TECHNICAL NORMATIVITY AT GILBERT SIMONDON

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ABSTRACT: In Du mode d'existence des objets techniques, Simondon had proposed an ethics that could save the machines, but in this text, now classical, it was only a philosophical ethic external to the techniques themselves. Beside this philosophical ethic, there is a normativity specific to the technical activity from which Simondon infers the constitution of social norms, that is, ways of thinking and acting, as well as the modes of existence of individuals. Technical normativity is thus always “universal”, and from this point of view, the real idea of technical normativity in Simondon suggests that the techniques are all good and that the ways in which they are displayed are merely anthropological projections installed by man in these techniques. This article then aims to highlight in a study first, exegetical these two moments of Simondonian ethics. Finally, he proposes to reopen the Simondonian theoretical offer of the absolute neutrality of technical objects, denouncing the anti-humanist ways that necessarily load such a position.

Keywords: culture, man, normativity, technique, universality.

I. INTRODUCTION

Simondon, contrary to what we usually accuse him of, that is, of not having been able to think ethics, is an honest thinker of ethics. His reflection on the regimes of individuation is simultaneously a reflection on the sense of ethics; and individuation expresses ethics when in return ethics is given as the other name of individuation. To rediscover the meaning of this reconciliation, it is necessary to refer mainly to the conclusion of L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information. Before reaching this conclusion, Simondon had already noted in the chapter 3 of the first part of this opus, “Form and substance” as “the relationship between the different domains of thought are horizontal” [Simondon; 2005: p. 111], which was already amounted to qualifying otherwise than by “hierarchization” and “identification” of the relationships between the different phases of being. Individuals according to their regime of individuation and on their order of magnitude, they can only be divided according to “an indefinite scale”. This already meant laying the foundations for a thought of ethics as close as possible to individuation, so that, just as individuation postulates the relationship, so also “ethics itself must appear as a study of the relation proper to living beings” [Simondon; 2005: p. 112]. In the conclusion of this same work, Simondon insists on the inheritance of ethics to individuation, to such an extent that ethics is given as the discovery of a constituent normativity of individuation. As Simondon will then point out, thinking ontogenesis is “to discover the foundation of a normativity” [Simondon; 2005: p. 317], since, in fact, the individual is not the whole of being, but only a phase of being. Thus the end of this conclusion will insist on the idea that “ethics express the meaning of perpetuated individuation” [Simondon; 2005: p. 335]. There is then a strong ethic that emerges from the study of individuation as there is a normativity that emerges from the study of the technical reality to which we dedicate the substance of this reflection.

At Simondon, technical normativity covers both the idea of intraneity and extraneity from ethics to technology. In the first case, Simondon thinks of ethics as a set of universal standards that technology refers to society, he thinks of technique as the basis of social norms; and, in the second case, he thinks less of an ethic to apply from the outside to the technique to regulate its short as to a true ethics as philosophical thought whose vocation would save the technique of its cultural muzzling by developing in its regard an adequate symbolization. Considering these two aspects, Simondon will show that the techniques are neither good nor bad in their background, he will support that they have the seeds of their vice in the intent to fabricate men, which amounts to saying that the supposed vices of techniques are only anthropomorphized aspects of man’s own vices. However, such a theoretical posture is not a simple attempt to dilute in extremis the drifts of modern anthropotechnics? The Simondonian desire to purify techniques by splitting them from their vice can be thought of otherwise than as an anti-humanist will to offer man as food to the technician hybris.
II. **IDEA OF AN EXTERNALIST ETHICS OF TECHNIQUES**

Simondon reflects on the technique in a context where it is fashionable to think against the technique. According to him, it is necessary to convert the traditional contemptuous look on the techniques, in order not only to understand them in that they are in themselves, but also, in order to think of an ethic that is not anthropocentric and not theocentric, able to account for their own normativity. Simondon sets the stage for this need to rediscover a normativity intrinsic to technical reality in *Du mode d’existence des objets techniques* and in the *Note complémentaire sur les conséquences de la notion d’individuation* and in the 1983’s text on the *Trois perspectives pour une réflexion sur l’éthique et la technique*. It is indeed from the search for such a normativity that the solution to the problem of partiality or alienation can emerge of modern culture. Simondon draws the analogy between the way culture looks at technical objects and the way man looks at strangers; the common denominator that describes these two looks is the word “ xenophobia”. Culture maintains fear transformed into hatred of technical objects, which it considers the enemy when it does not reduce them to their aspects of utensils. Simondon notes that ‘culture behaves with the technical object like man towards the foreigner when he lets himself be carried away by primitive xenophobia. [Simondon; 2012: P. 9].

Is Simondon’s project to “raise awareness of the meaning of technical objects” in order to insert them into the ‘family of human objects’. He wants to demonstrate that ‘the opposition between culture and technology, between man and machine, is false and unfounded” [Simondon; 2012: p. 9] and that a complete culture would be a culture that supports man and the system of the objects he produces. The campaign of denigration of the technique orchestrated by the culture is never but an eclectic attitude, because, at the same time and this since antiquity, it has discriminated against the field of techniques by distinguishing between “noble techniques” to be valued and “non-noble technique” to be devalued. In the modern period, this devaluation of the technique according to its sectors still persists; it is not the whole technique that is rejected by the culture, but this particular aspect of the technique that lies in the reality of machines and that Simondon intends to defend by insisting on their intrinsic normativity [Guchet; 2010: p. 232].

Simondon’s study in the second part of *Du mode d’existence des objets techniques* sheds particular light on the context of this index of technical reality. It is because the advent of the individual machine had made us to lose to man his role as a carrier of tools; that is why, in return, man’s hatred of machines could find his explanation in this loss of role [Simondon; 2012: p. 162]. But according to Simondon, the man did not work as a tool carrier only temporarily until the domain of individual machines is constituted [Simondon; 2012: p. 102]. Man, on the other hand, must play a role above and below the technical individuals neither as a true technician nor worker tool-carrying worker or economic machine operator specialist. It is this new role for man that creates the conditions for an egalitarian relationship between him and the machine; egalitarian relationship which will only begin to account for the intrinsic value of technical objects. Man’s role is less to be tools carrier than to be ‘the conductor’, working to put the reality of the machines together [Bontems; 2016] at the same time as producing a true symbolization for them.

It is this concern for the symbolization of techniques that is needed to understand as an ethical requirement, that philosophy will have to work to the advent, as it has already done in the past in working for the “abolition of slavery”. Simondon expresses this wish from the exordium of *Du mode d’existence des objets techniques* when he writes: “The awareness of the modes of existence of technical objects must be carried out by philosophical thought, who happens to have to fulfill in this work a duty analogous which the role it played in the abolition of slavery and the affirmation of the value of the human person” [Simondon ; 2012 : p. 9]. Philosophy must work to clarify the state of relations between man and technical objects; it must work to make these relations fairer, more egalitarian.

The 1983 text on the *Trois perspectives pour un réflexion sur l’éthique et la technique* offers itself as an important site to think about the extraneous ethics of techniques Simondon elaborates an ethics of techniques according to three perspectives as indicated in the title of the text: there is an ethics of the present of the technique, an ethics of the future of the technique as well as an ethics of the past of the technique. What is involved each time? The present – not ours, but that of Simondon – is that of destruction techniques and especially nuclear which can only be accompanied by harmful effects. Such a technique will long if not definitively remind Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and one might be tempted to believe that the right attitude towards them would be to develop, as Jacques Testart thought, an ethic of “non-research” [Testart;1986], that is to say to stop work on nuclear energy. However, if we stick to the analysis of the *Note complémentaire sur les conséquences de la notion d’individuation*, any technique is the result of a requirement for invention, so that a technical achievement comes only in reaction, that is to say as a solution to a requirement felt as a problem that precedes it. Nuclear power is indeed the solution to an energy requirement and its perverse effects can be curbed without stopping research, Simondon is quite clear about this when he shows that “paradoxically, we can estimate that the nuisance (pollution and danger of release of radioactivity into the environment) of nuclear power plants would decrease with a radical advance of the technique that would allow to pass from the old and
Unfortunately still current fission, fertile in waste and to obtain elements usable for military purposes, at controlled fusion, which would consist in short, to create miniature suns, an almost inexhaustible source of energy through which paradoxically, but yet really, the technique would reach, in the state of full development, nature. The essential problem of the present in Energetic, would thus consist in pushing to the highest possible point the scientific-technical effort to achieve a high nuclear efficiency to control any problems in the production of energy under a peaceful regime, and to resume the nuclear problem by removing it from the destructive ends of current nuclear applications (H-bomb)” [Simondon; 2014: p. 338].

Technological research is therefore redemptive; it follows its course by recovering the negative effects of an old technique to make them better if not completely eliminate them. It assumes that no technique is absolutely bad, that “technical progress conceals in itself and essentially a good, a potential good and also, in the end, a current asset” [Simondon; 2014: p. 340]. It is the role of “in-depth technology” present this “good” at the heart of each technique. Simondon builds on the achievements of the Note complémentaire to reiterate the idea of an ethics immanent to an advanced technology and which resides in its “recuperation” function. So to recap: it is the technique that saves the technique; we regulate the ethical problems of a crude technique through more technical sophistication and “ethics immanent to techniques is conquered” thanks to the in-depth technology and reveals itself under the species of a true dialectic of operative recovery” [Simondon; 2014: pp. 340-341].

The perspective of the future is that of construction techniques. Simondon here engages in an evaluation of the ecological movement. According to him, “there is a load of irrational in the ecology lived to the full.” [Simondon; 2014: p. 342]; his discourse is that of a return to the source of nature, a return thought of as ‘renunciation of the urban environment’. This load of irrational is first of all the illogical and incoherent nature of his discourse. The ecological movement is supported on the results of science and technique to show the depletion of the earth’s resources or exponential growth of population and consumption; logically, it should at least recognize that science and technology are good in this sense; but that no, on the contrary, it decrees the return to wildlife, “the return to essentially agricultural sources”. Moreover, this same ecological trend is accompanied by a certain pessimism and its desire to return to the wild, something constructive that should be taken into account: ‘The ecological movement is very valuable because it contains a constructive ethic that has its standards and perhaps also its limits as any normativity. What is constructive, it is the awareness of the need to not rely solely on hard (or dense) energies and to know how to equip oneself to take advantage of renewable energies (waterfall, wind, fermentation of household waste from a farm operations/exploitation)” [Simondon; 2014: p. 344].

The perspective of the past is the development of a recovery. Simondon pleads for the recycling and recovery of old objects, obsolete objects, objects that have fallen into obsolescence. He calls for an increase in their affectivity; he even goes so far as to draw the analogy between the situation of the elderly and that of old objects. Almost two decades before the writing of the Trois perspectives pour une réflexion sur l’éthique et la technique, Simondon was already saying the same thing when, in his interview on mechanics with Le Moyne, he said that “an attitude is needed”, an average attitude of friendship, of society with them, of correct companionship and, perhaps, something a little ascetic so that we know how to use them even when they are old, ungrateful, and that we can have a certain kindness for the former object which deserves, if not tenderizing, at least the consideration due to its age, and respect for its authenticity, the sense of its temporal density” [Simondon; 2014: p. 413].

Simondon thinks of the work of reinsertion of these old objects under the prism of a “dialectic of recovery”: “this dialectic” is turned to the past as a source and makes an effort to reinsert the main patterns into the present by relying on future-oriented trends. It is essentially a matter of selectively recovering in the past what can, in conformity with the main trends of the future, fit into the present of research and even industrial achievements” [Simondon; 2014: p. 345].

The “dialectic of recovery” is thus the gesture by which a civilization first discharges itself with a sum of fallen objects in obsolescence, regardless of their operational status before they are subsequently recovered, selectively, and reincorporate them in the present. Simondon describes the programmed obsolescence of objects as a ‘general massacre’ due to the advent of the “consumer society”, because “when an object is reformed for obsolescence, it is an important quantity of human labor that vanishes without profit, and becomes unrecoverable. So this is an ethical option in relation to techniques” [Simondon; 2014: p. 346].

It is by taking into account the importance of collectors and antique dealers that we manage to operationalize the ethical concern of a “dialectic of recovery”. Collectors are passionate about ancient things, rare things that are no longer in circulation or production and they are looking for “a taste of the collection”. Antique dealers are excellent in the restoration and sale of “furniture, works of art, books given to them by private individuals” or they could find in the auctions’ [Simondon; 2014: p. 347]. However, even if collector and antique dealer practice an ethic of recovery, we should celebrate the gesture of the first better than that of
the second. This one does not spend all the time worrying about ethics in the process of recovering objects, since its logic is commercial; the collector is careful to take in his collection original objects, not counterfeit and which, when modified, are only in the direction of improvement.

To understand the report that Simondon establishes between technique and ethics or normativity in general, we must also refer to the two texts of 1961 'Technical object and modern consciousness' and 'Anthropo-technology' respectively. These texts cover the idea that the technique is neither charged with hostile intentions or friendly intentions towards men nor charged with will. It does not recover deep that the anthropological aspirations that man himself has put into it without these aspirations being in it on its own initiative. The technique is in itself neutral, it is neither for man nor against man, it is only what Man wants her to be, for better or for worse. Simondon truly saves the technical object by accusing anthropology or the science of man of being the great responsible of its excesses. If the technique alienates man, it is not because it is alienating by nature, it is rather because it covers the alienation that man himself has placed in it; if the technique subjects man to slavery, it is not because it conceals this capacity of submission to slavery, but because the slavery it produces is an anthropomorphism which could not be the cause. This idea was already present in Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, where Simondon questioning man’s fascination for the perfect automaton, he saw in this fantasmatist gust only the vain political-social and “technocratic aspiration to unconditional power” [Simondon; 2012: p. 10]. “Technical object and Modern consciousness is the burden: “the technical object of making man a slave is accused: this is perfectly true, but man is in reality a slave of himself, because he accepts it, when he gives himself over to technical objects; he gives himself over to them as one gives his soul to the Devil, out of desire to power, or glory, or wealth; temptation does not come from the object, but from what the subject believes to see in the object that it mediates” [Simondon; 2014: p. 363].

The action which will then consist in saving the technical objects and which Simondon designates as a “purifying psychoanalysis of the technical object” [Simondon; 2014: p. 363] should be understood as a double “purifying psychoanalysis”. For, on the one hand, it will be a matter of removing the technique of anthropomorphism in which it is confined by technocratic aspiration, in order to make of it a constituent of the culture next to aesthetic objects and sacred objects and, on the other hand, to remind man of the fundamental continuity between himself and its technical objects in the sense that they are still the expression of a “condensed human effort”. Simondon can then write that it is necessary not only to reform our gaze, to purify it, but also to reform the technical operation: it must aim to be an open, perfectible, and neotenic object, that is, the "condensed human effort". Simondon can then write that it is necessary not only to reform our gaze, to purify it, but also to reform the technical operation: it must aim to be an open, perfectible, and neotenic object, that is, the repository of evolutionary potential; this object must not be a thing sold, possessed, but something which establishes a participation” [Simondon; 2014: p. 363]. With this last word, “participation”, Simondon wants to emphasize the idea that the technique thus purified becomes the "companion of man and not a thing” or pure object, free in relation to it though linked to it” [Simondon; 2014: p. 363], the technique becomes not the supplement of soul that Bergson vowed in Les deux sources de la morale and religion, but rather the “supplement of society and power of action” [Simondon; 2014: p. 363], in the sense that it induces this time around an internal normativity.

III. THE INTERNAL NORMATIVITY OF TECHNIQUES. THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSALITY

According to Canguilhem, “it’s because that the value is in the living that no value judgment concerning his existence is made on him” [Canguilhem; 1992: p. 159]. In other words, each individual is the soil of irreducible and at the same time not universal normativity. one cannot judge the ‘meaning’ of a singular living being by inferring that ‘meaning’ of another living being considered a model. From one living person to another caught in the same genus and in the same species, something is already changing regarding the cellular constitution and as to the constitution of the organic “medium”, and that is why each biological normativity is unprecedented, immeasurable. Value is for the individual or the living because it is ‘in the living’; heteronomy is loss of self, loss of biological identity, annihilation of biological footprint, alienation of self. In the footsteps of Canguilhem, Simondon will allow himself to think the technique under the prism of the same inheritance of values. We will then see that the value will be at Canguilhem in the living when she’s at Simondon’s in the technique. Canguilhem then wants to think about the non-universality of values and norms while Simondon wants to regain a universality of standards by the technique.

The Note complémentaire sur les conséquences de la notion d’individuation precedes and prepares ethical thoughts of Du mode d’existence des objets techniques and the Trois perspectives pour une réflexion sur l’éthique et la technique. If from the conclusion of Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et information, Simondon gives himself as principal adversary to think an ethics of both individuation and technique the hylemorphic thought that still distinguishes between pure and practical ethics, it must be said that it is in the Note complémentaire that he truly manages to reconcile ethics formerly sectored by hylemorphism distinguishing between norm and value. The first is the fact of the being already individuated and the second is
consansbstantial to the being made, that is to say, in the process of individualization. True morality is neither on the side of norms nor on the side of value, but on the side of both, with the precaution that it is the value as it is attached to the individuation that precedes and prepares the advent of the norm. It is therefore this notion of value that must be worked to regain the definitive meaning of what could be a normativity specific to the technique.

In Chapter I of this Note complémentaire, “Value and objectivity”, Simondon defines the value as both action and symbol. This is because it distinguishes between two types of value: relative values and an absolute value. This is “the action through which there can be complementarity” [Simondon; 2005: p. 503], it is “the value that allows the relationship” [Simondon; 2005: p. 504]. Culture represents such a value in the sense that it is defined as the beginning of action”. The relative values are those that “express the arrival of a condition of complementarity”. [Simondon; 2005: p. 503]. They are linked to things, to individuals, but without belonging to them in their own. Among these value as an organic condition and value as a technical condition; the remedy which heals belongs well to the individual, but is not constitutive to the individual, just as the food that allows to be kept belongs to the individual without constituting it. The organic and technical conditions, while defining the value as relative, define it at the same time as a “symbol”, that is, not only as an external complementary doublet that would have to be found to maintain a balance, but also as thought produced by culture as action and truly designating an extension of the represented reality. Simondon already anticipated the function of culture developed in Du mode d'existence des objets techniques. He notes that “culture” is related to the ability to symbolize organic and technical conditions instead of transporting them in bulk in the raw state [...].Culture can only be effective if it has the capacity to act on symbols at the outset and not on Gross Realities’ [Simondon; 2005: p. 504].

To be effective, culture must be reflexive, that is to say “sensitive to the need for a questioning of man by itself” [Simondon; 2005: p. 504]. Reflexivity is a return to oneself, creating the conditions through which the individual is discovered as incomplete. We now know that it is incomplete because it is not substantial; we now know that because that it is incomplete it is relational, that it is realized only when it is related. A reflexive culture would therefore be a condition the discovery of an uncomfortable situation at the heart of the individual which leads to the need to take into account a ‘allagmatic relationship’ between two aspects of culture - man and the system of these objects. Thus, “the sense of values is the refusal of an incompatibility in the field of culture, the meaning of a fundamental absurdity of the human person” [Simondon; 2005: p. 506].

Above all, it must not be seen as the refusal of all specific determinations in particular beings. The compatibility sought between the aspects of culture is then only the search for an environment of negotiation between these different aspects. This allows it to specify that “the value does not oppose the determinations; it recognizes them. The sense of value is inherent in the relationship by which man seeks to resolve the conflict by establishing compatibility between the normative aspects of its existence” [Simondon; 2005: p. 506]. Simondon therefore did not work incidentally to account for the human world and the field of techniques. The soteriological role of the technique is beginning to appear clearly in the second chapter of the Note complémentaire.

It shows the universality and above all the effectiveness of technical normativity. This saves man from the power of rigidity related to community life. Simondon defines the technician as the “worker” and the “specialist” as a pure individual, that is to say, a singular being, a mutant that emancipates from community stability to regain social dynamics. We have already said the Simondonian distinction between society and community. It is now necessary to specify that, Simondon attaches the biological value to the community while he thinks society as an ethical site because it is technical. Man, because he rejects the technique, is therefore community while the technique, because it is immediately closed to any closure, is social. The primary function of the technique is thus to be mediation, and that is why “the technician, in a community, brings an irreplaceable new element, that dialogue with the object as it is hidden or inaccessible to the human person of the community” [Simondon; 2005: p. 511].

The actions of the worker as well as those of the specialists dissipate in the hic and nunc of the practice. On the contrary, the gesture of the technician is not limited by this dual spatial and temporal boundary. Not only that the gesture of the technician does not exhaust itself once it is carried out, but remains intact by spreading beyond its production site. Simondon will say to this end that the technical being is of an “inexhaustible fertility as a being of information; he is open to every human gesture to use or recreate it, and is part of an impulse of universal communication” [Simondon; 2005: p. 512]. Simondon can not only infer a normativity specific to the technician as a pure individual, but also inflect on it a normativity specific to the technique as it is always the power of the universal, which normativity is really independent of social reality, since the technical object is the foundation of an internal normativity of which the only criterion of legitimisation is the internal scheme of operation. Simondon writes whereas: “the technician can only act freely, because technical normativity is intrinsic in relation to the gesture that constitutes it; […] technical normativity is intrinsic and absolute; we can
even notice that it is through technique that the penetration of a new normativity in a closed community is made possible. Technical normativity changes the values code of a closed society, because there is a systematics of values, and all private societies which, admitting a new technique, introduces the inherent values to this technique, also operates a new structuring of its value code” [Simondon; 2005: p. 513].

As a direct consequence of this situation, there is no “closed community” as such, since there is no human environment without a technical purpose. From this point of view, if social normativity ultimately has no taken on technical normativity, it is because it is the latter that derives social norms. It is not yet well understood by culture and it can be said that the technique does not yet have the culture it deserves. Culture denounces as iconoclastic the pretensions of the technician to emancipate from what is given once and for all to propose a duty to be; it qualifies as selfish such a claim that it immediately assimilates the will of enjoyment of the individual to the detriment of the collectivity; it thus opposes the aspirations of the individual to that of the social group, but is not lacking not to celebrate the particular form of selfishness of poets and artists in general. Culture thus loads a paradox heard this time as a contradiction that must be resolved to save it from the main danger of alienation.

First of all, we must stop opposing individuals and communities, since “every social group is a mixed community and society” or ‘collective reality is indissolubly communal and social” [Simondon; 2005: p. 513]. Then, it is necessary to value technical objects in the same way that were cognize and value aesthetic objects because, according to the perspective of what is here defended, it is in vain that culture rejects out of itself the reality of techniques. Every social group is structured so that the available technology pool always creates the requirements of a multiplication of techniques. It is that the demands in each social environment are always ahead of the achievements and the need to make up for these demands, that is to say, to solve the human and technical problems, is summed up in an ever increasing effort of multiplication/improvement of techniques. This is why “the technical being is converted into civilization” [Simondon; 2005: p. 514] and that the proper type of normativity inherent in the technique is the image of the crystalline germ which, from its mother water, spreads out in all the directions. Thus, “the technical being thus exists as a germ of thought, concealing a normativity that extends far beyond itself” [Simondon; 2005: p. 514]. Techniques evolve according to a “dynamic continuity rule”, which means that, on the one hand, each technique bears within itself the conditions of its own limitation; and that, on the other hand, this limitation creates the conditions for ever-pressing progress.

As we can see, technique is what regulates man’s relationship to the world, his relationship to his fellow men in social life and its relationship to itself. The technique is good in itself, since, according to Simondon, it contains a “good”, a “current good”, and a “potential good”, the type of normativity it imposes is the condition of social normativity. However, is it not fundamentally anti-humanist to make social normativity depend on a technical normativity that is not always for the benefit of man?

IV. TECHNICAL NORMATIVITY AND ITS ANTI-HUMANIST DRIFTS

The problem of an extraneous ethic of techniques arises at Simondon in the form of an internal contradiction to the work. While in Du mode d’existences des objets techniques, he put forward the idea that technical experimentation should not concern that nature and never the human - one of the rare times Simondon speaks about the potential danger that represents the technique for the human - at the whim of a revaluation of his own thought, he comes to affirm that man’s relationship to the machine cannot be complete and just if man definitely plays the role of operator and regulator machines. This Simondonian wish of a parity of level between his own thought, he comes to affirm that man’s relationship to the machine cannot be complete and just if man definitely plays the role of operator and regulator machines. This Simondonian wish of a parity of level between the de-substantialized man and his substantialized machines, cannot be thought of differently than as notoriously anti-humanist, since it thus gives rise to technical and scientific experiments which visibly harm human nature in its immaterial aspect.

In Simondon, technic normativity embraces the idea of neutrality of the technical object; this is intended and conceived by the man who, therefore, must assume all the consequences happy or unhappy. Praiseworthy intention, but Simondon ignores, however, the strong attraction and the great fantasy power inherent in these technical objects. Of these fantasies in general, Tsala Mbani said that they “offer the human being the possibility of overcoming finitude by means of imagination”, which are the lot of the human condition. Hence the futurological surge that we observe today through the techno scientific dynamics, which translates into mental constructs that foreshadow future, potentially to change the course of the history of humanity. Only fantasy beings born of science fiction, because of their operatory and manipulative ability, alienate the ontological landmarks of the human that are: autonomy, freedom and dignity” [Tsala Mbani; 2014: p. 22].

The idea of technical normativity is at Simondon only an attempt to sweeten in extremis that which has since long inscribed on the “slope of cynicism”, to use the expression of Lucien Sève who used it to define this attitude almost flipantly that characterizes technicians and that consists in saying every time that everything is fine or that everything is under logic control while all signals are red [Sève; 1994].
The technical normativity as Simondon presents it throughout his work is a trapped normativity; it is similar to the gift that the demon Teuth presented to the Egyptian king [Plato; 1992]. If it is true that the technique has a form of normativity not negligible, the fact remains that such a normativity only concerns its own internal development, or its “self-growth”. Let’s say it from the outset, technical normativity can only lead to the mechanization of society, because its overriding criterion of definition is always “efficiency”. Moreover, this is what Jacques Ellul demonstrates when he writes not irrelevant: “I would like to recall a thesis which is very old, but which is always forgotten and that the need for continual renewal is that industrial organization, such as post-industrial, such like the technical or computerized society, are not systems intended to produce or consumer goods, welfare, or an improvement in people’s lives, but only to produce profit, exclusively” [Ellul; 1988: p. 471]. To make the social norm depend on the technical norm is to subject the future of humanity to the mechanical forces that they themselves would be in great need of what Bergson called in the Deux sources de la morale et de la religion the “soul supplement”. In this sense, the technical normativity thought in any sense at Simondon, can only be the ostentatious expression of an anti-humanism.

The direct corollary of this structuring of techniques under the mode of efficiency is the erasure of freedom, of the autonomies and the dignity of the human person. However, Simondon strongly desired such an “effectiveness”, which called of his wishes for the multiplication and acceleration of scientific and technical research and development, a technique a crude technique that can only be corrected by more technical sophistication. Simondon is visibly anti-humanist, since he cuts off from man what he grants to machines, that is, here, self-righteousness and dignity. In the same movement, Ellul remarked with foresight: “There is no technique possible with a free man […] The technique must prevail on man; it is a matter of life or death. The technique must reduce man to being a technical animal, king of technical slaves…There is no possible autonomy of man in front of technical autonomy. Man must then be worked by the techniques, either negatively […] or positively […] to remove the smudges that his personal determination introduces into the perfect design of the organization” [Ellul; 2008: pp. 126-127].

We must return again to the idea of neutrality of techniques at Simondon, because it contains ambiguities that it has hardly clarified. On the one hand, it asserts that the techniques are neither good nor bad in themselves; and, on the other hand, that the techniques, in themselves, still contain a “good”, a “actual good” and a “good potential”. We notice from the outset that the technique is neutral at Simondon only in the sense that it is purely good, because when it comes to putting its negative aspects to the index, Simondon points out that the defects of the technique are only anthropomorphized projections, that the germs of vices of the technique are only anthropomorphized projections, that the seeds of the defects of the techniques are in the human. Simondonian technological optimism is limitless; on the contrary, its anthropological pessimism is without appeal, which is why it feeds humanity to anthropotechnics manipulations. Ellul denounces such eclectic neutrality, targeted and deflected when it shows that it is impossible to dissociate the factors that make up the technique in order to obtain a purely good’ [Ellul; 1988: p. 55].

In contrast to Simondon, it should be said that all techniques are pharmaka, or for use Ellul’s word that all techniques are “ambivalent”. This means that Ellul clearly expresses. First, all technical progress is paid for by pollution, congestion, social stress and individual, destruction, ugliness, overconsumption, etc. Second, “technical progress raises more difficult than those it actually solves” [Ellul; 1988: p. 67]. Invasion of privacy, secrecy and excessive power, centralization. “We continue to obey the technical rules of the primacy of means. We accept the growth of problems. [Ellul; 1988: p. 67]. Technical normativity cannot be self-reflective; it cannot ask itself about its purposes. It does not know not where it goes. It addresses a number of specific, non-urgent problems, most often creating artificial needs. Third, “adverse effects are inseparable from positive effects”. Quatro, “the unpredictable effects” [Ellul; 1988: p. 82] are becoming ever more serious, because “the obsession with efficiency leads to taking ever more serious risks in the hope of escaping it” [Ellul; 1988: p. 85].

As can be seen, the technical normativity and the idea of purity of the techniques underlying it are fundamentally flawed; and this vice is at least the effect of a simple anthropological projection as the fact of a true mode of existence of technical objects that Simondonian technological optimism has helped to veil.

V. CONCLUSION

In the end, we started from the implications of normativity in Gilbert Simondon starting from its application to the world of technical objects, in order to put into perspective, the impact of such a vision on man, the main beneficiary of the technological offer. Thus, the essential philosophical diagnosis that we establish here comes down to the uncovering of the unspoken elements of this normativity which are in no way unthinkable. Therefore, it is important to denounce without any hesitation the angelism cheap with ostentatious tentacles that Simondon tries, with great reinforcement of well-run argument, to confer to technical objects. Except that such an ambition does not go without difficulty since it is accompanied by an inevitable anti-humanism which leads the philosopher of technique to a dehumanization of the human who, in the end, is reduced to the subordinate
stage of a technical and technological universe that risks, if nothing is done, contributing to its extinction. There is therefore no doubt that the project of a technical normativity as it emerges from the baptismal font of the thought of Simondon, though flamboyant on the form, load many difficulties that only a comprehensive ethical watch/Overall ethics will allow to prune in order to preserve the human from a possible reification by the technical object. Paradox decidedly appalling, since the main beneficiary (man) is towed by the object intended to serve him.

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