

In British Cameroons ethnic relations were more with French Cameroon than with Nigeria. The Fulani, Tikar, Mbo, Bamileke and Balong on both sides of the Anglo-French divide canvassed for unification (Nfi, 2014:23). Again there was no dominant ethnic group like the Ewe on the Nigeria-British Cameroons borderlands to campaign for integration with Nigeria

British economic policies favoured Ghanain Togoland and disfavoured Nigeria in British Cameroons. The British sought and obtained the rapid economic integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. In 1922 they constructed a road from Accra to Togoland and across the Volta River by ferry. In 1930 they connected the cocoa-producing areas of British Togoland with Kumasi, Accra and other coastal towns (Haan, 1988:34). It was for this reason that the Convention People Party (CPP) of Gold Coast worked hard for union with Togoland that was economically vital for Gold Coast as it produced one-tenth of Gold Coast cocoa. Again by the time of the plebiscite, British Togoland was part of an expensive project, the construction of a large dam on the Volta River that would generate Hydro-electricity for industrialisation. (Haan, 1988:6). With all these advantages, British Togoland could not reject integration with Ghana. In British Cameroons, the Northern portion was completely neglected, no roads, schools or health centres. The Southern portion that had plantations inherited from the Germans was exploited by the British and Nigerians. The Nigerians (particularly the Igbo) invaded the zone and occupied all services and plantation jobs. The brutality, spitefulness and overbearing attitude of the Igbo behaving like conquerors contributed more than any political party could have done to cause revulsion against integration with Nigeria during the plebiscite in Cameroon (Nfi, 2015:7). The territory did not benefit from any major project comparable to the Volta project. Instead Nigerians treated the British Cameroonians as a conquered people and their territory as a "colony of a colony". There was therefore an anti-Igbo spirit and feeling of neglect in the British Cameroons. This Igbo phobia worked against British Cameroons integration with Nigeria.

Unfortunately for the British, the Nigerian political class was not very enthusiastic about Cameroon like their counterparts in the Ghana. While the CPP tried to influence the outcome of the plebiscite by accelerating investment in British Togoland agriculture and infrastructure and by providing finance and propaganda materials, the Nigerian Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa only visited Southern Cameroons once. He was not excited about the British Southern Cameroons out of fear that their integration with Nigeria may alter the population balance between the three regions of Nigeria in favour of Igbo land or the Eastern Region (Nfi, 2015:109) However in the Northern Cameroons, Nigerians crossed the borders and voted since the plebiscite there was opened to "all genuine residents" (Ngho, 1996:225). This certainly worked in favour of integration with Nigeria as reflected in the final results in the Northern Cameroons.

When the plebiscite was administered on May 9, 1956, it offered the people of British Togoland only one of two options; union with an independent Gold Coast or continuation of existing trusteeship. Alternative options such as unification with French Togoland as preferred by the Ewe or Togoland were not made available (Patil, 2007). This means that the CPP had connived with UN and Britain to annex the British Togoland. This was not the situation in the British Cameroons. Here the voters had to choose between union with Nigeria and unification with French Cameroon. It was therefore difficult for the British to impose their wish.

The 1956 plebiscite in Togoland unlike the 1961 plebiscite in the Cameroons was ill conceived and premature. 1956 was too early for the Togoland to decide on their destiny. Again the British had gratuitously accused Togoland for being too small and too poor to stand on her own as an independent state. Britain stated further that Togoland did not have the capacity to sustain her independence if granted because she was not economically viable and landlocked (Kedem, 2007:54) This British position made many Togoland to see union with the Gold Coast as irreversible. Although the British also raised the issue of slender territory and absence of resources for the economic sustainability of an independent British Cameroons, the indigenes were not better-off with Nigeria so they could not fear to venture into reunification with French Cameroon

Besides, the unificationists in Togoland were divided thereby increasing the changes of the unionists. While the Togoland Congress wanted the unification of all Togoland as though the area were a natural entity, other unificationists said "led the North and Centre go to the Gold Coast if they wish but the South (Ewe territory) must remain as a trust territory so that the door may be left open for the uniting of the Ewe nation" (Acheampong, 2016:17). This discord benefitted the unionists who were united and led by the CPP. Meanwhile in the British Cameroons, there was total harmony amongst the unificationists led by the Kamerun National Democratic Party and *Union des Populations du Cameroun* who even benefitted from some moral and financial support from French Cameroon. Again the British and Nigerian officials saw reunification with French Cameroun plagued by terrorism as nothing more than a dream and thus paid little attention to the KNDP and its leadership who campaigned for it. Malcolm Milner, the British administrator, dismissed Igbo phobia as of no serious threat to the plebiscite results describing reunification as a romantic or poetic concept and not a plebiscite winning concept (Ndi, 2013:298). The popularity of reunification and its leaders was therefore

ignored by the British officials in Cameroon and this contributed to the vote against union with Nigeria. These were the issues that influenced the plebiscite results in the two territories.

1. Theoretical Framework

This study can best anchor on the Post-Colonial Theory. As propounded by Edward Said, the interest of this theory lies in what happens to people, communities and societies during and after colonisation. The colonial master divided ethnic groups in Africa without respect for their aspirations. This was the case with the partition of Togoland and Cameroon. The balkanisation of ethnic groups, the creation of heterogeneous “nations”, economic exploitation and cultural denigration resulted in chaos, corruption and civil wars in Africa today. So although colonial activities appear to be over, ex colonies are still living with its consequences leading to the emergence of secessionists’ movements and civil wars.

Similarly, the deprived actor (grievances) theory could also serve in the understanding of these separatist struggles. Collier and Hoeffler perceived grievances as “widely shared dissatisfaction among group members about the culture, political and or economic standing vis-à-vis dominant group”(2004:139) and that rebellion is likely to occur when grievances such as lack of political rights, ethnic or religious division in society and high inequality becomes unusually severe. This is what happened to British Togoland and British Cameroons in Ghana and the Republic of Cameroon respectively after independence.

2. Similarities between the two secession Movements

The movements started immediately after independence indicating the premature manner in which the Trusteeship Agreement over British Togoland and British Cameroons was ended. The protagonist all complain of the plebiscites organised by the UN to determine their destiny. The British (Western) Togoland Movement complain that the votes were rigged and that the results of the 1956 plebiscite are the only document to prove or defend the union with Ghana, they also insisted that such results did not spell out the conditions or terms of the union (Laglo, 2019:45). In fact British Togoland was “annexed” by Ghana in controversial circumstances and was most likely to peel off at a later date (Nuget, 1991:32). Similarly, the Anglophones in Cameroon complained that the 1961 plebiscite gave them only two options meanwhile they wanted a third option or independence for a separate British Cameroons (Ngoh, 1996:123) These secessionist movements are therefore similar in their blame for the UN and Britain for poorly negotiating the end of trusteeship.

The two rebellions have grievances that range from deplorable socioeconomic conditions and neglect, discrimination, rising youth unemployment, lack of industries and deficits of roads, schools and hospitals. With the Anglophones in Cameroon it is more of the neglect and denigration of their culture especially the English Language and common law system in favour of the French Language and Napoleonic Code. With the British Togoland Movement, their region remained backward since 1956 serving as a source of energy and raw materials for Ghanaian industries. In fact the Ewe region or former British Togoland was the poorest part of Ghana in the 1970s (Brown, 1980:584)

In Ghana, the secessionist are demanding the immediate restoration of British Togoland as a sovereign state (Laglo, 2019:49). In Cameroon the radical Anglophones and armed groups are out for the restoration of the British Southern Cameroon or “Ambazonia arguing that the Anglophones voted for a federation at the plebiscite of 1961 but in 1972 the federation was abolished for a unitary state and in 1984, the Francophones withdraw from the union when the name of the country was changed from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon, the name they had before reunification (Ngoh, 1996:123)

The Cameroon Anglophone secessionist at several instances attempted to attract international sympathy to their plight. In the 1990s Gorji Dinka filed an application for member of Ambazonia in the United Nations and in 1994 J. N. Foncha and S. T. Muna who led British Cameroon into reunification with French Cameroon returned to the UN to ask for separation (Ngoh, 1996:322). They also organised conferences in Europe and the United States. The most popular were the Minnesota Conference September 26, 2003 and the Dallas Conference April 22, 2007 (Ayim, 2010:192). The Anglophone separatist also tried law suits in foreign courts. In January 2003, a group of Southern Cameroonians sued the Yaounde government in the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Banjul (Ayim, 2010:147). The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland (TOLIMO) which was the first movement of the Togolese in Ghana formed in 1972 also attempted to woo the international community. On November 10, 1972, the movement wrote a petition to the Secretary General of the Organisation of Africa Unity calling for a separate state of Western Togoland (Brown, 1980:584). In February 1974, TOLIMO members greeted Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary General with placards and a petition as he passed through Togo (Nuget, 1991:160). Some countries like Togo, Libya and Guinea indirectly and unofficially offered support to these separatists in the 1970s (Brown, 1980:587). On January 12, 2018, the Association of Volta youths and the Association of Western Togoland Youths petitioned the UN and Amnesty International against Ghanaian exploitation of minerals in their land (Ashon, 2019:1)

In the 1970s and following the dissolution of the federation in 1972, the first pressure group in favour of Southern Cameroons autonomy emerged in Cameroon. This was the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). It was also in the 1970s that TOLIMO was formed in Ghana. While the SCNC members were conscious of their Cameroonian identity and wanted a return to the federal system of government agreed on at reunification in 1961, TOLIMO also wanted to reunite British Togoland and the Republic of Togo.

Both secessionist movements frequently organise street demonstrations and protest. This was the case with the Anglophones in Cameroon who protested in on September 22 and October 1, 2017 proclaiming the independence of Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia (Tembon, 2018: 5). The British Togoland Movement protested in March 2017 and on March 6, 2017 its members were arrested and charged for treason (Laglo, 2019:42). Arrests and detentions also featured in the Anglophone rebellion in Cameroon as both separatist protested in 2018 and 2019.

The social media has been effectively used by the promoters of these rebellions to mobilise their followers and gain support. The British Togoland Movement use a Facebook platform called "EweawoGameasuMinamitso" meaning "Rise up Ewes, It is time" to market the idea of separation. The Ewe ethnic group is the dominant group in this struggle. The victory of Isaac Dogboe (an Ewe) over a Japanese boxer Hidenori Otake on August 26, 2018 was welcomed on the platform as the "demonstration of the strength of Ewes and a foreplay of their independence victory which will soon come" (Laglo, 2019:33). The declaration of the Independence of Western Togoland State by their leader Charles Kormi Kudzordi on November 16, 2019, was broadcast on Facebook by some members of the separatist group. Anglophone Cameroon activists in the diaspora run several Facebook pages, blogging sites and other media channels through which they use hate speech to discredit the Yaounde regime.

In order to convince observers on the seriousness of their dreams, both separatist movements have an anthem, a constitution and a flag. They also have state institutions. The Anglophones in Cameroon have the Interim Government of Ambazonia and the Togolese in Ghana have the Western Togoland Consultative Assembly and Judicial Council of Western Togoland. These state symbols are used during their manifestations in public or on the social media and the institutions are used for governance. The symbols also attract international sympathy. Today both separatist groups are members of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).

3. Differences between the two Movements

The two separatist movements may have similar origins and objectives as shown above but a close look at the organisation, activities, magnitude and popularity of these movements reveal significant differences. While in Cameroon, the separatist are organised in armed groups in possession of killer weapons like AK 47 and other locally fabricated guns and bombs with violence as the modus operandi, the separatist in Ghana do not want their activities to be characterised by violence as in Cameroon. In Ghana, the separatist are open to negotiations, discussion and tolerance to achieve their objectives (Laglo, 2019:5)

In fact in Cameroon the separatist since 2017 adopted civil disobedience, ghost towns, school boycott, urban violence, kidnapping for ransom, assassination of opponents described as "black legs or enablers", arson and civil war as their mode of protesting. More than 300 soldiers of the Cameroon Army and 100 civilians have been killed by the separatist in Cameroon. The regular Cameroon army also responded by killing the "Amba boys" as the separatist warriors are called and burning suspected hideouts of separatist and their collaborators (Nfi, 2020:4). The British Togoland Movement has not yet adopted warfare as its method of separation and so far its protest demonstrations have not resulted in human losses.

The British Togoland Movement seems to be a movement for the old generation. The generation that experienced the plebiscite of 1956 and the gradual subjugation of British Togoland by Ghana. Their leader, the white haired Charles Kormi Kudzordi is about 85 years old and moves with a walking stick. The secretary of the movement George Nyakpo is also above 70 years. The young generation of British Togolese between 20 and 40 years are unwilling to join the struggle even if they do not oppose it (Laglo, 2019:50). However, the movement is gaining popularity amongst the youths in the diaspora especially those in the USA. Meanwhile in Cameroon the leaders of the various separatist groups like Ayaba Cho Lucas, Mark Baretta, Chris Anu, Tapang Ivo and their warriors on ground zero are all below the ages of 50 years. This may be explained by the fact that the young Anglophones are familiar with the history of the British Southern Cameroons taught in Secondary schools and universities unlike the history of British Togoland which is not taught and which does not feature in any text books for schools in Ghana (Laglo, 2019:42)

While the central issue in the Anglophone protest in Cameroon was the differences in the British and French colonial legacies inherited by Cameroon, the British Togoland Movement had no such issue. In Cameroon the French language and French judicial system were imposed on the minority Anglophones and this provoked the Lawyers and Teachers strikes of October 2016 (Tembon, 2018:6). The integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast was complete and the people almost lost their identity. Their problem was ethnic

and cultural as they argue that their land had a unique history and culture and warrants being its own country (Kedem, 2005:17).

The Togoland movement in Ghana is also different from the Anglophone secession struggle in Cameroon in that, the people are in a majority of Ewe ethnic group and their leaders use the Ewe local language to promote their nationalism. They are also united by geography because a greater part of their land was constituted into the Volta Region of Ghana. The Anglophones in Cameroon although united by English language and a common colonial past are divided by many ethnic groups and geography. The Yaounde regime divided them in 1972 when their territory was divided into the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. This division has been accentuated by the divide and rule tactics of the Yaounde governments. The Anglophone struggle for the restoration of the independence of Southern Cameroon (Ambazonia) has therefore suffered because of the Northwest-Southwest differences.

Again, the Homeland Study Group Foundation (HSGF) led by Charles KormiKudzordi has served as the mouthpiece of the Togolese separatist but in Cameroon, there are many groups that claim to speak for the Anglophones. Some of these groups were; The Southern Cameroons National Council led by NforNgala, the Interim Government led by Dr Sako, the Anglophone Civil Society Consortium led by AgborBalla, and the Ambazonia Defence Council led by Ayaba Cho. Internal division is therefore a major feature of the separatist group in Cameroon.

II. CONCLUSION

This paper has revealed that the colonial boundaries and colonial decision especially by the United Nations under the influence of the great powers are still haunting Africa today. In the 1956 plebiscite, British Togoland voted to remain with the Gold Coast (Ghana) having been administered as an integral part of the colony since 1922. In the second plebiscite of 1961, the British Southern Cameroons voted against continuity with Nigeria having experienced British administration as an integral part of Nigeria since 1922. They voted for reunion with their "brother" in French Cameroon despite having been separated by the Anglophone-French partition of Cameroon.

Few years after independence, both political mergers suffered secessionist threats with similar objectives, complaints and accusations. The struggle for the independence of Southern Cameroon (Ambazonia) was rapidly radicalised with violence, terrorism, kidnappings and the killing of soldiers and civilians becoming the modus operandi. Although largely inspired by the Anglophone revolution in Cameroon, the British Togoland separatists in Ghana are still to adopt violence and terrorism. These crises if not well managed, may eventually give birth to other new states in Africa and render the continent more balkanised fragile and vulnerable.

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