

American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Research (AJHSSR)

e-ISSN :2378-703X

Volume-5, Issue-3, pp-121-127

[www.ajhssr.com](http://www.ajhssr.com)

Research Paper

Open Access

## HABERMAS ETHICS IN DISCUSSION: FROM THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE COLLECTIVE

Roger MONDOUE<sup>1</sup>, Linda MATAGO TSAFACK<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>(Department of philosophy, psychology, sociology (PPS), Professor-University of Dschang, Cameroon)

<sup>2</sup>(Department of philosophy, psychology, sociology (PPS), Doctoral student- University of Dschang, Cameroon)

**ABSTRACT** : The political philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, beyond its protean character, is worked in the background by the notion of public space which is practically the keystone in osmosis with the idea of consensus and communicational action. It is therefore necessary to study the habermasian ethics of discussion because it allows individuals to reach consensus through dialogue, interaction, democracy and even inter-subjectivity. Thus, is the exacerbating optimism of the ethics of discussion not being hindered by a universalism that underestimates and crushes the reference to the context, and particularly/notably to the idea of nation? This question would have allowed us to get out of the ethics of discussion as thought by Habermas and consider a recasting of this ideal of public space by leaning on patriotic constitutionalism asking to be comforted/reinforced by the idea of Nation-State.

**Keywords** -Consensus, Ethics, Communication, Cosmo citizenship, Democracy.

### I. INTRODUCTION

In a text on *La philosophie de l'histoire*, Kant asks himself the question "What is the Enlightenment?" He replies that it is a question of "the exit of man from his minority for which he is himself responsible. Minority, that is, the inability to use one's understanding without the direction of others" (Kant; 1947:46) The Enlightenment in question is that of reason-understanding, the function would be to guide men towards intellectual majority and moral autonomy. Thanks to it, man can free himself from all guardianship, no longer submit to a foreign law to his own conscience, Obey only to himself. This is the meaning of the founding motto of modernity. Sapere Aude "dares to know, know or use your understanding"). This "lights" program does not seem to have been fully realized. Alasdair Mac Intyre said, this project which had the ambition to found a secularized morality, independent of the hypotheses of metaphysics and religion, would have failed (Intyre; 1981:52) Horkheimer, a theoretician of the "Frankfurt School", had made the same observation years before, when he declared that modernity had distinguished itself in the realization of the empire of rationality of understanding or instrumental rationality "reason is calculating". It can establish factual truths and mathematical relationships, but nothing more. In the practical field, it can only speak of the means. In the end, it must remain silent" (Horkheimer; 1974: 182)

Habermas, on the other hand, is working not to deconstruct, but to reconstruct the project of the lights. He believes that modernity is much more "an unfinished project" than a definitive failure, we must rethink it by criticizing certainly what reason can have of totalitarian but also recovering on a new concept of freedom (which no longer defines itself negatively but positively) and truth. Jean-Godefroy Bidima can rightly write: "Modernity is in the making and if it presents itself as unfinished, it is necessary to recompose the games of discourse and change the paradigms. Habermas is part of a dialectic between continuity and discontinuity in history" (Bidima; 1993:83). Habermas's concern is to build a critical theory of society, based on an ethics of discussion, it has been elaborated since the 1970s by Karl-Otto Appel and Jürgen Habermas from multiple and ancient sources considerably popularized in more or less simplifying forms. Ethics comes from the Greek "ethos" (manners proper to a people), "ethê" (lifestyle), and "ethikos" (philosophical questioning). Generally, it is a philosophical reflection on morality. According to the Technical and Critical Vocabulary of André Lalande, ethics is the science which takes as immediate object the judgments on what is good or bad. Habermas's concern is no longer to know how to carry out a good action, but rather to know under what condition an act can be right, why it combines ethics and discussion. Thus, a certain vulgate very present in the media confuses the ethics of discussion with research at any cost of consensus. Indeed, according to a starving version of the discussion ethic, the all-out apology of the "debate" is also popular in professional policy and in the world of education. Put more precisely, the ethics of the discussion show that the so-called authority argument is unacceptable and that

one cannot receive a standard that is not subject to discussion. It is therefore a question of allowing the discussion process to be argued on the basis of the best argument. For Habermas, the practical discussion is “indeed, able, thanks to its unsuspected pragmatic characteristics, to guarantee a formation of the will such that the interests of each one can be evidenced without tearing apart the social fabric that objectively binds everyone to all.” (Habermas; 1992: 22). The originality of Habermas would therefore be to go beyond the policy of managing the affairs of the city by introducing not only the communicational reason, but above all the ethics of discussion as a subbasement of an off-center state or individuals by means of communication reaches consensus.

However, the reception of the offer of Jürgen Habermas is organized around the objection that the ethics of the discussion which passes through the bourgeois public space, would rather lead to not only a new form of dictatorship, a kind of neo-imperialism that would go through by the elitism of the various actors in the discussion; but also to an economic neoliberalism. Ultimo, is not optimism exacerbated by the ethics of the discussion does not preach by a tendency towards universalism that underestimates and crushes the reference to the context, especially to the idea of Nation? In the lines that follow, we will go back to the percussions of Habermas' thought, in order to grasp the originality of his thesis, decline the limits of his thought, finally we will try to envisage a recasting of this ethic backed precisely by patriotic constitutionalism.

## II. THE HABERMASSIAN REDESIGN OF THE IDEAL OF DISCUSSION

Jürgen Habermas is credited with rethinking the idealism of discussion by moving it from the reference to the individual subject to the reference to dialogue, has the ideal of communication focused on debate. Precisely how does he intend to go beyond the views of the philosophy of the subject and why he now supports an intersubjectivity philosophy.

### 1.1 The Habermassian dropout in relation to the approach of the philosophy of the subject.

The Jürgen Habermas, a German author, poses himself by opposing the philosophy of the subject or modern subjectivity. Reinventing modernity in Habermas consists of “leaving the philosophy of the subject” (Habermas; 1988: 348) or the philosophy of consciousness, whether it be the Methodism of Descartes, the phenomenology of Husserl, Kant's transcendental idealism, Hegel's dialectics, to some extent Heidegger's ontologism, Sartre's humanist existentialism.

What philosophy of consciousness is it? Habermas takes the Cartesian conception as his main target, who knew a prodigious posterity in the “modern times” Hegel did not think so well when he called Descartes “the father of modern philosophy”. Descartes' philosophy is based on a primary evidence: “Cogito Ergo Sum”. It is around this principle that will crystallize the philosophical promotion of the “self” or the affirmation of the subject as separate reality or as substance. Descartes will speak of “rescogitans.” Cartesian cogito is the discovery of the simultaneous certainty of the existence of a “I” and the act of “thinking”: the subject is subject only if he knows himself “thinking, feeling, wanting, doubting” (Descartes; 1973: 39-40), in Descartes, “thinking”, is not limited to intellectual activity, but rather an act of conscience. Such a philosophy that defines the subject by consciousness is reflexive or, to use an electronic term, auto reverse.

Habermas contests the self-reference of the self-conscious subject, it is “a solipsist subject who poses as a master or arrogant judge and self-righteous” (Renault; 1995: 162). Such a conception or position implies a dismissive and dismissive consideration of the other, whether it is the object or other subject. In the philosophy of the subject as criticized by Habermas, the subject is thought as absolute and solitary subject. He poses himself as an autotelic (he is his own finality). He is neither dependent on anything nor on anyone. This hypostasiation of the EGO is the foundation of a progressive vision of history. Against such a conception, Habermas comes up with a theory of “communicational reason” (Habermas; 1987:15), which wants to be a therapeutic reconstruction of modernity, sick of itself, a shift of the subject closed on itself.

The philosophy of the subject is therefore at the antipode of the intersubjective philosophy. We note therefore the will of Habermas to exit from hermeneutics understood as “the theory or art of the explanation, of the interpretation” (Gadamer; 1995: 231), to enter into a critical theory. Habermas criticizing hermeneutics, José María Aguirre Oraa affirms the fact that “the hermeneutic approach is attacked because of its lack of criticism of tradition” (Aguirre Oraa; 1981: 256).

The philosophy of the subject therefore means, that doctrine which would place above all its activities the individual in his uniqueness as withdrawn into itself having no relation to the outside world (ipseity to speak like Edmund Husserl). The philosophy of the subject arises by opposing intersubjectivity philosophy as advocated by Jürgen Habermas, a philosophy which puts dialogue, rational discussion, at the center of everything.

The philosophy of the subject begins with St. Augustine, a philosopher of the Middle Ages, for whom, if one must return to oneself, it is not to be a prisoner of the Ego but to let God speak to us in the heart, the confessions show that the confession does not fall on oneself, but may it open the door to Christ and even more precisely to the love of God.

It is with Descartes that the philosophy of the subject is radicalized. The Cartesian cogito can truly access existential fullness only by enclosing himself in his original insularity hence the definite opposition between his philosophy of cogito and that of the ethics of Habermasian discussion essentially dialogical, communicational, collective see intersubjective having as under-base otherness. "The fact that cogito is the only apodictic certainty leads Cartesian philosophy to solipsism, especially when we know that the exclusive cogito is the one who believes that he does not have the power to think and to exist in sharing with otherness" (Ayissi; 2004:24).

In fact, we notice that Descartes is a pioneer, modern in the philosophy of the subject, a hostage of otherness by ipseity in its gnosetological approach thus testifying to an existential monism of the thinking subject situated at the opposite of the essentially dialogic Habermasian subject and therefore especially open to his fellow man, to others and to the outside world.

In Kant, we note a moral at the risk of otherness, it is now a question of which condition a standard can be said valid contrary to Aristotle for whom the existential concern was how to live a good life.

Habermas differs from Kant on three points essentially: first, Habermas abandons the Kantian doctrine of the two kingdoms, the reign of intelligence and the reign of phenomenal. He therefore rejects the empirico-transcendental dualism which reflects the positivist dialectic subject/object (cf. *La critique du positivisme de Comte et de Mach dans Connaissance et intérêt*, Paris, Gallimard, 1976) then according to E. Kant, morality must be experienced "*in foro interno*" (in the solitude of the soul's life according to the words of Husserl, "the moral in me," says Kant). On the contrary, the Habermasian ethic pleads so that the intercomprehension on the universalization of interests is the result of a public discussion carried out intersubjectively. Finally, Habermas claims to have solved the problem of foundation of moral theory which Kant eventually short-circuited by the categorical recourse to a fact of reason, the experience of the constraint of duty. Kant merely lays down the form of the foundation, which is precisely what is to be founded. In this, Habermas takes up Hegel's criticism against Kant, according to which the assertion of a fact was "made of reason" cannot be used as normative validation or justification. Thus one does not pass logically from the right. The indicative cannot base the imperative. Habermas therefore renounces the transcendental Philosophy of the Kantian type.

In Rawls, as in Habermas, the notion of consensual discourse is at the heart of political action. They renounce Kantian transcendental philosophy (search for conditions of possibility), but still claim from Kant to base rationally an ethics of discussion (Habermas) and a theory of justice (Rawls). Habermas and Rawls agree on the criticism of utilitarianism and reject both ethical irrationalism.

In the first version of his philosophy, *The Theory of Justice*; Rawls proposes to found the principles of justice as fairness/equity for a well-ordered society that is a system of fair cooperation that requires the rationally motivated consent of all partners. In order to do this, Rawls uses a contractualistic procedure that allows it to consider outsourced (from a moral point of view and formal) issues of political justice. Subsequently, starting in the eighties and in his book *Liberalisme politique*, Rawls mitigates the claim to a universalist foundation of its theory and corrects its strong idealizing tendency. In this sense, it articulates more rigorously pluralism and the requirement of consensus, and it shows that its theory is political and not metaphysical. Despite this reasoning, Habermas shows that Rawlsian thought is not sufficiently attentive to the problems of the institutionalization of the law, the ambiguity of the norms. Rawls does not care enough about the problematic relationship between positive law and political justice. "Rawls focuses on questions of the legitimacy of the law, without discussing the legal form as such and thereby the institutional dimension of law. What is specific about the validity of the right. Namely, the tension inherent in the right itself between factuality and validity is not perceived. That is why it does not perceive either; without reduction, the external tension existing between the claim of the right to legitimacy and social factuality" (Habermas; 1997: 79).

Moral impartiality cannot be the result of a solitary moral subject; yet in Rawls, the metaphor of the veil of ignorance in the original position is the symbol of an historical and individualistic practical reason Habermas believes that the procedure that Rawls imagines to show how his principles could be chosen rationally by everyone is not only fictitious but fundamentally monological. In this way Rawls still depends on the philosophy of consciousness, riveted to the model of a mainly solitary subject; Habermas contests that the Rawlsian artifice of veil of ignorance has real argumentative value; it is an argument in thought that is a prisoner of a philosophy of the monological subject. Far from Habermasian's criticism of the veil of Rawlsian ignorance we find that Habermas would have confined himself to the Solipsist argument of an enclosed subject, however, the 'Veil of Ignorance' must be correlated with what Rawls calls "balance reflected". This articulation allows Rawls to overcome monological reasoning by basing his principles of justice from justice from the moral point of view: according to the Sunday of a moral argument.

Beyond these major theories that we have just covered; the Habermasian recasting of the ideal of discussion consists in opening to otherness, to dialogue and communication, hitherto omitted by the above-mentioned philosophers. This desire for dialogue has a prominent place in Jürgen Habermas in that it allows to define a more complete and presumed collectivist anthropology. The democratic ideal of discussion would thus

make it possible to respond to the philosophies of the subject turned towards the Ego. The disengagement that the German philosopher thus operates, against modern theories, allows him to rely on the ethics of discussion or the ethics of communication in order to decline its perception of the democratic ideal.

### 1.2. The democratic ideal as backed by the ethics of discussion

Habermas through his notion of the ethics of discussion would like to escape a philosophy of the subject or consciousness because it, in their eyes; would be unable to recognize the communicational activity as constitutive of humanity. It should be noted that of all cognitive ethics, Habermas considers the Call attempt to be the most promising approach. But this theory has not been realized consistently, that is to say within the limits of pragmatic reason. Habermas undertakes to make this assessment of the current field of argument convincing by presenting a program which will serve as a basis for the ethics of discussion.” (Appel; 1990: 64)

Nevertheless, the ethics of the Habermas discussion owes much to the ethics of the Appel discussion (this is the title of a book by Karl-Otto Appel (*Ethique de la discussion*, Paris, Cerf, 1994). Habermas also wrote a book entitled “*De l’éthique de la discussion*” translated from the German by Marck Hunyadi, Paris, Cerf 1992). Habermas does not hide: “among the living philosophers, he writes no one has determined the direction of my thought as durably as Karl-Otto Appel” (Habermas; 1986:21). Appel proposes a pragmatic-transcendental foundation unlike Habermas who instead thinks we should just lean on an ethic (according to him, society has acquired intuitions in the processes of socialization by which the individual can recognize their common humanity and get along. Therefore, for Habermas one cannot base ethics on a transcendental basis but in the process of socialization given in a lived world.

It is not a question here of seeing the relationship between Appel and Habermas but of showing the democratic ideal as backed on the ethics of discussion as advocated by Habermas situating themselves at the antipodes of the philosophy of the subject. What is the ethics of discussion?

The ethics of discussion consists of a procedure of moral argument which takes the place of the categorical imperative and establishes the “D” principle that only those standards that could be agreed to by all concerned can claim validity as long as they participate in a practical discussion. Indeed, the exact function of the ethics of the discussion is that of a dialogical test which examines standards that it does not invent. Norms are already there, in the world lived”. (Jaffaro; 2001:71)

The prospect of an ideal communication society, anticipated by ordinary discussion, guides social integration. In a published conference, Habermas states: The idealizing presupposition of a universalist form of life, in which everyone can adopt the point of view of every other and rely on mutual recognition by all, makes it possible for community integration to be individualism, just as it makes individualism possible insofar as it is the other side of universalism”. (Habermas; 1993:226)

Etymologically democracy comes from the Greek words “*Dêmos*” which means people established on a territory and “*cratein*” which means the government, the exercise of authority. Democracy is therefore defined according to Abraham Lincoln as a government of the people by the people and for the people. democracy covers three major ideas: First a theoretical idea namely the recognition of the people as the unique origin of the legitimacy of the supreme political power which presupposes that this people is sovereign including in the face of any political, traditional or religious authority and that the members of that people are equal among themselves, without any consideration of race, ethnicity, sex, class, religion or knowledge. Then a practical idea to know the effectiveness of a set of institutions guaranteeing the fact that the people are really depositary of the power: open and transparent elections, separation of powers. Beyond discussion. And finally, respect for the Rule of Law (State that everyone is governed by the laws) and not the State of fact (State or man governs). The rule of law is not the society of rights which reduces all inter-individual relations to legal relations. The rule of law prohibits the rule of law, that is, institutional and non-transparent measures taken in the name of security (Limits rights to the people) The rule of law can be the alibi of despotism The one who makes the decisions alone and cruel in the name of the rule of law” which implies the reason of state

This criteriology of democracy seems insufficient in the eyes of Jürgen Habermas, therefore, also, he proposes a third fundamental idea for a better democracy, namely the existence of a public space. What is meant by this? Is it a sufficient condition of democracy?

The public space is therefore a space of rational deliberation, normalizing, allowing us to bring back reason and the human being at the heart of politics. Because when we start arguing, reason is not far away. Reinventing democracy through public space.

In fact, in Habermas it is necessary to define man no longer from the individual (economic as in Locke) or (cogito as in René Descartes) but from intersubjectivity, communication, openness to the other, the dialogue which can thus lead to a consensus.

Nevertheless, let us raise the idea that Habermas and Francis Fukuyama tend to be philosophers of universalism (tendency to universalize, to want to extend everything in a global way) this universalism is



perceived in Fukuyama thanks to its philosophy of history and at Habermas through its notion of cosmo citizenship, what is cosmopolitan? Why does Habermas make it a flagship concept?

Cosmopolitanism is an idea whose first formulation is indebted to the cynics. This philosophical current/movement defends the borderless belonging to a common humanity. It is a cosmopolitan posture that promotes the primacy of the universal over the individual. It "vows to extend citizenship" beyond the borders, to establish it on a universal scale and for the human race". (Mecquenens; 2013: 389). As a philosophy, cosmopolitanism though groping and groping, since antiquity is linked to a philosophical register that goes back from Diogenian cynicism to ancient stoicism with a resurgence to the modern period on the term cosmo citizenship

According to the history of philosophy, Diogenes of Sinope was the first to use the term "cosmopolitan" that is, citizen of the world. When asked about his origins, he replied that he was a citizen of the world. The wise Diogenians opposed to the political law a higher law. The cynic, citizen of the world is unattached or above any fastening

Later this cosmopolitan posture was taken up with a particular intensity among the Stoics, for whom the idea of humanity forms a "cosmo polis" is to a Universal City. Although Stoicism shares the cosmopolitan ideal with cynicism, it differs from it in its mixing with political life. In other words, Stoic cosmopolitanism is positive while cynical cosmopolitanism is negative.

The stated ambition of such cosmopolitanism would be to promote the idea of universal peace in the world.

Habermas returns to Immanuel Kant in his Perpetual Peace Project. To better support his notion of cosmo citizenship. In Kant, we notice a preference for the republican government because guarantor of the liberties of the subjects, their equality, and their dependence on common legislation, at Kant, "the republican constitution, in addition to the clarity of its origin, since it comes from the pure source of the concept of law, still presents the perspective of the consequence we desire, namely perpetual peace" (Kant; 1975: 16). At Habermas, cosmo citizenship would be necessary because allows citizens to consider themselves more and more as members of an international community." (Habermas; 2000: 37).

In contrast to Kant, for whom cosmopolitan citizenship is a historical and logical necessity that fits into the urgency of the realization as the finality of perpetual peace, Habermas sees more a bellicose imperative stemming of global expansion. as very aptly state; then Ondoua, the Habermasian cosmo citizenship, which notes a historical process in progress (globalization, extension of the horizons of the world), is transformed into prescriptive normativity of the linkage to the totality of a universe (ideological universalism) operating according to the principles of an instrumental reason, disengaged from ethical concerns" (Ondoua; 209 :198).

In other words, the birth of cosmo citizenship stems from the fact that the transnationalisation of the economy and of the market mortgages the sovereignty of the nation-state. Cosmopolitanism is a new solidarity that is a transition from national consciousness to Cosmo political consciousness. Thus, one passes from the universal community of Kant legal persons to the inclusive legal community of world citizens. The cosmopolitan is an overshoot by expanding special or national interests through global regulation. Habermas thinks rather for a desired becoming together consensually.

For Habermas, the multicultural problem naturally leads to constitutional patriotism, which at the same time sharpens the sense of diversity and integrity of the different forms of life that coexist in a multicultural society. The new world, post-political or cosmo political world, world of supranationality, which consecrates the extension of the intersubjectively shared world lived, does not imply the absence of the fragmentation of the consciousness of the various national or international actors; nor does it imply the absolute harmony of power relations between citizens of the nation-state or those of the Nation-States among themselves. Habermas is fully aware of this double mortgage. Habermas conducts an analysis of the world in the era of globalization, with its figures and challenges (Ondoua; 2009: 192-193).

For Habermas, constitutional patriotism is the only possible form of patriotism. This is how we will see in *De l'usage public des idées* an update of the themes classically addressed by Habermas at the same time as all the reflections that led him to renounce the national perspective in the name of a cosmopolitan openness made necessary, in his view, by the globalization of the economy. In Habermas there is a transition from the nation-state to cosmo citizenship, or even constitutional patriotism "For us in the Federal Republic, constitutional patriotism refers among other things to the pride of having succeeded in overcoming Constitutional patriotism is the only form of patriotism" (Habermas; 2002: 20).

Faced with cosmopolitanism at Habermas, Then Ondoua criticizes this posture by estimating the idea that one could lead to international private ownership. In doing so, the latter proposes a cosmo responsibility as an urgent pledge for the future. This principle is based on analyses of Hans Jonas and Edgar Morin.

Is not public optimism exacerbated by a universalism that underestimates and crushes reference to the context, especially the idea of a nation?

### III. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM TO PATRIOTIC CONSTITUTIONALISM

The main criticism that we can formulate to constitutional patriotism as supported by Habermas, concerns the character “too abstract” (Lourme; 2019:59) of this constitutional patriotism. Thus, the character or even the “attachment to universal principles can suffice to hold together a community and to establish a certain level of concrete requirements of solidarity? Does the attachment to the Constitution carry the weight of the binding contributions that the community formulates on its behalf?” (Lourme; 2019: 59). As can be seen, Habermas strongly supports the constitutional process. In this sense, according to Jean-Marc Ferry, constitutional patriotism should not be seen as a purely “abstract or disembodied” concept (Ferry; 2004: 91). But Europe is in this respect a credible bearer, capable of representing and updating the values underlying a constitutional patriotism. This does not require that its political unity must be anchored in a homogeneous cultural, social and historical environment which makes it precisely lacking. However, the specific reason for attachment to Europe, which the idea of a homeland of the fundamental rights of individuals would provide, but also peoples, presupposes, it is true that Europe is viewed from the point of view of a certain historical and cultural unity which would make her a possible moral community. “(...) Constitutional patriotism, at a distance from an abstract universal, is connected to the ethical-historical consciousness of individuals and peoples and peoples who can self-critically relate to their own past (...) Each national history would begin to enter into dialogue with others to build a common history” (Ferry; 2004 :92). In other words, according to Jean-Marc Ferry, constitutional patriotism is always embodied in a particular historical consciousness, but above all, with regard to the values of constitutional patriotism, Europe presents “a certain historical and cultural unity” (Ferry; 2004: 61). In the sense that to a certain extent this attachment to values and principles makes Europe precisely.

The other grievance against Habermas about his constitutional patriotism lies in the fact that he returns to conventional patriotism, in that it reaffirms the importance of a common identity for democratic institutions” (Ferry; 2004: 59). Thus, does the fact that Habermas modified the basis of the common identity change nothing to the essence of patriotism? To this, according to Lourme, the political community identity, changes within the framework of constitutional patriotism. In short, the constitutional patriotism of Habermas, carries within it the seeds of a Europeo-centrism<sup>1</sup> that does not say its name. It is therefore a love of the constitution and the laws of Europe.

Instead of overtaking the nation-state by constitutional patriotism as Habermas thought, we suggest that this be done through patriotic constitutionalism, which will more precisely be to promote the idea of Nation-state. Thus, this patriotic constitutionalism would give more weight to the national reference than to the international one. We will have to resist foreign forces by asserting and preserving its identity, because beyond the borders, only the interests of the nation count. Hence the idea of political realism. For Chatué, the Nation must be defined as “the political inscription of the cultural” (Chatué; 2012: fourth hedging) because our states are borrowing states. Culture as an expression of the imagination of a people conceived as a political body, that is, a body that expresses its values at the same time as its interests, its affirmative will.

In front of a world space<sup>2</sup>, if not of a world space in which the particular and contextual identity is not taken into account, where no one affirms their own identity, we must, in order to be pragmatic and operational associate the idea of culture. By culture, we understand a collective heritage designated by the spirit that inhabits<sup>3</sup> it. It is oriented precisely according to three horizons: the cultural, hermeneutical and strategic dimension.

---

<sup>1</sup>Eurocentrism or Europeo-centrism is a form of ethnocentrism which consists of giving a central place to cultures and European values depend on other cultures. Eurocentrism has the corollary to consider as superior the cultures of Europe sometimes in the narrow sense, being limited to the continent. Sometimes in a broad sense, encompassing the various branches of Western civilization.

<sup>2</sup> Globalization comes from the global term that has appeared since 1990. It means a growing interconnection of economic phenomena, political and cultural on a global scale

<sup>3</sup> In the field of archaeology and anthropology, culture is defined as the body of knowledge and behavior which characterize a human society, or more generally a human group within a society. Culture refers to the way of living and thinking proper to a people or a group of peoples at a given time. The word culture is more or less synonymous with a people’s way of life, morals, customs, custom or tradition. Everything that determines how individuals think and act.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The problem posed at the outset regarding the ethical value of the discussion. We have realized that its tendency to universalism convened so far in the ethics of discussion sins by a Europeo-centrism or even a Western-style ethnocentrism because crushes and underestimates the reference in the context of the idea of nation.

The ethics of discussion is an essentially dialogical, intersubjective ethic. In fact, the ethics of discussion or the public space of Habermas as backed by a democratic ideal would constitute the road par excellence proper and adapted to each one. In fact, its notion of cosmo citizenship or world citizenship (world citizen) would therefore be a solution to this rampant globalization. Faced with the idea of a world space, if not a world space, we propose to leave this space and consider a refocused back on the concept of Nation.

#### REFERENCES

- [1] E. Kant, *La philosophie de l'histoire* (Trad. S. Pioletta, Paris, Gallimard, 1947).
- [2] E. Kant, *Projet de Paix Perpétuelle* (Traduction de J. Giden. Paris, Vrin. 1975).
- [3] A. Mac Intyre, *After Virtue*, Notre Dame University Press (South Bend, Indiana, 1981).
- [4] M. Horkheimer, *Eclipse de la raison* (Trad. J. Delonzy, Paris, Payot, 1974).
- [5] J. B. Bidima, *Théorie critique et modernité négro-africaine*. DE l'Ecole de Francfort à la Docta Sps Africana (Paris, publication de la Sorbonne, 1993).
- [6] J. Habermas, *De l'éthique de la discussion* (Paris, Les éditions du Cerf, 1992).
- [7] J. Habermas, *Le discours philosophique de la modernité*. Douze Conférences (Trad. C. Bouchindhomme et R. Rochlitz, Paris, Gallimard, 1988).
- [8] J. Habermas, *Après l'Etat -Nation*, une nouvelle constellation politique (Paris, ED. Fayard, 2000).
- [9] R. Descartes, *Méditations métaphysiques* (Paris, Larousse, 1973).
- [10] A. Renault, *l'ère de l'individu*. Contribution à l'histoire de la subjectivité (Paris, Gallimard, 1989).
- [12] J. Habermas, *Théorie de l'agir Communicationnel*. 2 tomes (Trad. de l'allemand par Jean-Louis Schlegel, Paris, Fayard, 1987).
- [13] L. Ayissi, « cogito et altérité », in Belle Wangué Thérèse (Sous la direction de l'individuel et le collectif (Paris, Dianoia, 2004).
- [14] J. Habermas. *Droit et démocratie. Entre faits et normes* (Trad. de l'allemand par Rainer Rochlitz et Christian Bouchindhomme. Paris. Gallimard, 1997).
- [15] J. M Ferry, *Habermas, l'éthique de la communication* (Paris, P.U.F, 1987).
- [16] K-O. Appel, *Penser avec Habermas contre Habermas* (Ed de l'Eclat, 1990).
- [17] J. Habermas, *Morale et communication*, conscience morale et activité Communicationnelle, (Trad. Et introd. par C. Bouchindhomme, Paris, Cerf, 1986).
- [18] L. Jaffaro, *Habermas et le sujet de la discussion*, (Presse Universitaire de France n°5, 2001).
- [19] J. Habermas, *La pensée postmétaphysique* (Trad R.Rochlitz, Paris, Armand Collin, 1993).
- [20] I. De Mecquenem, Cosmopolitisme in: P.A. Taguieeff f (éd), *Dictionnaire historique et critique duracisme*, (Paris, PUF, 2013, tome 2).
- [21] P. Ondoua, « Cosmocitoyenneté et idéologie chez Habermas Une critique africaine de la mondialisation libérale » in *La philosophie et les interprétations de la mondialisation en Afrique*, sous la direction de Ebénézer Njoh Mouellé, (L'Harmattan, Paris, 2009).
- [22] J. Habermas, *De l'usage public des idées*, écrits politiques 1990-2000 (Fayard, Traduit de l'Allemand et de l'Anglais par Christian Bouchindhomme, 2002).
- [23] L. Lourme, *Qu'est-ce que le patriotisme ?* (Paris, Vrin, 2019).
- [24] J-M. Ferry, « Face à la question européenne, quelle intégration post nationale ? », *Critique internationale*, (Paris, vrin n° :23, 2004).
- [25] J. Chatué, *L'Afrique noire et le biais épistémologique*, (Yaoundé, Editions clé, 2012).
- [26] H-G. Gadamer, *Langage et vérité*, (Paris, Gallimard, 1995).
- [27] J. M. Aguirre Oraa, *Raison critique et Raison herméneutique ?* (Paris, Cerf, 1998).