy of USA (United States of America) as a super power at that multi-polar situation during the liberation war of Bangladesh. To the end if the study, it puts forward an analyzed conclusion.

**Key Words:** Multi-polar, Superpower, Bangladesh, Liberation War, Emergence, USA, Tilt, Pakistan, USSR, China, India, Role.

### I. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Multi-polar system is a system in which power is distributed among significant poles concentrating wealth and/or military capabilities and able to block or disrupt major political arrangements threatening their major interests. USA emerged as a super power in the transformation of political fields of late sixties and early seventies.

The situation of the liberation war of Bangladesh and the complexity that led to it was a perplexing surprise for the United States. This complexity was completely unpredictable and unwanted for America in the early seventies and under the circumstances. Moreover, the bitter experience of Vietnam War referred new ideas about foreign policy and Asia policy in particular begin. But the Liberation War of Bangladesh gave birth to a completely different situation. The role of the United States in the liberation war of Bangladesh was very disappointing and suspicious, in the broadest sense contrary to the interests of Bengali.

#### **Purpose of Study**

The purpose of the study is to analysis the intervention of USA (United States of America) in the liberation war of Bangladesh and their policy as a super power at that situation of multi-polar world.

#### **Objectives of the Study**

This study have some specific objectives which help to find out the accepted result(s). The specific objectives of the study are as follow :

- To determine the multi-polar world situation
- To analyze the role of USA during the liberation war of Bangladesh
- To explore the documents of USA administration and intellectuals

### Hypothesis

Most probably, the involvement of USA in liberation war is influenced by the conflicts of interest, not only for cold war but also for state's interests.

### Study Area

The data of this work is collected from literary fields by primary analyzing or investigation.

### Limitations

Several limitations are considered. Most significant two are\_\_

Firstly, limitations of required or authentic documents because of relying on secondary sources of data; Secondly, the biggest limitations are time and cost.

### Significance of Research

- Upholding the history of Liberation War of Bangladesh.
- Drawing out the roles and contributions of the super powers; USA.
- Knowing about the revolving policies which considered by USA to deal with the Pakistan crisis.

## II. CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### Research Design(Research Questions)

To analyze the role of USA, there should be the answers of some questions like\_\_ What was the view of world politics at that time? What was the role of USA, why and how? What were the influencing elements?, etc.

### Instrumentation

Data collection instruments are secondary data from topic related sources like books, articles, journal's publications, bio-graphy, newspapers as well as other authentic writings and documents.

### Data Collection and Analysis Procedure

As the work was documents and related literature based, data collection procedure is analysing the secondary data and it is a 'Historical Research ' in qualitative perspective. The study aims to investigating the requirements of the given objectives, specially the role of USA(administrative).

## III. CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### Literature Review :

The War of Liberation '71 was framed in ninth months sacrifices though it had 23 years' history of exploitation. The rise of Bengali sub-nationalism within Pakistan had its origin in a number of factors\_\_political, economic, cultural, ethical, sociological etc.<sup>1</sup>The affairs that influence to create an independent geographical status, was deefed-up when the defeated rival Zufigar Ali Bhutto and military occupied ruler were overruled the result of the elections held in previous December. The authorities unwilling to accept the radical redistribution of regional power inherent in the result and to consign power to Bengali regionalist Sheikh Mujibur Rheman as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

On March 25, 1971, Operation Blitz\_\_later re-named as Operation Searchlight, West Pakistani forces commanded by General Yahya and the Martial Law Administrator, Lt. General Tikka Khan began a self-destructive course of repressive actions against their fellow Pakistanis in the East. The Martial Law Administrators did not discriminate, targeting anyone from Awami Leaguers to students in the name of self-containment.\*\*note2) Between March to December 1971, Pakistani army and their local auxiliary forces killed not less than three millions civilians in East Pakistan. AS, the crisis presists, the superpowers became involved. Sanjoy Banarjee, an author cited that one can identify three layer of conflict of this crisis. The deepest layer was in **Pakistani domestic politics**, putting the marginalized majority\_\_the Bengalis and the Awami League party for which they had voted massively\_\_against the West Pakistan dominated state. The next layer was in the **South Asian subsystem** putting Pakistan against India. So Pakistan's loss in 1971 was as much ideological as strategic.

<sup>1</sup> G W Choudhury, "Bangladesh : Why it Happened" *International Affairs* (London), vol.48, no.2, April 1972, p.242

Here the two-nation theory is functioning the system which proclaimed that differences and similarities among people at the religious level transcended differences and similarities at the linguistic and ethnic level. The third layer of conflict was in the **global system**. Global polarities became aligned with the local polarities where in the matter of Bengali separation, India & Soviet Union opposed the Pakistan State (mostly the former West Pakistan), the United States & China. The explanation of the American tilt advanced here draws links among all the three layers.<sup>2</sup>

Phase of quiet non-involvement began on March 25 and lasted roughly until July 8, 1971. During this phase, the US posture was "neutral" and it described the problem in East Bengal as Pakistan's "internal matter." The second phase started with the secret trip by President Nixon's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to China during July 9-10, 1971. This marked the real beginnings of the Sino-US detente. During this phase, which lasted until September, the US pursued diplomacy of restraint, counselling India to desist from armed conflict with Pakistan and privately pressing Pakistan to thrash out a "political settlement" of the East Pakistan issue. During the third phase, lasting from September until December 3, when the Indo-Pakistan war over Bangladesh broke out, the US attempted to promote a constructive political dialogue between the Pakistani military government and the Bengali nationalist leaders in India, but in vain. The fourth phase covered the period of the Indo-Pak war. During the 14-day sub-continental war, the US backed Pakistan and blamed India for the escalation of hostilities, and tried through the UN and other means to bring about a ceasefire and "save West Pakistan" from possible Indian attempts to destroy it militarily. President Nixon ordered a task force of eight naval ships, led by the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, to sail into the Bay of Bengal in a "show of force." In response, On December 13, Russia dispatched a nuclear-armed flotilla, the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) from Vladivostok. Russia deployed two task groups; in total two cruisers, two destroyers, six submarines, and support vessels. A group of Il-38 ASW aircraft from Aden air base in Yemen provided support.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Zahed (2013) introducing the initiatives of USA administration and cited from Kissinger's 'White House Years' (1979) that Henry Alfred Kissinger played a vital role in US foreign policy of Nixon governments. As a part of his job he played as a main character to make policy in Liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971.<sup>4</sup> Kissinger presented few proposals to Nixon as a solution of East Pakistan crisis. Proposal Number one- support Pakistan completely including military action in East Pakistan taken by Yahya government. Proposal Number two- postponed all economic and military aid to Pakistan. Proposal Number three- to send the aid for East Pakistan and India for victims and refugees. Nixon took part in favour of West Pakistan and send humanitarian aids to East Pakistan and India as well.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the Nixon administration ignored the reports it received of the genocidal activities of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan, most notably in the infamous 'Blood telegram'. This had been sent by US diplomat, Archer Blood, on 6 April 1971 and had highlighted atrocities during the liberation war.<sup>6</sup> Evidently, neither of the feuding groups in the power circle of the United States was inspired to take side primarily for the cause of the suffering humanity on the soil of Bangladesh. It was rather American strategic interest in South Asia that motivated both the groups to take side: one group believed that a victorious India would serve the US interest better while the other group thought a stronger Pakistan would be more beneficial for the US interest in the region.<sup>7</sup>

## COLLECTED DATA: DOCUMENTS

### Document 1

The report is on the Selective Genocide which occurred to control the masses movement of East Pakistan. Consul General Archer Blood reports of "a reign of terror by the Pak Military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicated

<sup>2</sup>Banerjee.S., "Explaining the American "Tilt" in the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis: A Late Dependency Approach." International Studies Quarterly. 31(2), 201-216, 1987

<sup>3</sup>Mostofa.A., "Politics and the press during 1971", Dhaka Tribune, Published at 11:11 pm March 26th, 2017

<sup>4</sup>Zahed, I.U., "An Analysis of US Policy in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, 1971". IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science. XII(2), 123-128. May 2013

<sup>5</sup>Kissinger, H., "White House Years", Boston, pp. 848-49, 1979

<sup>6</sup>Socialism Today, "The Birth of Bangladesh," 2012 <http://www.socialismtoday.org/154/bangladesh.html>

<sup>7</sup>Kabir., N. "Liberation War of Bangladesh: Actions, reactions and inactions of foreign powers" – XVII

| Published: 00:05, Jul 26, 2018 | Updated: 15:16, Aug 13, 2018 <http://www.newagebd.net/article/46896/liberation-war-of-bangladesh-actions-reactions-and-inactions-of-foreign-powers-xvii>

\*\*\* Documents (1-45): "National Security Archives". January 19, 1971. Accessed April 24, 2011. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/>

that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial Law Administrators.(as cited in.....) <sup>8</sup>

#### Document 2

NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. More significantly, this memorandum acknowledges both American recognition of the "reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan, and the need to address the new policy issues that have been created as a result of the terror. These situations would raise some questions and new policy issues for USA. Here seeks approval for initial relationship between USA-Pakistan.<sup>9</sup>

#### Document 3

Ambassador Keating expresses his concern at repression unleashed by the Martial Law Administrators with the use of American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality. Washington however, never publicly spoke out against West Pakistan.<sup>10</sup>

#### Document 4

Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed at Dacca University in Iqbal Hall and the Rokaya Girls' Hall. The observer indicates that students had been "shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLA set a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."<sup>11</sup>

#### Document 5

This document describes the estimated number of casualties that had occurred and were continuing to occur as a result of military crackdown. Blood reports that an estimated 4-6,000 people have "lost their lives as a result of military action" since martial law began on March 25. He also indicates that the West Pakistani objective "to hit hard and terrorize the population" has been fairly successful.<sup>12</sup>

#### Document 6

Blood indicates that Martial Law Administrators are now focusing on predominantly Hindu areas. "Congen officer heard steady firing of approximately 1 shot per ten seconds for 30 minutes." Cable also reports that naked female bodies found "with bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans," after apparently being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans.<sup>13</sup>

#### Document 7

During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly asks that "due allowance be made for behavior of Pak officials and others during what had amounted to civil war for a few days," because the "army had to kill people in order to keep country together." Expressing concern over the situation and bloodshed as well as use of U.S. arms in repression, Sisco observed that the US is "keenly sensitive to problems and feelings on developments [in East Pakistan]."<sup>14</sup>

#### Document 8

In one of the first "Dissent Cables," Blood transmits a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. The transmission suggests that the United States is "bending over backwards to placate the West Pak

<sup>8</sup>Document 1: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 28, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp. Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB1.pdf>

<sup>9</sup>Document 2: Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan, March 28, 1971, Secret, 2 pp. Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East, Box 625, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB2.pdf>

<sup>10</sup>Document 3: U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide, March 29, 1971, Confidential, 1 pp. Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB3.pdf>

<sup>11</sup>Document 4: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University, March 30, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB4.pdf>

<sup>12</sup>Document 5: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Extent of Casualties in Dacca, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp. Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB5.pdf>

<sup>13</sup>Document 6: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp. Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73, Pol and Def, Box 2530, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB6.pdf>

<sup>14</sup>Document 7: U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on East Pakistan; April 6, 1971, Confidential, 8 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB7.pdf>

[sic] dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them." The cable goes on to question U.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."<sup>15</sup>

#### Document 9

Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel the third is the best as it, as Kissinger writes, "would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last page Nixon writes, "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."<sup>16</sup>

#### Document 10

U.S. and Pakistani officials discuss the potential for a political solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friend in need." He also offers American assistance so as to not compound "the anguish" that Pakistan "is already suffering," as a result of the repression in East Pakistan.<sup>17</sup>

#### Document 11

Nixon and Pakistani officials discuss a potential political solution in East Pakistan. Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan by indicating that "Yahya is a good friend," and seemingly in response to the genocide like repression in the East, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him."<sup>18</sup>

#### Document 12

As early as May 1971 the State Department became aware that a war was possible between India and Pakistan. This memorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war: (1) continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerrillas (the MuktiBahini).<sup>19</sup>

#### Document 13

Kissinger, Keating, and Saunders discuss the situation in Pakistan and American military assistance. Kissinger indicates that Nixon wants to give Yahya a few months to fix the situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger points out that "the President has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life."<sup>20</sup>

#### Document 14

Relaying his impressions of his visit to India, Kissinger describes the strong feelings about the heavy burden placed upon India by the refugees from East Pakistan. In his meetings with Indian officials, Kissinger discussed

<sup>15</sup>Document 8: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes Signatures from the Department of State. Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB8.pdf>

<sup>16</sup>Document 9: Memorandum for the President, Policy Options Toward Pakistan, April 28, 1971, Secret, 6 pp. Includes Nixon's handwritten Nixon note Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 625 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB9.pdf>

<sup>17</sup>Document 10: Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, Henry Kissinger and Harold H. Saunders May 10, 1971, (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB10.pdf>

<sup>18</sup>Document 11: Memcon The President, M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H. Saunders, May 10, 1971, (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB11.pdf>

<sup>19</sup>Document 12: Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971, Secret, 4 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB12.pdf>

<sup>20</sup>Document 13: Memcon Kenneth Keating, Henry Kissinger, and Harold Saunders June 3, 1971, (4:00 P.M.). Attached to Cover Sheet Dated June 21, 1971, Secret /NODIS, 6 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files Country Files: Middle East, Box 596. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB13.pdf>

the East Pakistan situation, military assistance to Pakistan, and China. He assures the Indians that the U.S. "would take the gravest view of any unprovoked aggression against India."<sup>21</sup>

#### Document 15

Just days before Kissinger's secret trip to China, Indian and U.S. officials discuss numerous issues, including the Soviet Union, the situation in East Pakistan, arms transfers to Pakistan, and China. During the conversation, Kissinger assures the Indians that "under any conceivable circumstance the U.S. would back India against any Chinese pressures." He also states that "In any dialogue with China, we would of course not encourage her against India."<sup>22</sup>

#### Document 16

Indian Ambassador to the United States L.K. Jha and Acting Secretary John Irwin discuss the East Pakistan situation, a possible political solution, American military assistance to Pakistan, and the role of the UN in refugee camps.<sup>23</sup>

#### Document 17

Saunders discusses U.S. Aid to South Asia, specifically noting the connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes, "But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship to Pakistan."<sup>24</sup>

#### Document 18

Nixon expresses his concern over the South Asian conflict to Ambassador Farland, "not only for its intrinsic tragedy and danger, but also because it could disrupt our steady course in our policy toward China."<sup>25</sup>

#### Document 19

The NSC staff discusses Congressional reaction to the conflict in East Pakistan and American military assistance. The Administration has chosen quiet diplomacy as means to motivate Yahya to avert famine and create conditions in which the refugees may return from India. "We have not openly condemned Yahya. He appreciates this."<sup>26</sup>

#### Document 20

Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time when West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East Pakistan, Nixon told Yahya that "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt."<sup>27</sup>

#### Document 21

The NSC Senior Review Group discusses the situation in East Pakistan and increasing tensions between India and Pakistan. The President indicates that "the big story is Pakistan," and he expresses his concern from the standpoint of human suffering. While Nixon suggests that some Indian and Pakistani interest might be served by war, it is not in American interests as "the new China relationship would be imperiled, probably beyond repair." While stating that the Indians are more "devious" than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the U.S. "must not-cannot-allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixon states that "We will not measure

<sup>21</sup> Document 14: Memorandum for RADM Daniel J. Murphy, Dr. Kissinger's Reports of Conversations in New Delhi, July 7, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 4 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Haig Chron, Box 983.<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB14.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Document 15: Memcon, Dr. Sarabhai, Dr. Haksar, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Winston Lord, July 7, 1971, (1:10 - 2:50 p.m.), Secret/Sensitive, 4pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Pres/HAK Memcons, Box 1025 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB15.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> Document 16: Department of State, Cable, Indo-Pakistan Situation, July 15, 1971, Secret, 7 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB16.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> Document 17: Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking, July 19, 1971, Secret, 2 pp. Includes handwritten Kissinger note on bottom of second page. Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 574. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB17.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Document 18: Memorandum for the Presidents File, President's Meeting with Ambassador Joseph Farland, July 28, 1971, Secret, 5 pp. Attached to Cover Memoranda Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 626. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB18.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> Document 19: NSC Paper, South Asia: Cutting of Military and Economic Assistance, July 30, 1971, Secret, 5 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB19.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> Document 20: Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya, August 7, 1971, 4 pp. Attached to cover page. Source: RG 59 PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB20.pdf>

our relationship with the government in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan. By that criterion, we would cut off relations with every Communist government in the world because of the slaughter that has taken place in the Communist countries."<sup>28</sup>

#### Document 22

Indira Gandhi, in a letter to President Nixon, notes that the refugee flow has not slowed, and has reached approximately seven million. She questions U.S. efforts to work towards a political solution in East Pakistan as well as American arms transfers to Pakistan.<sup>29</sup>

#### Document 23

Kissinger in a memorandum to Nixon describes his talks with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. Kissinger explains to the Chinese that the U.S. is prevented from giving any military assistance to Pakistan because of Congress, but supports Chinese assistance by stating that the U.S. would "understand it if other friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment they need." He also declares that the U.S. "will do nothing to embarrass the government of Pakistan by any public statements."<sup>30</sup>

#### Document 24

Kissinger discusses the developments in South Asia including Yahya's stand to not grant independence in the East, the serious insurgency movement underway in East Pakistan, and the continued flow of refugees into India. He suggests that American strategy give Yahya a face-saving way of taking the political steps necessary to re-establish normal conditions. While Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "We had no national interest to prevent self-determination for East Pakistan," the documents show he believed otherwise. In this record, at a time when rapprochement with China was in the national interest, Kissinger suggests that "a U.S. effort to split off part of Pakistan in the name of self-determination would have implications for Taiwan and Tibet in Peking's eyes."<sup>31</sup>

#### Document 25

Indicates that repression of intellectuals in the East continues, but on a reduced scale. Ambassador Farland advises that the best policy is to continue the current practice of "persistent but quiet pressure on GOP toward better treatment of East Pakistanis in all categories."<sup>32</sup>

#### Document 26

The U.S. disguising the movement of the nuclear aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal for evacuation purposes, gladly lets the ship movement represent possible American involvement in the conflict, especially if it expanded to a superpower confrontation. Admiral Welander from the NSC Staff indicates that the JCS has approved, for planning purposes only, the CINCPAC concept to ready a USS attack carrier to dissuade "third party" involvement in the South Asia crisis.<sup>33</sup>

#### Document 27

Keating suggests that Gandhi is trying to "cool" the political climate in India while continuing to exert pressure on Pakistan. The Presidents Briefing indicates however, that India is stepping up its support for the guerillas fighting in East Pakistan, action that could "goat" the Pakistanis into a full scale war.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Document 21: Memorandum for the Record: The President, Henry Kissinger, John Irwin, Thomas Moorer, Robert Cushman, Maurice Williams, Joseph Sisco, Armistead Seldon, and Harold Saunders, August 11, 1971, Secret, 7 pp. Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB21.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Document 22: Department of State, Cable, Letter from Prime Minister Gandhi, August 14, 1971, Secret, 4 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB22.pdf>

<sup>30</sup> Document 23: Memorandum for the President, My August 16 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, August 16, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, 16 pp. Includes Memorandum of Conversation between Huang Chen, TsaoKuei Sheng, Wei Tung, Henry Kissinger, Vernon Walters, and Winston Lord Dated August 19, 1971. Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330.<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB23.pdf>

<sup>31</sup> Document 24: Memorandum for the President, Implications of the Situation in South Asia, August 18, 1971, Secret, 4 pp. Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB24.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> Document 25: U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, Arrests of East Pakistan Intellectuals, September 17, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 576. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB25.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> Document 26: Memorandum for General Haig, Pakistan/India Contingency Planning, Secret/Eyes Only, November 15, 1971, 3 pp. Includes JCS Cable. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB26.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> Document 27: United States Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, Pakistan Crisis, November 18, 1971, Secret, 9 pp. Attached to Presidents Saturday Briefing and includes United States Embassy (New Delhi) Cables Dated

**Document 28**

These telcons show Nixon and Kissinger's knowledge of third party transfers of military supplies to Pakistan. Haig summarizes the Telcons to Kissinger by writing that the telcons, "confirm the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan," in exchange for providing aircraft to Pakistan. The telcons also show that Kissinger and Nixon, following the advice of Barbara Walters, decide to put out a White House version of the facts involved with the South Asian crisis through John Scali. Nixon express his desire to, "get some PR out on the- - put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us."<sup>35</sup>

**Document 29**

Saunders discusses Yahya's request for military equipment from the U.S. and other sources, specifically Jordan. He also observes that "by law," the U.S. "cannot authorize" any military transfers unless the administration was willing "to change our own policy and provide the equipment directly." This would rule out any transfer of American military equipment for Pakistan, supplied by the U.S., or any third party.<sup>36</sup>

**Document 30**

As a result of American media criticism towards the U.S. position on the India-Pakistan conflict, Kissinger in an attempt to straighten the record conducts a "background" press briefing. Kissinger presents the U.S. position using many questionable facts.<sup>37</sup>

**Document 31**

Responding to a news story based on Kissinger's background briefing, Keating argues that many of Kissinger's statements can not be supported. Specifically, Keating questions Kissinger's reference to Indian requests for a relief program, the Pakistani offer of amnesty to Awami Leaguers, and his claim that Washington has favored autonomy for East Pakistan.<sup>38</sup>

**Document 32**

UN Ambassador Bush describes the December 10 meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. While discussing the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts in the administration's "Two State Departments thing," and takes issue with Kissinger's style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.<sup>39</sup>

**Document 33**

Possible American courses of action with regards to the India/Pakistan crisis included notification to China that the U.S. would "look with favor on steps taken" by Beijing to "demonstrate its determination to intervene by force if necessary to preserve the territorial integrity of West Pakistan to include subtle assurance the Government of the United States will not stand by should the Soviet Union launch attacks against the PRC."<sup>40</sup>

**Document 34**

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November 15 and 16, 1971. Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB27.pdf>

<sup>35</sup>Document 28: White House, Telephone Conversations (Telcon), Dated December 4 and December 16, 1971, 11 pp. Includes Cover Sheet Dated January 19, 1972 Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB28.pdf>

<sup>36</sup>Document 29: National Security Council Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, Jordanian Transfer of F-104's to Pakistan, Secret, December 7, 1971, 7 pp. Includes State Department Cable to Jordan, State Department Memo to Kissinger, and United States Embassy (Amman) cable. First page has handwritten Kissinger note in which he, in reference to the title and secrecy of the issue, suggests "that title should have been omitted." Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB29.pdf>

<sup>37</sup>Document 30: Background Briefing with Henry Kissinger, December 7, 1971, 14 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB30.pdf>

<sup>38</sup>Document 31: United States Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, U.S. Public Position on Road to War, Secret, December 8, 1971, 3 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB31.pdf>

<sup>39</sup>Document 32: Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, December 10, 1971, 7 pp. Source: George Bush Presidential Library. George H.W. Bush Collection. Series: United Nations File, 1971-1972, Box 4. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB32.pdf>

<sup>40</sup>Document 33: NSC List, Courses of Actions Associated with India/Pakistan Crisis, Top Secret/Sensitive, December 8, 1971, 2 pp. Source: NPMP, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB32.pdf>



The transfer of F-104 planes to Pakistan from both Jordan and Iran is under review at "very high level of USG."<sup>41</sup>

#### Document 35

The DIA assesses the limits and possibility of Chinese support to the Pakistanis. It opines that while Chinese support will be limited to political, diplomatic, and propaganda for the time being, the PRC could initiate small attacks in the high mountainous areas in the East, and therefore occupy Indian troops without "provoking Soviet retaliatory moves."<sup>42</sup>

#### Document 36

In a discussion of the India-Pakistan situation, Haig declares that the U.S. is doing everything it can do to facilitate transfers of fighter planes and military supplies from Jordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.<sup>43</sup>

#### Document 37

Indian Ambassador Jha expresses his concern over American deployment of a Nuclear Carrier in the Indian ocean.<sup>44</sup>

#### Document 38

The State Department sees the possibility of a ceasefire in the East; Notes that Eleven Jordanian F-104 fighter aircraft have possibly been sent to Pakistan.<sup>45</sup>

#### Document 39

Heavy fighting is turning in favor of the Indians, while cease-fire plans continue to be in the works. A controversy is brewing with regards over the U.S. decision to send a nuclear carrier into the Bay of Bengal.<sup>46</sup>

#### Document 40

The present trickle of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold off the Indians. Handwriting next to Mig-19's notes "China" and next to F-104's notes "Jordan."<sup>47</sup>

#### Document 41

Keating describes his difficulty in explaining the rationale behind the deployment of a carrier task force. He also suggests that the decision to send the task force into the Indian Ocean has only encouraged Yahya to continue the Pakistani military effort.<sup>48</sup>

#### Document 42

India has ordered a unilateral cease fire upon the unconditional surrender of West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Despite the cease-fire, American officials in Dacca report that "no one seems to be in effective control of the situation," and that fighting continues "between Bengalis and scattered "Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani elements." Also, in a heavily excised paragraph, the CIA reports that a squadron of American origin, Jordanian

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<sup>41</sup>Document 34: Department of State Cable, Pakistan Request for F-104's, Secret, December 9, 1971, 2 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB34.pdf>

<sup>42</sup>Document 35: Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, Communist China's Capability to Support Pakistan, Secret, December 9, 1971, 3 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB35.pdf>

<sup>43</sup>Document 36: Memcon, Huang Ha, T'ang Wen-sheng, Shih Yen-hua, Alexander Haig, Winston Lord, Top Secret/Sensitive, Exclusively Eyes Only, December 12, 1971 (3:50-4:20), 9 pp. Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston Lord), Box 330. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB36.pdf>

<sup>44</sup>Document 37: Department of State of Cable, Carrier Deployment in Indian Ocean, Secret, December 14, 1971, 2 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB37.pdf>

<sup>45</sup>Document 38: Department of State, Situation Report #41, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST), Secret, December 14, 1971, 4 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB38.pdf>

<sup>46</sup>Document 39: Department of State, Situation Report #44, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST), Secret, December 15, 1971, 4 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB39.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> Document 40: United States Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, Top Secret/ Exclusive Eyes Only, December 15, 1971, 1 pp. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB40.pdf>

<sup>48</sup>Document 41: United States Embassy (New Delhi), Cable, Deployment Carrier Task Force in Indian Ocean, Secret, December 15, 1971, 2 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB41.pdf>

F-104's was delivered to Pakistan on 13 December, despite an American embargo on military supplies to both India and Pakistan. This embargo includes third party transfers of American equipment to either of the parties.<sup>49</sup>

#### Document 43

Secretary Rogers suggests that Keating neither confirm nor deny allegations that the U.S. endorsed Jordanian and Iranian transfer of American arms to Pakistan.<sup>50</sup>

#### Document 44

Embassy Iran reports that three F-5A Fighter aircraft, reportedly from the United States, had been flown to Pakistan to assist in the war efforts against India. A Northrop official matches the aircraft to a group of planes originally slated for sale to Libya, but which were then diverted to USG control in California. This information suggests that not only did Washington look the other way when Jordan and Iran supplied U.S. planes to Pakistan, but that despite the embargo placed on Pakistan, it directly supplied Pakistan with fighter planes.<sup>51</sup>

#### Document 45

The Nixon administration, during the East Pakistan crisis convened meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) to discuss the situation in South Asia. Records of these meetings were kept, and somehow leaked to Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson. Anderson's articles, based on classified WSAG minutes became contentious, not only because they quoted from leaked classified material, but also for their racy content. Kissinger and others in the administration became upset at Anderson's exposure of White House policies because, among other things, it revealed the tilt towards Pakistan, despite the genocidal conditions in the East.<sup>52</sup>

#### The U.S. Perspective in 1971

USA played the spearheaded role by means of superpowers' intervention in the Indian subcontinent. As a result of cold war and superpower diplomacy, Russia (former Soviet Union) and China were involved one after another. Individuating that in fact the nature of USA policies were rely on the activities of other two.

Basically, USA eager to explore the Indian subcontinent for political, diplomatic and strategic reasons. It was 1953, resisting evolutionary status of communism around the world considered as first & foremost national duty for USA.<sup>53</sup> In consequence, the idea of 'Containment Theory' was emerged by George Kanon. For the implementation of this theory, there should be some military bases from North Africa to Far-east and Indian subcontinent was the merger location strategically. But the darkle shadow of cold war initially started by exporting 1.3 billions (\$) priced military weapons to Pakistan within eleven years(1954-1965) and 3 billion(\$) economical aids. USA- Pakistan relation, dormant since Washington had cut off aids to Pakistan and Indian during their 1965 war. Then again the relation had been revived in 1969 as Pakistan played an inter-meditary role in the secret United States-China dialog.

In 1971 USA administration was the main ally of Pakistan. Widely, we can divided the USA policy toward Pakistan crisis and emergence of Bangladesh into two successions\_\_

#### 1. First Succession : March-July '71

During this period USA neutralized themselves and former USA president RecharaNixsonpropogandized that the arising crisis of independence was Pakistan's internal problem. It may characterized by\_\_

- The Nixson ignored gross human rights violation by Pakistani Army and entitled the problem as Pakistan's internal matters and be neutral strategically. Washington rather preferred to follow the policy of non-interference towards the issue.

<sup>49</sup> Document 42: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, India-Pakistan Situation Report (As of 1200 EST), Top Secret, December 16, 1971, 6 pp. Source: NPMP, May Release, MDR# 4. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB42.pdf>

<sup>50</sup> Document 43 : Department of State, Cable, Supply of Third Country US Arms to Pakistan, Secret, December 23, 1971, 1 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB43.pdf>

<sup>51</sup> Document 44: United States Embassy (Tehran), Cable, F-5 Aircraft to Pakistan, Secret, December 29, 1971, 3 pp. Includes DOD cable. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575 <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB44.pdf>

<sup>52</sup> Document 45: National Security Council, Notes, Anderson Papers Material, January 6, 1972, 5 pp. Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB45.pdf>

<sup>53</sup> *Revelations from the Russian Archives: The Soviet Union and the United States.* [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/sovi.html&ved=2ahUKEwIjqJeVnNXoAhXkV3wKHeCDDJMQFjAJegQIAhAB&usq=AOvVaw3JiMwdxgoWXq73PV6V\\_uu](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/sovi.html&ved=2ahUKEwIjqJeVnNXoAhXkV3wKHeCDDJMQFjAJegQIAhAB&usq=AOvVaw3JiMwdxgoWXq73PV6V_uu)

- Continuing relief program to eliminate criticisms.
- Publicly military supplies had been adjourned though they tried to assure military aids in via varied ways.

## 2. Second Succession: July-December '71

Two characteristics sighted in this stage of American policy\_\_

- Kissinger's dramatic Beijing tour which changed the background of South-asian politics. During this tour USA committed to China to recognize the state and help to be the member of UN. In fact USA had been desired to fight back USSR's expansion.
- USA administration figure out that Indo-Soviet plan against West Pakistan might be finalized. The administration started up from very beginning of July '71.

From November to 3 December Nixon's administration tried whole heartedly to avoid the war. They sought to settle the crisis into a political settlement within integral Pakistan state. The American Embassy in Islamabad recommended that the USA government voice its deep concern but by "not to make developments a contentious international political issues."<sup>54</sup>

US president Richard M. Nixon supported Pakistan from March to December in 1971 against Bangladesh continuously. So the question is why US support Pakistan? There were several reasons for America to help Pakistan in 1971 war:

1. Pakistan was the member of SEATO and CENTO with United States in 1954 and 1955 against the communism of the world. As a result of those agreements Pakistan had good relationship with US from earlier. On the other hand India signed alliance with Soviet Union in August 1971 which was a risk and hindrance for US to exercise power in South Asia. Therefore America was bound by treaty conditions to help Pakistan. Pakistan has been given a status of Non-NATO ally by America. America has so far given billions of dollars help to Pakistan in order to fight Taliban from Afghanistan.

2. At that time Russia had much interest to expand into Afghanistan. America used influence and military of Pakistan to stop propagation of Russia.

3. America helped Pakistan with arms and weapons to fight against terrorists in Afghanistan but these weapons and arms were used against India by Pakistan continued to fool America by pretending to fight against Taliban and helping them secretly against America in Afghanistan. This secret diplomacy of Pakistan continued until Bin-Laden was found and killed in a secret hideout near Abbottabad by American navy seals. Now America has made India their defence partner and do not favour Pakistan.

4. USA was looking for a faithful friend for controlling Muslim countries in Middle East. As a Muslim country Pakistan was automatic choice for this objective.

5. After being defeated in Vietnam War, the USA was interested to rebuild relationship with China. Washington cut off all relationships with China due to communist revolution in 1949. Kissinger wrote in his book "White House Years" (1979) that there was no alternative to communicate with China except Pakistan. To take control in South and South East Asia and rebuild relation with China, Pakistan was the faithful media for the USA. Kissinger said, "*Pakistan was our sole channel to China; once it was closed off it would take months to make alternative arrangements.*"<sup>55</sup> In 1967 Nixon did not get warm reception in India tour comparing Pakistan.

6. One more reason was that Pakistan defence forces were armed by America weapons and America ardently desired Pakistan to win against India. America wanted Pakistan to play an important role in Asian subcontinent. Integrity of Pakistan was in the interest of America and therefore America was eager to see that Pakistan wins in the war.

These are the point of view of every step took by USA in policy making.

## IV. CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

### Data Analysis : Findings

The two super powers, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States, which dominated a largely bipolar world until the middle of 1980s played a significant role in the 1971.

The available documents offer many useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made important decisions during the war of 1971. They show in detail how U.S. policy, directed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, followed a course that became infamously known as "The Tilt."

<sup>54</sup>Dr. Hossain. A. M. D., "*ShadinBangladesherObudoyerItihas*", BishobidolayProkasoni-Dhaka

<sup>55</sup>Kissinger, H., "*White House Years*," Boston, pp. 848-49, 1979

The first part of the documents, from March '71 to the end of May is a record of the genocide. These documents highlight some particular issues, mainly the brutal details of the genocide conducted in East Pakistan in March and April of 1971. It reveals that, in one of the first "dissent cables" questioning U.S. policy and morality, The second part of the documents shows the desperate effort of Nixon to give military aid to Pakistan and the international ties among the countries supporting Pakistan. In this part, the U.S first recognized the muktibahini (freedom fighters) as a force to reckon with.

United States looked for own interest in Bangladesh crisis. If US took part in favour of Bangladesh the return from their investment would be nothing. Kissinger wrote in his White House Years(1979), "There was no question of "saving" East Pakistan".<sup>56</sup> As a part of US interest, US choose tilt policy to Pakistan as a media to China and Muslim countries of Middle East. To take china in part of US side Nixon tried to balancing power of Soviet Russia. United States policy was not worked as like as the US government wanted. The administration tried to say Nixon was always influenced by neutrality. US authority did not express dissatisfaction in mass people killing operation called operation Searchlight in 25 March, 1971 and the journalist Anderson proved that the US policy was completely in favour of Pakistan by the leaked papers named Anderson Papers. He charged the government "Richard Nixon brought the United States to the edge of another world war. His actions were deliberate; he operated in secret; and he lied to the American people about his actions"<sup>57</sup> Initially, United States took steps to solve the crisis by keeping undivided Pakistan and settle down the problem according to election of 1970. But Bengali leaders were not willing to sit with US representative in absent of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This step was failed. As Van Hollen Observes, it the period between the removal of secrecy on Nixon's China trip and the Indo-Soviet treaty, Washington was tilting toward Islamabad and not pushing for a political settlement in East Pakistan.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, the US policy was against the humanity. America showed the lack of moral and humanitarian concern. Yahya ordered to kill three million of Bengali in 25 March genocide in East Pakistan. US supported them by military aid and economic help. About 10,00,000 people were took shelter in India; therefore, The involvement of India added a new direction to the war. The US policy did make happy neither Pakistan nor India. The relationship was deteriorated between USA and India. USA sent money as a relief for inhabitation for Bangladeshi.<sup>59</sup> They took this policy for two purposes. 1) To decrease forcedness of anti criticism of white house. 2) To make force on Yahya to do the political solution.

On 3rd December 1971, the Pakistan air force attacked north and west air force of India; though Nixon administration strongly took part by the side of Pakistan after starting India –Pakistan war. US also followed a pro-Pakistan line in the UN. By a emergency meeting on 12 December, US decision to send USS enterprise, a aircraft carrier, to Bay-of-Bengal for helping Pakistan. Russian navy started to Bay of Bengal with two groups of ships with nuclear weapons. They trailed the US activities from Indian Ocean in the meantime.<sup>60</sup> But this policy was failed due to surrender of Pakistan army in 16 December 1971.

## CONCLUSION

The emergence of Bangladesh and the liberation war movement creats problems for USA in a whole region and calls for a fundamental redefinition of their policy making toward the states of South Asia.<sup>61</sup> By using tilt policy they wanted to rebuilt relationship with China, controlling Muslim countries of Middle East. Pakistan was the country by what they can implement their policy. But the involvement of Soviet Union with India made difficult situation for USA. In short, we can categorized the wills beyond the tilt into following :

Firstly, opening diplomatic relationships with China that means reconstructing the relations after Vietnam War. Secondly, reducing expansion of USSR and the movement through socialism. Since, Pakistan was the member of SEATO and CENTO with United States in 1954 and 1955 against the communism of the world which referred a good relationship with US from earlier. On the other hand India signed alliance with Soviet Union in august 1971 which was a risk and hindrance for US to exercise power in south Asia

<sup>56</sup>Rahim, E. & Joyce, L., "Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971", Pustaka, Dhaka, (2000) . Add citation from-Zahed,I.U.."An Analysis of US Policy in the Liberation War of Bangladesh,1971".IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science. XII(2),123-128.May, 2013

<sup>57</sup>Anderson, J., The Anderson Papers with George Clifford (New York: Random House, pp. 205,1973)

<sup>58</sup>Hollen, V., "The Tilt Policy : Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia", Asian Survey, Vol. XX, No.4, April, pp-346, 1980

<sup>59</sup>Rashid. A."BangladesherMuktijhuddhoSnayojhuddherBisworajniti,"Oitijhya, February 2009.p.45.

<sup>60</sup>Kissinger. H., "White House Years", Boston. pp. 879-882. (1979)

<sup>61</sup>Wilcox.W.A.,"The emergence of Bangladesh :problems and opportunities for a redefined American policy in South Asia,"American Enterprise Institution for Public Policy Research, 1973

Thirdly, establishing a naval base in South-Asian triangular or lunar point at Bay-of-Bengal.  
 Fourthly, refreshing a gateway to control Muslim countries in Middle East through an ally and here automatically Pakistan as Muslim country at the top of the wish list.  
 So, we can outlined the role of each superpower that they played its part in accordance with its national, regional and global interests; USA isn't out of that. Although Bengali were struggling for independence at the time of undergoing strategic shifting in global politics, involvement of superpowers as positive or negative resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign state.

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### ➤ List of Abbreviations

USA- United States of America  
 USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republic  
 CENTO- Central Treaty Organization  
 SEATO- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  
 UN- United Nations  
 WSAG- Washington Special Actions Group

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