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Rhetoric in its historical dimension: Towards the sophistic, technical and philosophical rhetorics

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ABSTRACT: This article describes the historical dimension of classical rhetoric. Like the western philosophy, classical rhetoric is devised into the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary periods. As we know, classical rhetoric has gone through the following three stages: the sophistic rhetoric emphasizes the role of the speaker; the technical rhetoric focuses on the importance of the speech; and the philosophical rhetoric deals with the relevance of the audience. In this article, we give an equal importance to the three components of rhetoric, that is, the speaker, the speech and the audience.

I.   INTRODUCTION

Alfred North Whitehead famously summarized the whole history of western philosophy as "footnotes to Plato."[1] Also, Immanuel Kant considered "the Aristotelian logic as an achieved science."[2] However, in recognition of our ever-changing world, we should be writing the history of every discipline. Keeping in mind various books on the history of both philosophy and logic, this article aims, first, at providing the historical study of classical rhetoric. As we shall see, the background of the study of rhetoric can be subdivided into the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary periods.

The ancient period is concerned with: the beginnings of rhetoric, followed by rhetoric as it is understood by the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. While the period around the Roman Empire deals mainly with Cicero-Quintilian-Augustine and some Christian preachers, the Modern time emphasizes the rationalistic (or self-evident and demonstrative) approach to rhetoric. And the contemporary period is a time of Chaïm Perelman's new rhetoric, that is, a time of the revival or renewal of the so-called "old" (or classical) rhetoric.

Indeed, this article aims atdescribing the sophistic, technical and philosophical rhetorics to college and university students, researchers and lecturers.It aims at equipping them with influential theories and approaches concerning the concept of rhetoric. Keeping in mind the three rhetorical components, our article will focus on Chaïm Perelman's new rhetoric.

II.   RHETORIC IN ITS HISTORICAL DIMENSION

1The Ancient Period

1.1 The Beginnings of Rhetoric

The history of rhetoric in the Western tradition does not have a precise date. This is why I prefer speaking in terms of "beginnings" or "origins" of rhetoric. On the one hand, Richard Leo Enos' conception of rhetoric begins in ninth century BC with the writings of Homer. Enosfinds three main functions of rhetoric: the "heuristic, eristic, and protreptic."[3]For him, the heuristic function is a capacity of self-awareness in communication skills. The eristic function of language draws the attention to captivate others. And the protreptic function of discourse expresses the language's ability to turn or direct human thought.With these functions, "words afford a speaker the possibility for persuading others to think the way he or she thinks."[4]

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[1] Peter Kreeft, *Socrates' Children: Ancient: The 100 Greatest Philosophers* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2019), 17.

[2] Pierre MutundaMwembo, *Éléments de logique* (Kinshasa: Éditions Medias Paul, 2006), 15.

[3]Richard Leo Enos, *Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1993), 4-6.

[4] James A. Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction*, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2013), 27.

In fact, the Homeric rhetoric is perceived through poems portraying some songs on heroic or mythological subjects, whereby the Homeric orator is understood as speaking with an inspiration from either a god or a specific education. For instance, Achilles (the hero in Homer's *Iliad*) is said to have been taught by Phoenix to be "a speaker of words and a doer of deeds."[5] But in Homer's *Odyssey*, Telemachus' speaking skill comes both from his education and his experience. In both Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, rhetoric isdescribed as an art and a science of persuasion. As an art, rhetoric is either acquired by birth, or inspired by the gods. And as a science of persuasion, it comes from human education and experience.

On the other hand, Jane Sutton argues that rhetoric may be traced to Syracuse city in the fifth century BCE. For him, rhetoric begins with Empedocles (490-430), who uses his speaking ability to oppose some powerful rules of his time. Since 467 BCE, Corax offers training to citizens defending their claims in court by directing Syracuse towards democratic reforms,[6] which "created the need for a new kind of education, an education consistent with the new politics of limited democracy."[7] During that time, women, slaves, children, and foreigners are excluded from public speaking because "only all native freeborn males… were political equals, with equal rights to debate and to determine state policy."[8] With the distinction between the Mass[9] of ordinary citizens and the Aristocracy, the sophists[10] teach rhetoric to anyone regardless of class.

1.2 The Sophists and Rhetoric

According to Enos, there are four main Sophists, who are: Gorgias, Protagoras, Isocrates, and Aspasia. Gorgias of Leontini (485-380) is famous for his three-part formulation of skeptical philosophy: "No thing exists. If anything did exist, we would not know it. If we would know that something existed, we would not be able to communicate it to anyone else." He studied rhetoric under Empedocles, whom Aristotle credits with having invented the art of persuasion and with having been "one of the most innovative theorists in Greek rhetoric."[11]

Gorgias himself boasts of being able to persuade anyone of anything. He even suggests that the only reality we have access to "lies in the human psyche, and its malleability and susceptibility because a rhetor is a *psychagogos*, like a poet, a leader of souls through a kind of incantation."[12] For him, effective rhetoric has a hypnotic effect on audiences captured by the Orator's "the power of logos or persuasive words, which constitute a type of witchcraft."[13]

Being active in Athens, Protagoras of Abdera' reputation (490-420) was spreading in the sense that "wherever he went, rich and clever young men flocked to hear him."[14] He is considered "the first person to charge for lectures… and also the first of the Greek Sophists."[15] His most famous maxim is that "man is the measure of all things; of all things that are not, that they are not; of things that are, that they are."[16] He is known for his "important contributions to rhetoric, epistemology, the critical study of religion, dialectic, and literary criticism."[17]

Isocrates (436-338) "studied philosophy under Socrates and claimed him as his master."[18] He also studied under Gorgias and Corax's famous Tisias. However, Isocrates never achieved fame as a public speaker because his speaking voice was not strong enough to hold the attention of a large public audience. Among his achievements, first, he was a highly paid "*logographos*" or speechwriter. Second, he allowed the accused to have an equal chance to respond in court to accusers. Third, he founded the first rhetorical schools in Athens.[19]

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[5] Homer, *Iliad*, trans. George Chapman (New York: Wordsworth, 2003), 9.443.

[6] Jane Sutton, "The Marginalization of Sophistical Rhetoric and the Loss of History," in John TakisPoulakos, ed., *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric: Multidisciplinary Essays on the History of Rhetoric* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 87.

[7] It was this theory of rhetoric which, under the name of rhetoric, was considered by the Greeks the τέχνη "par excellence" [Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, translated by John Wilkenson and Purcell Weaver (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 9; John TakisPoulakos, *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric*, 57.

[8] Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Ancient Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 7.

[9] The Greek term "*demos*", often translated "the people", carries a meaning that is closer to "the masses." An elite group, called the "*gnorimoi*," holds a higher social status than do members of the ordinary "*demos*." But, a large number of daily decisions are left to the determination of this larger group. And the qualities to distinguish the members of the elite are noble birth, wealth, education (*paideia*), and virtue (*areté*). This is why the sophists' education is viewed as a means of entering a higher social class (James A. Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 33).

[10] The Greek word "*Sophos*" means wise or skilled. The term "sophists" (pl. *sophistae*) carries with it the modern meaning of professor, teacher, authority or expert, while a sophist specializing in speechwriting is called a "*logographo*s." But a third group of sophists is all about professional orators who give speeches for a fee, whether for entertainment in a court or legislature. Therefore, the 3 kinds of sophists are: teacher, speechwriter, and professional speaker; Edward Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 11.

[11] Richard Leo Enos, *Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle*, 72-91.

[12] George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 35.

[13] Jacqueline de Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 3.

[14] Maurice Balme and Gilbert Lawall, *Athenaze: An Introduction to Ancient Greece Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 66.

[15] Billig G. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 40.

[16] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 151e-152a.

[17] H. D. Rankin, *Sophists, Socratic, and Cynics* (London: Croon Helm, 1983), 32.

[18] Jaqueline de Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens*, trans. J Lloyd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), viii.

[19] Brian Vickers, *In Defense of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 155.

Aspasia (c. 470-c. 400) is the only prominent woman in formal rhetoric[20] because the Greek Democritus "asserts that women should not be allowed to practice argument because men detest being ruled by women... It is prohibited to women to plead on behalf of others."[21] In fact, most women "were confined within the house at all times, except on occasions of religious festivals."[22] In the context of a limited democracy, many women "did not participate in any formal public functions."[23] Nevertheless, Aspasia "is fundamentally reputed to have taught the art of rhetoric to many, including Socrates, and may have invented the so-called Socratic Method."[24]

1.3 Socrates and Rhetoric

In Plato's *Gorgias*[25], Socrates discusses the question about Rhetoric with the following three Sophists[26]: Gorgias (On Rhetoric's nature), Polus (On Rhetoric's power), and Calicles (On Rhetoric's audience). First, Socrates is not satisfied with Gorgias' answer[27] that the nature of rhetoric is concerned with persuasive words. Against narrowing the scope of rhetoric, Socrates distinguishes between "true knowledge" (*episteme*) and "mere belief" (*pistis*) or "mere opinion" (*doxa*) about justice. Instead of appealing to popular beliefs and opinions about justice, he says that "one who truly understands justice could never choose to do injustice. This is because to understand justice is to love it, and at the same time to hate injustice."[28]

Second, Polus defines rhetoric as "the noblest of the arts," that is, "the true art, a *techne*."[29] He associates rhetoric with fame, wealth, nobility, status, and power. For him, Rhetoricians exercise "the greatest power in the country," a power to "act like tyrants and put to death anyone they please and confiscate property and banish anyone they have in mind to."[30] However, Socrates considers Polus' rhetoric as a "foul" and "ugly" art that aims at "flattery" (*kolakeia*). According to him, a true art brings health to the body (gymnastics and medicine) and health to the soul/mind (legislation and justice). For him, a true rhetoric directs towards a physical and mental health.

Third, Socrates opposes Calicles, who defines rhetoric as following pleasure or desire (*hedone*) rather than excellence or virtue (*areté*) towards the audience. But he argues that Calicles is not free; he is a slave to both his own desires and those of his audience, the masses. According to Socrates, "If you are making a speech in the Assembly…and the Athenian *Demos* disagrees, you [must] change and say what is good, true, and right."[31] In short, Socrates finds that there exists a true art of rhetoric with justice, well-being, and virtue as its goals.

1.4 Plato and Rhetoric

In *Phaedrus*, Plato presents a conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus, who is "an immature youth intoxicated with the Sophists."[32] Socrates finds him attractive, physically as well as intellectually. Unlike Plato's *Gorgias*, his *Phaedrus* presents another kind of rhetoric, "a science of dialectics."[33] This is why Socrates defines rhetoric as "an art of influencing the soul [*technepsychagogia*] through words [*logoi*], while Plato defines it as the art of leading the soul toward truth through words and arguments [*logoi*]."[34] Plato's conception of rhetoric is about knowledge of truth, or the soul.[35] At the psychological level, he distinguishes:

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[20]According to Cheryl Glenn, "Aspasia seems to have been the only woman in classical Greece to have distinguished herself in the public domain." Cheryl Glenn, "Locating Aspasia on the Rhetorical Map," in Molly Meijer Wertheimer, ed., *Listening to their voices: The Rhetorical Activities of Historical Women* (Columbia: University of Carolina Press, 1997), 21.

[21] C. Jan Swearingen, "A Lover's Discourse: Diotima, Logos, and Desire," in Andrea Lunsford, ed., *Reclaiming Rhetorica: Women in the Rhetorical Tradition* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 25.

[22] Susan Jarratt and Rory Ong, "Aspasia: Rhetoric, Gender, and Colonial Ideology," Andrea Lunsford, ed.,*Reclaiming Rhetorica*, 13.

[23] Andrea Lunsford, ed.,*Reclaiming Rhetorica*, 14.

[24] Andrea Lunsford, ed.,*Reclaiming Rhetorica*, 13.

[25] Socrates argues that the Sophists' rhetoric does not embody an adequate conception of justice. For him, it is unjust to manipulate the public opinion because true justice is founded on knowledge and it secures the well-being of both the individual and the society [Seth Benardete, *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 36].

[26] Socrates considers the Sophists as "flatterers and corrupters of the people". He criticizes them on a number of grounds, including their "taking money, and making exaggerated pedagogical claims, and boastfulness" [Brian Vickers, *In Defense of Rhetoric*, 153].

[27] Bruce Gronbeck, "Gorgias on Rhetoric and Poetic: A Rehabilitation," in *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 38 (Fall 1972), 35.

[28]Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 54.

[29] Vickers, *In Defense of Rhetoric*, 97.

[30] Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. Walter Hamilton (New York: Penguin Books, 1960), 466b-c.

[31]Plato, *Gorgias*, 481d-e.

[32]Poulakos, *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece*, 79.

[33]Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens*, 71.

[34] Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 62.

[35] Plato's conception of rhetoric is mainly found in his two dialogues, called *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*. However, other dialogues embody Plato's obsession with rhetoric as a counterpoint to philosophy. As James Golden and his co-authors note: "Insights on the nature of eloquence, the need for ethics in communication, and use of pathos are discussed in the *Apology*; rhetoric as a means generating meaning and knowing in *Cratylus*; criticism and taste, speech introduction, ethos, humor and persuasion in *Laws*; learning and recollection in *Meno*; first principles and dimensions of interpersonal communication in *Phaedo*; types of speech forms and recommendations concerning the length of speeches in *Protagoras*; the cardinal virtues, ideal forms, audience analysis and adaptation and the notion of conversion in the *Republic*; genuine and sophistical discourse, and refutation in the *Sophist*; model speeches by Agathon and Socrates in the *Symposium*; the use of examples and analogies appeals to the motives in *Statesman* and the noble lover, probability, and knowledge versus opinion in *Thaetetus*"; James Golden et alii, *The Rhetoric of Western Thought*, 7th ed. (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 2000), 22.

The soul's three parts by the characteristic loves of each. One part loves wisdom; the philosopher's soul is governed by this part. A second part loves nobility and honor, and people of a military cast of mind are controlled by this part of the soul. Third is the appetite or lust loving part. People controlled by this part spend their lives pursuing pleasure, never knowing peace of mind or self-control.[36]

Thinking of a rhetoric worthy of a philosopher, Plato recommends a technique capable of convincing the gods themselves[37]. Since philosophy remains a rational activity, he wants to shift from the ignorant audience (emotionality or the masses) to the gods themselves (rationality or divine beings). According to him, "good rhetoric" is "the dialectical instrument advocated as a means of eliminating the false answers in order to reach the true ones."[38] For this reason, "bad rhetoric"[39] and sophistry seem to be identical because they are a pejorative discipline dealing with verbosity, demagogy, manipulation, or flattery[40].

1.5 Aristotle and Rhetoric

Unlike Plato's conception of the philosopher-king, Aristotle argues that the common good of a society cannot be imposed from top to bottom by a narrow ruling elite supposed to know what is better for all inhabitants of the city. For him, the common good is always a matter of discussion between citizens. This is why he considers discussion to be a necessary condition for a true rhetoric because people must argue for their well-being. In the context of rhetoric, Aristotle is more concerned with the ways people reason about public issues (or dialectical reasoning) rather than with the mere formal logic (or analytical reasoning.)[41]

Aristotle's contribution is essential because he wrote the first treatise on rhetoric.[42] In this treatise, rhetoric becomes a "discipline," which includes argumentation and rhetoric *stricto sensu*. Argumentation is based on reasoning, while rhetoric *stricto sensu* is concerned with eloquence (or elegance).[43] In the opening sentence of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle states that: "Rhetoric is the counterpart [*antistrophos*] of dialectic. It is a subject that can be treated systematically. The argumentative modes of persuasion [πίστεις] are the essence of the art of rhetoric: appeals to the emotions deform the judgement."[44] In this way, argumentation and rhetoric *stricto sensu* are the two alternative ways of dealing with questions faced by the Rhetorician. With argumentation, the rhetor puts the question "on the table" (discussion and debate), whereas with rhetoric *stricto sensu* he or she puts it "under the table" (figures of style).[45]

Taken as a whole, Aristotle's view of rhetoric places greater emphasis on argument or reasoning (*logos*) rather than it does on both emotions or passions (*pathos*) and credibility or personality (*ethos*).[46]His "rhetoric at large" (argumentation and rhetoric *stricto sensu*) is fundamentally opposed to analytical reasoning (theory of deductive inference). As we know, the analytic reasoning deals with formal logic (or logic in the strict sense), whereas the dialectic reasoning generally focuses on informal logic (or logic at large).[47]

III.   RHETORIC AROUND THE ROMAN EMPIRE

2.1 Cicero and Quintilian

After Plato and the primacy of "*Pathos*," after Aristotle and the primacy of "*Logos*," Cicero offers the primacy of "*Ethos*." In the wake of Aristotle's treatise, the next great breakthrough in rhetoric is achieved by Roman Rhetoricians. If the most innovative surviving voice is Cicero (106-43BCE), the most synthetic is certainly Quintilian (35-100CE). Cicero devotes an entire book to the role of the speaker, entitled *De Oratore* (In English,

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[36] Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 61.

[37] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 7.

[38] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 257c-279c.

[39]Comparing rhetoric with cookery, Plato concludes that "bad rhetoric makes pleasure its aim instead of good, and… [that] it is merely a knack and not an art because it has no rational account to give of the various things which it offers." (Plato, *Gorgias*, 48).

[40] Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ix.

[41] Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 79.

[42] The first book of this treatise is concerned with the definition of rhetoric. The second book uses rhetoric in order to impress or please the audience, while the third book deals with figures of style. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Dover Publications, INC, 2004).

[43] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 25.

[44] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, vii.

[45] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 26.

[46] "*Logos*" is a Greek term, meaning word, discourse, argument or reasoning, and intellect or reason because it distinguishes us from other animals. This is why John H. Randall writes that "to act in accordance with logos is to act intellectually" [John H. Randall, Jr, *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 253]. The Greek term "*pathos*" refers to emotions or passions that move an audience to action. By creating feelings (influence or impact) on the audience, they are able to change (increase or diminish) its beliefs and opinions about a question. Aristotle's rhetoric deals with fourteen passions: anger and calm, shame and imprudence, love and hatred, fear and confidence, benevolence and pity (compassion), indignation and contempt, emulation and envy [Michel Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 28]. "*Ethos*" is a Greek term referring to the speaker's authority, legitimacy, credibility or personality. Ethos is most closely associated with ethics because, concerning the questions of Law and health, Lawyers and Physicians are legitimate in their answers. They are competent authorities because their credibility and knowledge (expertise) inspire faith in them. Their "ethics" lies in the possession of the virtues (capacities) and competence needed to provide an appropriate answer; Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 5.

[47] William Kluback and Mortimer Becker, "The Significance of Chaïm Perelman's Philosophy of Rhetoric," in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie. La Nouvelle Rhétorique. EssaisenHommage à Chaïm Perelman.* Revue TrimestriellePubliée avec l'aidefinancière du ministère de l'éducation nationale-33ᵉᵐᵉannée, 127-128, 1979, 34.

About the Speaker or *On the Orator*). Unlike the Greek democratic society, the Roman society is hierarchical and aristocratic. This is why the socio-political context (or situation) of the speaker pre-determines the expected type of speech[48].

While a Platonic speaker begins his discourse with a question, the Roman rhetor socio-politically does begin it with an answer. In Roman rhetorical setting, there are five steps for a rhetorical discourse: *Inventio* (rhetor begins collecting valid arguments to support his thesis); *Dispositio* (rhetor arranges or organizes his strong, accepted and weak arguments); *Elocutio* (rhetor chooses or selects the figures of style which fit to the audience); *Memoria* (rhetor memorizes or assimilates his speech); and *Actio* (rhetor presents or exposes/pronounces his speech).[49]

With the Roman rhetoric, the speaker (*ethos*) must reveal the following virtues: courage (or determination), wisdom (or experience), and mastery of the subject (elegance or eloquence). In fact, these three virtues summarize the three goals of Roman rhetoric[50]: "*Delectare*", "*Movere*", and "*Docere*", as Cicero puts it[51]. These aims are also taken up in Quintilian's *InstitutioOratoria* (translated and known as the *Orator's education* or *Education of the Orator*)[52]. These three goals represent the Latin equivalents of *Ethos*, *Logos*, and *Pathos*, because to please, teach and move constitute the foundation of the Roman rhetoric.[53]

First, to please is to present oneself as an adequate speaker, by fitting or coping with the situation and by exemplifying the necessary or personal virtues required so as to inspire credibility. At this level, the speaker should please, charm or be able of captivating the audience's attention. Second, to teach is the basis of reasoning because it mainly requires argumentative skill, specific knowledge or mastery of the subject. Third, after teaching or proving, the speaker must be ready to move his audience to action. At this step, the speaker's teaching (argumentative skill) and mastery of the subject must move the audience's emotions in the direction the Orator wants.[54] In a sophistic way, the Roman Orator aims at persuading his audience.

2.2 Augustine and the Orders of Preachers

Between 410 and 1000 CE, rhetoric *stricto sensu* becomes important to the functioning of the Catholic Church. With the influence of Cicero and the Roman education, Augustine becomes an orator and teacher of rhetoric. He sees rhetoric as a path to wealth and fame because prior to his conversion, he could live, believe, and teach like any sophist. He also argues that a true rhetoric could aid in the pursuit of truth, that is, God. Influenced by Bishop Ambrose, he becomes a Christian preacher by discovering and teaching the contents of the Holy Scriptures[55]. In defending scriptural or divine truth, he adopts the Ciceronian ends of rhetoric (to please, teach, and move his audience). And in the context of making possible the soul's health through communicating divine truth, he adopts Plato's conception of "true rhetoric," which is a medicine for the sick souls. On this note, he requests the Church to use what is useful in the classical rhetorical treatise[56].

The art of preaching develops in the 12th and 13th centuries. The Orders of Preachers (such as the Dominicans and Franciscans) emerge in the Church[57]. By dealing with the audience that is illiterate and unfamiliar with the contents of Scripture, the preaching instruction emphasizes the selection of appropriate and accessible texts,[58] whereby the preacher must possess "competent knowledge or explicit knowledge of the Articles of Faith, the Ten Commandments, and the distinction between sin and non-sin."[59] Also, the preacher has to "place at the beginning something subtle and interesting… some terrifying story or illustration."[60] But when dealing with the literate audience, these preachers were able to adapt themselves to their context.

IV.   RHETORIC DURING THE MODERN PERIOD

During the modern era, many books on rhetoric are published, such as: César ChesneauDumarsais (*Tropes*, 1730), Pierre Fontanier (*General Treatise on the Figures of Speech*, 1827), Bishop Richard Whately (*Elements of rhetoric*, 1828), George Campbell (*Philosophy of rhetoric*, 1846), David Hume (*Treatise of Human Nature*, 1853), etc. These modern authors focus on the subject (or speaker) in the process of communication. In the

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[48]Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 35-40.
[49]Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 40-41.
[50] M. C. Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome* (London: Routledge, 1996), 50-61. See also G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 103-130.
[51] Cicero, *De Oratore*, (English translation D. Sutton, *About the Speaker*) II, 128 (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1942).
[52] Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory*, trans. H. Butler (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1921), 6, 2, 9-13.
[53] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 41.
[54]Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*,42.
[55] Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine*, trans. D. W. Robertson (Indianapolis, IN: Library of Liberal Arts, 1982), 7.
[56]The four Augustine's books, related to the teaching and practice of rhetoric, are: *Confessions* (397), *City of God* (413-426), *On Christian Learning* (*De Doctrina Christiana*) (397-426), and *On the Teacher* (*De Magistro*).Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 117-120.
[57] George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 174.
[58] James J. Murphy, ed., *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), 112.
[59]James J. Murphy, ed., *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts*, 124.
[60]James J. Murphy, ed., *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts*, 126.

study of rhetoric,[61]Paul Ricoeur says that "the history of rhetoric is a history of rhetoric *stricto sensu*, which was reduced to figures of style."[62] In this rational and sophistic perspective, Descartes argues that,

> Whenever two men come to opposite decisions about the same matter, one of them at least must certainly be in the wrong, and apparently there is not even one of them who knows; for if the reasoning of one was sound and clear he would be able so to lay it before the other as finally to succeed in convincing his understanding.[63]

Chaïm Perelman counters Descartes' assertion by saying that perhaps both are right, perhaps both views could be proven in the process of argumentation and dialogue[64]. He believes that judgements not based on the categories of formal logic could still be reasonable, not irrational. This is why he distinguishes the logical reason from the rhetorical reason. The former deals with correct expressions and rules of inference, while the latter explores the domain of contextual or situated reason[65]. For him, the rhetorical reason does not merely discover truth and error; but it also justifies and argues because Perelman's rhetorical reason goes beyond the analytical, demonstrative, and calculable approach[66].

Perelman criticizes René Descartes, who says that if two men have contrary judgments about the same thing, one at least must be mistaken and irrational. However,he argues that the Cartesian claims are excessive and unreasonable in the sense that:

> Both parties may have good, reasonable opinions because human, practical political, and moral problems cannot be reduced to the antinomy of either true or false. There are problems which cannot be even presented in the categories of formal logic; they cannot be syllogistically expressed or proven.[67]

As we shall see, Perelman's new rhetoric does not eliminate formal logic; his new theory of argumentation does not reject the value of syllogisms concerning deduction and induction. But it only reserves a proper place for them in the totality of human reasoning. With this rhetorical reason, the concept of reasonableness is inherently pluralistic; it is incompatible with all pretentions of monism, absolutism or totalitarianism[68]. This is to say that the modern rationalism and sophistry deals with a monistic and dictatorial world, whereas the Perelmanean rhetorical reason (or reasonableness) leads to a pluralistic and democratic world.

V.   RHETORIC DURING THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
4.1 The rejection and rediscovery of Rhetoric
With the modern Rationalists and logical Positivists, the study of rhetoric becomes a "forgotten" subject. During the modern area, even the word "rhetoric" is not mentioned in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* nor in the *French Philosophical Dictionary of Lalande*. This is why Chaïm Perelman says that the teaching of rhetoric has been struck from the programs of both High schools and Universities in Europe over fifty years.

However, Perelman argues that the 20th century has been described as the century of advertising or propaganda,[69]whereby he deals with "arguments put forward by advertisers in newspapers, politicians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings, judges in decisions, and philosophers in treatises."[70] Dealing with a kind of practical logic, he extends the domain of reason. Operating in the realm of the probable, the contingent, and the plausible, his enlarged concept of reason elaborates new ways of thinking and acting.

[61] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 45-46.
[62] Paul Ricoeur, *La Métaphore* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 13.
[63] René Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, trans. Taylor Anderson (New York: Indianapolis, 2008), 2.
[64] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 2-3.
[65] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 27.
[66] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*,28.
[67]Maneli, *Perelman's New Rhetoric as Philosophy and Methodology for the Next Century*, 17-18.
[68]Maneli, *Perelman's New Rhetoric as Philosophy and Methodology for the Next Century*, 19.
[69]Bruce Lannes Smith, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ralph D. Casey, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*: *An Annotated Bibliography* (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1933); *Social Forces. Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946); Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York: Random House, 1973); Stanley Jason, *How Propaganda works* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Antony Pratkanis, *Age of Propaganda. The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (California: University of California Press, 2002); Noam Chomsky, *Media Control. The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002).
[70] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 10.

Within the context rediscovering the art of persuasion, Perelman wants to overcome and open formal logic to a "new rationality."[71] He wants to think about a new logic or the new rhetoric, which is a logic of socio-political reality. This is why, in 1958, Chaïm Perelman the *New Rhetoric*, which is known as a new theory of argumentation. With this book, he wants to rediscover certain Greek and Latin authors concerning the art of persuasion, which he calls the technique of deliberation and discussion[72].

With this book, Chaïm Perelman rediscovers ancient writings on rhetoric. He thinks of "rhetoric at large," within a dialectical approach, as it is exemplified by Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*. He also thinks of a generalized rhetoric, which is the combination of argumentation and rhetoric *stricto sensu*. This is why he considers the new rhetoric as the revival of the Roman rhetoric, which was only reduced to figures of style.

4.2 Perelman and other contemporary Rhetoricians

Before Perelman's publication of *The New Rhetoric*, I. A. Richards wrote *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, which originated as a series of lectures at Bryn Mawr College in 1936. In this book, Richards claims that rhetoric should be "a study of misunderstanding and its remedies."[73] Discussing "misunderstanding," Richards argues that: "Most words, as they pass from context to context, change their meanings."[74] With his linguistic approach, Richards rejects George Campbell, Kenneth Burke, Stephen Toulmin, and Chaïm Perelman, who instead deal with rhetoric philosophically, politically, and psychologically.

In his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Campbell is particularly interested in effect of successful rhetoric upon the mind. For him, rhetoric is "a useful art."[75] Richards studies the terms of "tenor" and "vehicle" in order to describe the workings of metaphor.[76] In fact, the best approach on this subject is found in Paul Ricoeur's *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*.[77] Also, a broader understanding of rhetoric is found in the writings[78] of Kenneth Burke, especially in *Grammar of Motives* (1945), *Rhetoric of Motives* (1950), and *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology* (1961).

In *Grammar of Motives*, Burke comes back to the Aristotelian concepts of speaker, speech, and audience. In *Rhetoric of Motives*, he defines the "realistic" function of rhetoric as "the use of language" in a practical, contextual or situated dimension. While Richards sees rhetoric as a source of misunderstanding, Burke sees it as the hope of understanding or a potential basis of peace. And in *The Rhetoric of Religion*, Burke focuses on God's words in creating the world.

Reconciling Richards and Campbell, Perelman thinks of rhetoric from a philosophical and socio-psychological perspective rather than as a purely linguistic and literary phenomenon. In this process, he distinguished argumentation, which is always addressed to an audience, from formal proof, which is not. This is why the difference between Perelman's reasoning and that of others lies in an extensive notion of pluralism and dialogue. His philosophy of pluralism concerns a democratic society whereby there is a possibility of discussing, negotiating and arguing about the "*res publica*" (public thing) in order to reach an agreement or dialogue.

His philosophy of dialogue becomes not only a simple exchange of ideas, but it constitutes a philosophical or socio-psychological category, which promotes an endless exchange of arguments so as to establish the best possible solution in a given situation and at a given time. With his philosophical and socio-political approach, dialogue helps us to rearrange the lives of people in order to make them more tranquil, secure, and free. In fact, his philosophy of dialogue is a philosophy of values such as freedom, justice, tolerance, and equality. It is also a methodology of exhorting the public to be more respectful of one another's viewpoints.[79]

Among the contemporary scholars, Perelman is a central figure in terms of rhetoric. His conception of rhetoric is influential in the twentieth century restoration of rhetoric in the intellectual tradition of Western culture because the ancient art of rhetoric becomes again a respected part of the organon of learning.[80] In short, his conception of rhetoric is among the major contributions to contemporary thought: the use of reason in action.[81]

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[71] From Ancient period to Contemporary times, rhetoric has gone through four main steps: rhetoric has its origins (Homer, Empedocles, Corax, and the Sophists), development (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine, Dominicans and Franciscans), fall (René Descartes, George Campbell and David Hume), and renewal (Kenneth Burke, Stephen Toulmin and Chaïm Perelman).
[72] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 5.
[73] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 3.
[74] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 107.
[75] George Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: Harper & Brother, Publishers, 1868), 18.
[76] The "tenor" is what is meant by the comparison inherent in the metaphor; and the "vehicle" is what is literally said by the words used Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 294.
[77] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, Translation by Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
[78] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 294.
[79] Maneli, *Perelman's New Rhetoric as Philosophy and Methodology for the Next Century*, 136.
[80] Ray D. Dearin, ed., *The New Rhetoric of Chaïm Perelman: Statement and Responses*, 1.
[81] Maneli, *Perelman's New Rhetoric as Philosophy and Methodology for the Next Century*, ix.

VI.   TOWARDS THE SOPHISTIC, TECHNICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL RHETORICS

Throughout the western history, there are three components of rhetorical relationships, such as: the speaker (*ethos*), the audience (*pathos*) and the speech (*logos*). However, some thinkers have mainly focused on one of "the three components of the rhetorical relationship."[82] But, in Perelman's conception of rhetoric, these three components should either be put on an equal footing or be of equal importance by respecting the speaker, the speech as well as the audience.[83]

In the same line, George Kennedy distinguishes three[84] kinds of rhetoric: the sophistic, technical and philosophical rhetorics. The sophistic rhetoric is developed by the sophists and the Romans, and it emphasizes the speaker (*ethos*). This sophistic rhetoric concerns the image of the ideal orator leading the society by means of persuasion. Of the three Aristotelian rhetorical factors[85] (speaker, speech, and audience), the technical rhetoric concentrates on the speech (*logos*).And the philosophical rhetoric begins with Socrates' objections to sophistic and technical rhetorics because it focuses on the audience (*pathos*) and it is what Plato calls "true rhetoric," or "good rhetoric" because it helps us to shift from ignorant audience (persuading the masses) to a reasonable audience (convincing even the gods themselves).[86]

2.1 Sophistic Rhetoric and the "role of the Speaker"

Why do we speak of "sophistic" rhetoric? It's because the word "sophist" is derived from the Greek adjective "*Sophos*," meaning "wise," "teacher," or "expert." In Ancient Greece, Sophists were known as teachers and writers on public speaking. From these Sophists, the young Athenians could learn public speaking and also learn how to persuade others in the society. But, why do we really speak of "sophistic" rhetoric? It's because the focus was on sophistry, a term that implies the word "sophist," or the speaker's skills concerning persuasion.

In this persuasive context, some sophists gave lectures on rhetoric or wrote rhetorical handbooks by requiring their students to write, memorize, and deliver speeches so as to attract large audiences on occasions, like: high courts, competition, weddings, funerals, etc.[87] In fact, these sophists could teach a young man "the proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as a speaker and man of action."[88]

These sophists could teach "the art of verbal persuasion"; they could instruct their students in *areté* (a Greek term meaning virtue, excellence and capacity for success, although Socrates doubts that *areté*can be taught, for virtue is considered gift of birth). For Socrates, virtue (*areté*) cannot be taught, but it can only be inherited. Indeed, Friedrich Nietzsche says that rhetorical education "is gained in three ways, through *physis*, natural ability, through *technè*, theoretical instruction, or through *askesis* or *meleté*, practice."[89]

Why are the Sophists controversial? Plato calls the sophists "masters of the art of making clever speeches" and Xenophon reduces them to the level of "masters of fraud."[90] Sophists are controversial for the following five factors. First, they teach for pay. For example, Gorgias and Protagoras charge substantial fees for their teachings and other services. In this financial context, children from aristocratic families can generally access education, while rhetoric remains mainly out of reach of most ordinary working Athenians.

Second, most sophists are foreigners or itinerant who travel from city to city looking for work as teachers, entertainers and speechwriters. For this reason, sophistry is considered an exotic and import activity to Athens. Third, the sophists' cultural relativism contributes directly to Greek suspicion of these masters of persuasion. In fact, several leading sophists develop a view of truth as relative to places and cultures. As Jarratt notes, the sophists "were skeptical about a divine source of knowledge or value."[91]

Fourth, the sophists' education is a kind of linguistic constructivism. For Poulakos, the sophists believe that "the world could be created linguistically. For them, reality itself is a linguistic construction rather than an effective

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[82]*Ethos* (speaker) is the person who addresses a question with an answer or who brings this question to the attention of the audience (*Pathos*). But *Pathos* is simply another person, with his emotions and viewpoints, who reacts to the speaker's question. And *Logos* (speech) is the discourse pronounced in order to negotiate (reduce or increase) the distance between the speaker and his audience (Michel Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 118-119).
[83] Michel Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 119.
[84] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Its Secular Tradition*, 13-15.
[85] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.3.1.
[86] George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 14.
[87] During that time, some occasions include:*panegyric* (a speech at a festival), *gamelion* (a speech at a marriage), *genethliac* (a speech on a birthday), *prosphonetic* (a speech addressed to a ruler), *epitaphios* (a funeral oration).George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 45-46.
[88] W. Keith Chambers Guthie, *The Sophists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 20.
[89] S. Gilman, G. Blair, and D. Parrent ed., *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 19.
[90] The dialectical method leads to the notion of continuous "contrary arguments" (*dissoilogoi*). This dialectical method also leads to the notion of "*kairos*," a Greek term that respectively means: a favorable situation, an opportune moment, an urgent circumstance, an appropriate context, a nice time and right place.James A. Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 35.
[91] Susan C. Jarratt, *Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured* (Carbondale, IL: Southern University Press, 1991), xx.

fact."[92] Fifth, the sophists build a view of justice on the notion of social agreement or "*nomos*." Believing in *nomos*, they reject respectively "*thesmos*" (authority of the king), "*physis*" (authority of nature), and "*logos*" (authority of God)[93]. Also, George Kennedy differentiates the pure sophists from the philosophical ones.

For him, the pure sophists were teachers of rhetoric, who taught their students some theories on persuasion because their emphasis was on eloquence or elegance. They became rich because they were famous and fashionable preachers and teachers, who really influenced the Athenians' opinions and beliefs. These pure sophists even influenced the Roman Orators, who constituted the "Second Sophistry," which also influenced some Christian preachers and writers. However, Plato condemns the verbosity and manipulation of all the pure sophists.

But the philosophical sophists used oratory beyond the scope of persuasion. First, they expanded their sophistic skills on political, moral, and aesthetic subjects. Second, they could become orators as well as leaders in the Athenian cities. Third, they could deal with both persuasion and knowledge, that is, by dealing respectively with eloquence (or elegance) and learning (or knowledge). Fourth, these philosophical sophists influenced some Christian leaders, such as: Ambrose (Bishop of Milan) and Augustine (Bishop of Hippo).

The question should be: "is sophistic rhetoric relevant to human communication?" Yes because "When a speaker stands before his audience, he can try to locate it in its social setting."[94] In arguing, the speaker must also consider various conditioning agents that are available to increase one's influence on an audience. He or she must consider conditioning factors extrinsic to the audience: music, lighting, crowd effects, scenery, climate, voice, space, and time, etc.[95] Indeed, the speaker must consider some intrinsic factors, such as: attitude, knowledge, intention, expectations, etc., it was relevant to him because Perelman says, it "is necessary to speak and to be listened to."[96]In fact, sophistic rhetoric is relevant to human communication in terms of influencing the audience's viewpoints. As Chaïm Perelman notes, "Sometimes it will be enough for the speaker to appear as a human being with a decent suit of clothes, sometimes he is required to be an adult, sometimes he must be a rank and file member of a particular group, sometimes the spokesman of this group."[97]

For Perelman, the speaker should take into account the context or situation in which the audience reacts. At this level, he says that the important thing is not what the speaker regards as true or important, but knowing the views of those he is addressing. This is why he argues that: "The great orator…, seems animated by the very mind of his audience… It is indeed the audience which has the major role in determining the quality of argument and the behavior of orators.[98] Perelman's main concern is all about the "adaptation of the speech to the audience, whatever. Arguments that in substance and form are appropriate to certain circumstances may appear ridiculous in others."[99]

2.2 Technical Rhetoric and the "role of the Speech"

Of the three rhetorical factors identified by Aristotle,[100] the technical rhetoric focuses on the speech at the expense of the speaker and the audience. Emphasizing the importance of the speech (*logos*), Aristotle insists on dialectic, while Chaïm Perelman insists on the new rhetoric. Aristotle's insistence on the role of the speech came during the political changes because in many Greek cities and most fully in Athens, there was a political shift from monarchical to aristocratic system and then from the aristocratic to democratic government.

In fact, the Greek democracy led to an active participation of adult male citizens in various deliberative assemblies and law-courts[101]. In several law-courts, for instance, a man accused of a crime was expected to give a speech on their own behalf. However, for any reason of the sickness of an accused man, a relative or friend could give a speech on his behalf. Also, it was possible for any adult man to buy a speech from a logographer, or speech writer that the speaker could memorize and adapt it to the case at hand.

Indeed, the Greek democracy was exclusive and discriminatory because women, children, sick people, and foreigners were not allowed to speak in public sphere. Only the adult male citizens were involved in disputes over the ownership of property or other socio-political matters. These male citizens took up their own cases

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[92] John TakisPoulakos, *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 25. This linguistic constructivism is also used in the "first story of creation" (Genesis 1: 3-31). For example, "Then God said, 'Let there be light,' and there was light" (Genesis 1: 3).

[93] James A. Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 37.

[94] James A. Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 22.

[95] James A. Herrick, *The History and Theory of Rhetoric*, 23.

[96] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 18.

[97] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 18.

[98] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 23-24.

[99] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 25.

[100] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.3.1.

[101]In terms of participation, the minimum size of an Athenian jury was 201 members for important cases. Depending on complex cases, the Athenian jury would reach 501, and even more in some cases. But in terms of procedure, there was a speech by the accuser and a reply by the accused. During the discussion or debate, each partner gives his speech in a form of a continuous address to the jury. And whenever there was disagreement, evidence of witnesses was taken down in writing before the trial and then it was read out in court. During the debate process, each speech aimed to "persuade" the jury of the justice of either the accuser or the accused.

before the courts because "the most important part of a speech is the argument." Focusing also on argumentation, Perelman's new rhetoric constitutes a rediscovery, renewal or revival of the Aristotelian rhetoric.[102]

This is why Perelman considers the speech (*logos*) as the medium through which the speaker and the audience communicate. When dealing with a rhetorical question, the speaker should either put "the question on the table" (argumentation) or putting "it under the table" (rhetoric *stricto sensu*). In other words, the new rhetoric has two main parts: argumentation that begins with a question (or a question on the table) and rhetoric *stricto sensu* that begins with an answer (or a question under the table).

In the context of Perelman's new rhetoric, there are two basic principles, such as: the principle of adherence and the principle of distance. This principle of adherence helps the speaker and his audience to agree or dialogue during their discussion.[103] And the principle of distance runs as follows: distance L (*logos* or the speech) increases when E (*ethos* or the speaker) and P (*pathos* or the audience) become increasingly separated due to the increasing level of the problematicity of the question motivating their exchange (L=E-P).[104]

Concerning any speech, the more a question is divisive and conflictual, the greater the distance becomes. For instance, friends, lovers, or spouses who cease to get along usually, put distance between themselves in order to avoid seeing each other. In other words, the more divisive they are, the greater the distance between audience and speaker widens. This is to say that the level of problematicity of a question increases any distance.[105] Also, the distance increases whenever both the speaker and the audience run short of arguments.

In lacking strong arguments, the speaker can displace his attack onto the audience and vice versa. He can also do the reverse by accommodating his audience by humor and flattery in order to gain its approval more easily. And when the speaker cannot find right or good arguments, he will mainly resort to personal attacks, which have a greater destabilizing impact on the audience.[106] Also, if the speaker does not have any right or good arguments, then he is shifting from argumentation to rhetoric *stricto sensu*.

If the audience does not have any right or good arguments, then he can be manipulated by the speaker. If both the speaker and the audience do not have any right or good arguments, then they are using "questions under the table." In this specific context, both the speaker and the audience are using questions that are not very problematic. In other words, the speaker and the audience are emphasizing rhetoric *stricto sensu* by dealing with persuasion (eloquence or elegance) without argumentation (rational reasoning).

Very often we use "questions under the table" during the eulogy by presenting only the virtues of the deceased's life. During someone's eulogy, we usually exhibit his or her excellent personal qualities. Although the deceased person had several issues, we can instead write on the cover of the eulogy book: "*Life Well Lived*." This is to say that rhetoric *stricto sensu* smoothes the problematic aspects, which are always attached to social encounters, just as funeral orators have to "hide" the deceased person's weaknesses.

The most interesting case of rhetoric *stricto sensu* is the advertising process. In fact, the advertiser follows the above strategy by presenting only the positive side of things to be sold. In marketing, for instance, the advertiser treats the problem as being solved by radicalizing only the solution. The same strategy is used during propaganda in times of electoral campaign. At this level, the master of campaign gives the impression to the voters that nothing is problematic; he or she gives the impression to the voters that the solution to the people's problems is now obvious.[107]

However, Perelman's new rhetoric deals with both argumentation and rhetoric *stricto sensu*. His new rhetoric takes into account both "questions on the table," and "questions under the table." According to him, argumentation and rhetoric *stricto sensu* are two possible and complementary ways of dealing with a question: either we confront it head on and give arguments pro and contra, or we offer an elegant answer in the guise of a solution.[108] For Perelman, we need both right arguments and elegance in order to reach proper communication.

2.3 Philosophical Rhetoric and the "role of the Audience"

Even if the philosophical rhetoric focuses on the role of the audience, it is often considered as the combination of the other two kinds of rhetoric. It is what Plato calls the "true," or "good" rhetoric and what Perelman calls the "new rhetoric." Before Chaïm Perelman, Socrates is the first thinker to speak in terms of philosophical rhetoric. However, Socrates is very different from other sophists in three ways. First, he did not accept fees from his followers. Second, he doubted that justice was being achieved by the rhetoric of convention or emotion in the law-courts.

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[102] George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 28.
[103] George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 106.
[104] George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 107.
[105] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 107.
[106] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 108.
[107] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 112.
[108] Meyer, *What is Rhetoric?*, 112-113.

Third, Socrates rejected the "authoritarian" process of thought and action. The question is: "Is it possible to talk clearly about Socrates' rhetoric since he left no writings? In fact, we know him only from the reports of his followers or the reactions of his critics. The most important of these followers was Plato, who took up many of his views. Plato developed his master's views over a period of fifty years.[109] In fact, Plato's *Apology* provides the best example of the Socratic orator, his *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* most specifically discuss the nature of rhetoric.

The *Apology* is Plato's after-the-fact version of a speech for Socrates at the trial in 399 B.C. This speech deals with the charges of atheism and corrupting the young and then Socrates' execution. It was written as a reply to the publication of an *Accusation against Socrates* (now lost) by the sophist Polycrates.[110] In the *Apology*, Socrates contrasts the philosophical rhetoric with the rhetoric of convention or emotion. For instance, he rejects a kind of emotional appeal by relatives and friends that was commonly introduced into the epilogue of a Greek judicial speech.

In this way, Plato's *Apology* includes three speeches. The first speech is Socrates' defense, whereby the jurors cast their ballots and found him guilty, probably by a vote of 280 to 221.[111] Since the law provided no specific penalty, each side next made a proposal about what punishment Socrates should be given. The prosecution proposed death. Socrates would have escaped if he had proposed exile, but he regarded that as a betrayal of his philosophy of life. In his defense, he was engaged in the philosophical rhetoric (one-to-one approach) instead of the oratory of the masses.

During the second speech, there is a kind of rhetoric of convention because the jury voted for two emotional proposals: prison and death. They chose death by 360 to 141, some of the jurymen who had early voted for acquittal having been antagonized by Socrates' intransigent attitude. And the third speech reproduces Socrates' reaction to death sentence:

> Perhaps, gentlemen of the jury, you think that I have been convinced because of a lack of the kind of words by which I would have persuaded you if I had thought it right to do and say everything so as to escape the charge. Far from it. I have been convicted by a lack of daring and shamelessness and of wanting to say to you the kinds of things that you most like to hear: you would have liked me to wail and carry on and do and say lot of things unworthy of me in my own judgment. This what others have accustomed you to hear. But during the trial I didn't think I should do anything slavish and I have no regrets now at the nature of my defense; indeed, I much prefer to die after a defense like this rather than to live after another kind of defense. Neither in court nor in battle should I, nor anyone else, fight in order to avoid death at any cost… Avoiding death, gentlemen, is probably not very difficult; it is much more difficult to avoid doing wrong… Now having been condemned to death I leave you, but my opponents leave having been convicted by the truth of wickedness and injustice. I stick with my punishment and they can have theirs.[112]

It should be noted that Socrates blames orators and not jurors or others for vitiating a form of rhetoric that so widely prevailed. In fact, he is contrasting philosophical rhetoric with the rhetoric of convention or emotion. According to Socrates' speech, Jurors are easily satisfied by hearing what they want to hear. For him, the orator who uses such flattery is destroying justice in the state of which he is part. In this way, the Socratic orator clings to the truth and then avoids any kind of flattery because the Socratic rhetoric is a dialectical rhetoric.[113]

In his dialectical method, Socrates asks questions to which the respondent can be expected to give an answer. From the argument based on the answer, he can lead his opponent to a greater understanding. After destroying false knowledge, Socrates can lead his opponent to what Plato calls "true opinion," that is, an advanced and tested opinion.[114] Dialectically speaking, he asks Gorgias what art he knows and how should he be called?[115] Gorgias replies that he knows *rhêtorikê* and he should be called a *rhetor* (a public speaker or politician, in Greek).

Indeed, Socrates asks: what class of objects is included in the knowledge that constitutes rhetoric?[116] Gorgias replies that it is knowledge about words. But, Socrates' view of rhetoric is something grounded in the nature and

[109] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 54.
[110] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*,55.
[111] Plato, *Apology*, 36a-b.
[112] Plato, *Apology*, 38b-39b.
[113] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*, 58.
[114] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*,59.
[115] Plato, *Gorgias*, 449 a 3.
[116] Plato, *Gorgias*, 449 d 8-9.

not in convention. In his philosophical rhetoric, he contrasts both the sophistic rhetoric (elegance) and the technical rhetoric (convention). For him, the true rhetoric should be based on knowledge and be aimed at doing what is good. As he says, the philosophical approach to rhetoric must deal with both knowledge and justice.

In the conclusion of Plato's *Gorgias*, for instance, Socrates says that: "One must study to be good. The bad must be punished; flattery of all sorts should be avoided and rhetoric must only be used for the sake of justice."[117]And in Perelman's perspective, knowledge stands for the speaker's right or good arguments, while justice[118] stands for the attention or adaptation to the audience's context or situation. With Perelman's new rhetoric, the speaker is "addressing a learned society, or publishing an article in a specialized journal."[119]

In his philosophical rhetoric, Perelman was the first philosopher and logician to stress the "role of the audience," that he defines as "the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation."[120] For him, the "role of audience" is relevant because "an orator wishing to persuade a particular audience must of necessity adapt himself to it."[121] And in his new theory of argumentation, he says that the important thing is not knowing what the speaker regards as true or important, but knowing the views of those he is addressing.

As we shall see, Perelman argues that the great orator seems animated by the very mind of his audience. He also argues that it is the audience which has the major role in determining the quality of argument and the behavior of orators.[122] At this level, we should reach the conditions of knowledge and justice if and only if the audience influences the speaker's behavior and mode of argument. In order to reach a proper communication based on both knowledge and justice, there should be someone who speaks to someone else on a given topic or question.

For a proper communication (or dialogue), Perelman argues that both the speaker and his audience should continually negotiate (increase or diminish) the distance (or question) that divides (or separates) the two parties in discussion. At this level, Perelman's conception of rhetoric is an expression of the philosophical rhetoric; it is fundamentally understood as a philosophy of dialogue because it combines[123] the sophistic rhetoric (the role of the speaker) and the technical rhetoric (the role of the speech) in the process of negotiation.

VII.   IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION:

Whitehead considered the whole history of western philosophy as the "footnotes to Plato." And even Kant considered "the Aristotelian logic as an achieved science." However, in our article, we have understood that it is necessary to write the history of every discipline. Knowing that there are various books on the history of both philosophy and logic, our article has focused on the historical and cultural background of the classical rhetoric. In fact, this article has helped us to analyze and summarize the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary rhetorics.

First, we have seen that the ancient period is mainly concerned with: the beginnings of rhetoric, followed by rhetoric as it is respectively understood by the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Second, we have understood that the period around the Roman Empire deals with Cicero-Quintilian-Augustine and some Christian preachers. Third, we have shown that the Modern time emphasizes the rationalistic (or self-evident and demonstrative) approach to rhetoric. And lastly we have considered the contemporary period as the time of Chaïm Perelman's new rhetoric, that is, a time of the revival or renewal of the so-called "old" (or classical) rhetoric.

Throughout this history of the western rhetoric, George Kennedy distinguishes three[124] kinds of rhetoric: the sophistic, technical and philosophical rhetorics. For him, the sophistic rhetoric is developed by the sophists and the Romans, and it emphasizes the speaker (*ethos*) rather than the speech (*logos*) and the audience (*pathos*). Of the three Aristotelian rhetorical factors[125] (speaker, speech, and audience), the technical rhetoric concentrates on the speech (*logos*) of the expense of the other two. But, the philosophical rhetoric begins with Socrates' objections to the sophistic and technical rhetorics in Plato's dialogues (*Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*). This philosophical rhetoric focuses on the audience (*pathos*) and it is what Plato calls "true rhetoric."

[117] Plato, *Gorgias*, 527 c 3-4.
[118] Under his direction, many books were published in the perspective of justice, such as: *Fact and Law* (1961), *Antinomies in Law* (1965), *The Problem of Lacunae in Law* (1968), *The Rule of Law* (1974), *The Motivation of Decisions of Justice* (1978), *Studies in Juridical Logic* (1978), *Proof in Law* (1981), and *Unsettled Ideas in Law* (1984) [Gross, and Dearin, *Chaïm Perelman*, 11.]
[119] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 19.
[120] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 20.
[121] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 20-21.
[122] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 23-24.
[123]The way Chaïm Perelman takes into account the theory and practice of rhetoric, Rev. Dr. Stephen Okello focuses on the development of philosophy at both theoretical and practical. According to Dr. Okello, "A notable problem facing philosophy in Africa is that of context and practice." Okello, Stephen, ed. *The Role of Philosophy in the African Context. Traditions, Challenges and Perspectives* (Roma: Urbaniana University Press, 2019), 12.
[124] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Its Secular Tradition*, 13-15.
[125] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.3.1.

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