

ANALYTICS OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

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ABSTRACT: This article deals with the analysis of aesthetic judgment. Indeed, as a being endowed with consciousness and relation, man has the faculty of judging or appreciating all that presents to his sensitivity. In other words, man is an aesthetic being, that is to say, able to feel and enjoy the beauty in nature, even to realize it and judge its value in the work of art. It is thus distinguished from the other beings of the world. The aesthetic sense reveals itself to this effect inherent in the human existence by the fact that only the man can carry a judgment of the taste, that is to say, to emit statements such as "it is beautiful" or "this thing is beautiful." These statements of aesthetic judgment can be carried on an object of nature or a work of art.

Key words: Aesthetic judgment, beautiful, aesthetic taste, pleasant, sublime.

I. INTRODUCTION

In ordinary life, some statements are used wrongly and rightly. It is primarily those that concern the judgment of the taste. Some people use "it's nice" for "it's good" or for "it's pleasant" without perceiving the nuance. Even when an animal prefers this food to that one, we think that it indirectly emits a judgment of aesthetic taste. This is why we ask ourselves how it is possible that a creature makes a judgment of aesthetic taste without reason. Hence the question: is the determination of aesthetic taste inherent to man alone? To answer this question, we emit the following hypothesis: it could be that the judgment of the aesthetic taste, whose statement is "it is beautiful," is proper for reasonable beings, especially of man.

This qualitative study, based on the documentary approach, better the philosophical documentation, wants to find the bases of the judgment of the aesthetic taste. It is based in a particular way on the reflections of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, written in 1781, Immanuel Kant develops a "transcendental aesthetic." This one deals with studying the forms necessary for any practical knowledge. In other words, it is a science of all the a priori principles of sensibility. These pure forms of sensible intuition, Kant presents them as principles of all knowledge: space and time (Kant, 1781: 118-141)

Through the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, published in 1790, our author gives another meaning to aesthetics. This one is presented as a systematic and rational reflection on the beautiful. Kant considers that there is no science of the aesthetic but a judgment or a faculty corresponding to it. The aesthetic decision concerns the faculty to feel pleasure or pain. It can involve the beautiful and the sublime. It is thus concerned with the logical judgment that touches the knowledge faculty.

Our human constitution is such that we have a receptive faculty which is the intuitive sensibility and three active faculties: imagination, understanding, and reason (Deleuze, 2008). Kant attests, however, that the faculty of knowing is related to nature and the faculty of desiring, to freedom. Thus, he adds, it is between these two faculties that the feeling of pleasure or sorrow is placed, which finds its node in the judgment (Graham, 2013). The decision thus makes possible the passage between understanding and reason, between nature and freedom, or between knowing and desiring.

This study is articulated on four points: the aesthetic taste, the beautiful in the judgment of the aesthetic taste, and the distinction between the beautiful, the pleasant, the good, and the sublime.

1. The aesthetic taste

Man is a being formed of body and mind. His world and where he evolves are full of natural and artificial objects. These objects affect him, touch him. Heidegger affirms that the table never "touches" the wall against which it leans, whereas our body "feels" in the sense of handling what surrounds it (Heidegger, 1986: 88-89). It is by the organs of understanding that the man perceives the objects thanks to sight, hearing, touch,

smell, and taste. In the Kantian perspective, when an object or an event touches man through the senses, it produces pleasure or displeasure.

In its etymological sense, the term aesthetic comes from the Greek *aisthanomai*, which means to perceive by the senses. Aesthetics is thus defined as the science of sensation or feeling. Kant starts from this definition to differentiate aesthetics from logic. Whereas logic designates any objective representation, aesthetics is confined to the subjective domain. The latter gives itself the task of questioning beauty in the place where it is produced, i.e., in nature and art. The beautiful and its manifestations are the themes that cross from one side to the other of the domain of aesthetics. In short, for Kant, aesthetics is the theory of the beautiful (Fingerhut, Gomez-Lavin, et al, 2021).

Jacqueline Russ estimates that before Immanuel Kant, David Hume, in his reflection on the aesthetic, better in his analysis of the beautiful, already said that "the delicacy of the taste makes us sensitive to the beautiful and the ugly" (Russ, 1988: 217). Of this fact, he realizes that the taste indicates the sensitivity of the one who perceives beauty. Also, it designates the faculty of making a judgment relative to the beautiful.

Indeed, Hume (1757/1985) opened the way for Kant to pose his problem. Kant thus expressed, in a simplified form, the definition of taste, "The taste is the faculty of judging the beautiful." (Kant, 1790/2000). For him, the taste becomes thus aesthetic by the simple fact that it concerns the beautiful. In this sense, any judgment relating to the beautiful engages the taste and the aesthetic. This judgment does not apply only to the taste of the tongue, the palate, and the gullet. It extends to what may be pleasing to the eyes and ears (Hoyer, Stokburger-Sauer, 2012).

Aesthetic taste is a feeling that we experience. This feeling can be a pleasure or a pain. Comte Sponville points out with Kant that the aesthetic joy we feel, we consider it, in the judgment of taste, necessary in any other individual. As if, when we say that a thing is beautiful, it is a property of the object, determined in him by concepts (Sponville, 2011). It exposes a universal value of a singular judgment and not the union of the decisions of each one (Budd, Malcolm, 2001). In this order of idea, two conditions characterize taste.

On the one hand, the taste is characterized by a determination of its object (which is beauty) from the point of view of satisfaction, claiming the adhesion of each one as if the judgment were objective. In this sense, the judgment of taste does not consist in what we declare such a thing because we seize it. The taste aims more at autonomy than heteronomy because only one is judged. Thus, for any first judgment, when others adhere to it by judging, the true meaning of taste changes. It becomes objective. On the other hand, Kant believes that the judgment of taste is not determinable by expressive logic as if it were only objective (Kant, 1989: 118). Taste is thus the object of a subjective aesthetic judgment that can be determined by the beautiful.

II. The Beautiful in the judgment of aesthetic taste

This reflection on the beautiful crosses almost all ages of philosophical thought. In the dogmatic period, stammerings were made around beauty. According to Denis Huisman's periodization, this age goes from Socrates to Baumgarten. Indeed, in Hippias, Plato maintains that aesthetics was born the day Socrates knew how to answer to Hippias that beauty was not an attribute particular to a thousand and one objects. To Theaetetus, that beauty is not reduced to any simple object (Huisman, 1983: 7). In fact, Socrates was able to show that the idea of beauty, in beautiful things, should not be understood materially and sensibly and that beauty can only appear thanks to a formal relationship of appropriateness (Lacoste, 1986: 11). Better, the beautiful consists in the harmony and the measure (Steven 2011). The beauty appears in Plato under the shape of correspondence of the thing to the idea of the beautiful. Indeed, Plato sees beauty in an absolute way, that is to say, in itself and by itself, universal and transcendent, the model of the models, the "what from which what is beautiful is such." It is this idea that the artists tend to copy.

For Aristotle, on the other hand, the "beautiful" is the order of a world considered under its best aspect (Huisman, 1983: 19). Moreover, in the *Enneads*, Plotinus defines beauty as unity, pure form, and order. For St. Thomas Aquinas, there is what pleases in harmony. What pleases is the ultimate contentment, the perfect; it is the repose of taste (Huisman, 1983: 21). During the critical age, the debate concerning the beautiful is open to an attitude relative to the subject.

The pre-Kantians had not solved the question of the aesthetic. Leibnizian intellectualism defends the idea that harmony extends from us to things. The Anglo-Saxon sensualism or empiricism identifies the beautiful with the feeling. It is the feeling of beauty that is the judgment criterion according to Hume. Baumgarten, the initiator of the science of sensibility, invents the aesthetic term to define the theory of the interior faculty (the sensibility) (Huisman, 1983: 23-25).

Immanuel Kant, in his approach on the beautiful, relies on the categories which allow the agreement between imagination and understanding. For him, it concerns the varieties one can pronounce on an object or a thing by stating a judgment of taste according to the four Kantian categories: quality, quantity, relation, and modality.

According to Kant, taste, according to quality, is the faculty of judging an object or a mode of representation by satisfaction or displeasure in a completely disinterested way. And the beautiful is the object of this satisfaction. It is thus the object of a disinterested feeling (Kant, 1989: 55). In the judgment of taste, many confusion problems arise from the fact that the taste decision is aesthetic and, therefore, its determining principle is only subjective. However, what is subjective can pre-establish an interest. Interest is defined in our context as what matters to someone's utility. It is the satisfaction that we link to the representation of an object. This satisfaction always has a relation to the faculty to desire. In other words, the term designates the link between the object and the beautiful, the pleasant and the good.

III. On the distinction between the beautiful, the pleasant and the good.

We propose at this point to develop the judgment of the aesthetic taste seen according to the Kantian categories: quality, quantity, relation, and modality.

3. 1. *The beautiful, the pleasant, and the good are seen according to the quality.*

According to the quality, we call pleasant, what pleases the senses in the sensation. Thus, there is confusion about the statements: "It is beautiful" and "it is pleasant." Some people take one for the other. But, if I say "it is beautiful"; I do not want to say it is pleasant. It is a question of establishing a discrepancy between what pleases and what makes people happy.

The feeling indeed is what remains subjective. However, in the same perspective, Kant considers that "what pleases, precisely because it pleases, is pleasant" (Kant, 1989: 51). From what pleases, we deduce an objective representation of the senses. When the presentation solicits one's position, one subscribes to agreeableness. Thus, Kant states, "My judgment of an object, I declare it pleasant" (Kant, 1989: 51). The pleasant arouses the desire of the one who makes the judgment.

Hence, it is better to say "this wine is pleasant to me" than to say "this is beautiful" or "this wine is pleasant" or "the sound is pleasant to the ear." Indeed, it is important to specify that, as far as the pleasant is concerned, everyone recognizes that the judgment by which he declares that something pleases him is based on a particular feeling and has value only for his person (Russ, 1988: 264).

This kind of judgment expresses an interest for the one who announces it. This judgment is caused by a feeling, an attraction, or a desire for all objects of the same or similar kind. One thus considers the relation between the object and the state of the subject. It is not a simple approval as if it would be for the beautiful. On the other hand, there is an inclination, a leaning towards the object. Let us affirm with Kant that "The satisfaction related to the pleasant is related to an interest." (Kant, 1989: 51).

On the other hand, when one asks to judge something beautiful, one is not interested in the existence of the thing. One only wants to know if it provokes in the subject a satisfaction: pleasure. As an illustration, a natural beauty (a beautiful landscape) produces satisfaction independent of any interest (the terrain is not eaten).

From the above, the superior pleasure should not be linked to any sensible attraction, inclination, or interest. If the feeling producing the pleasure is disinterested, that is, not counting on the existence of the represented object, or its utility, the satisfaction is thus the expression of a pure judgment or a pure operation of judging (Deleuze, 2008).

The specificity of judgment in matters of taste is not concerned with the object's existence. For Jacqueline Russ, it is clear that to say that an object is beautiful, and to show that I have a taste for it, is not to concern myself with the relationship that there may be between me and the existence of this object, but with what happens within myself concerning the representation that I have of it. Thus one will only recognize that a judgment on beauty in which the slightest interest is mixed, is partial, and is not such a judgment of the aesthetic taste (Russ, 1988: 263). Let us say thus that "the judgment of taste is only contemplative; it is a judgment which, indifferent to the existence of the object, only links its nature with the feeling of pleasure and sorrow. It only concerns a pure and simple representation" (<http://www.Lumière.Org/esthetics/philo-criticism.Part 2.Html>).

In the two preceding approaches, notably that of the beautiful and that of the pleasant, the intervention of the reason, starting from a concept, was not evoked. It was only a question of pleasure or pain that an object arouses in us.

We maintain now that the good or the goodness uses the reason by the concept. Kant specifies it thus: "is good, that which, thanks to reason, by the simple concept, pleases" (Kant, 1989: 52). This approach implies utility. An object can please man only because it is helpful to him. In this case, the good please with interest. Hence, for Kant, good-to-something means that which pleases only as a useful or a means, and good-in-itself designates that which pleases by itself, but to an end determined by a concept of the good (<http://www.Lumière.Org/esthetics/philo-criticism.Part 2.Html>).

In everyday life, men always judge in relation to utility. They see what an object is worth to appreciate it. This tendency to the usefulness gave rise in philosophy to a current: utilitarianism. Jean Lacoste clarifies to us more than in the aesthetic sense, and the user object should not be said beautiful even if it can give a certain satisfaction to what one could call the ease of the work (Lacoste, 1986: 24).

Immanuel Kant believes that in order to find something suitable, it is necessary to know what it must be for us (Kant, 1989: 52). This implies that we first have a concept that corresponds to the object we want to judge. We are not interested in discovering the beauty of this thing but the value it has in making our life better.

Heidegger underlines, in the same logic, the reading of the work of art. As an illustration, he points out the shoes of Van Gogh. Painted in a painting, they provoke a satisfaction of the beautiful; seen in their nature, they are suitable for the farmer (Heidegger, 1980: 37). From this point of view, utilitarians give more importance to the craftsman than to the artist.

In many cases, the pleasant and the good speak the same language because they have an interest in common. They both have a relation with the faculty of desiring. On the other hand, they are disparate. One can say of a dish that is pleasant to look at, that is, it excites the taste because it is well prepared, or I can say that I always like this meal quality, it has always attracted me. But one can speak of the same dish that is not good, i.e., that it may contain poison and therefore harm life. This shows that goodness is of the order of mediateness and involves the reason that analyzes the consequences. On the other hand, the pleasant implies immediacy with an attractive character.

The beautiful, on the other hand, bound to the judgment of the aesthetic taste, is only contemplative. This contemplation is, moreover, not subjected to a concept. In other words, I do not enunciate a judgment on the beautiful in response to a concept of the beautiful nor to produce such a concept (Carvalho, 1996: 81). This judgment, far from pleasing itself to the existence of the object, establishes a link between the nature of the object and the feeling of pleasure or pain.

In short, every individual calls pleasant what pleases him, beautiful what pleases him, good what he esteems or approves, and what he attributes an objective value to. The pleasant and the good are essential even in animals; the beautiful is only in men. Of these three, only the judgment of taste for the beautiful causes disinterested satisfaction (Kant; 1989:55).

3. 2. *The beautiful, the pleasant, and the beautiful seen according to the quantity*

We have affirmed that the beautiful according to the quality is the object of satisfaction free of any interest. This definition to which the quality refers lets us prevail another one to which the quantity relates and is deduced from the first one. Indeed, he who is aware of finding in something a disinterested satisfaction cannot help judging that the same thing is such for everyone. Since pleasure is disinterested, aesthetic judgment is the object of a claim to universality ([http:// www. Lumière.Org/aesthetics/philo-criticism.Part 2.Html.](http://www.Lumière.Org/aesthetics/philo-criticism.Part2.Html)).

According to Kant, the definition of the beautiful according to quantity is clear: "the beautiful is that which is represented without concept as an object of universal satisfaction" (Kant; 1989:55). How can the judgment of taste for the beautiful claim to universality when it is based on a subjective principle? Immanuel Kant attests that when one emits a disinterested judgment, one considers emitting it for everyone because there is no interest for anybody. This is what reveals its universal character. But by its universality, this judgment of taste could be confused with the judgment of knowledge. Kant specifies, contrary to the latter that no concept can verify the judgment of taste. There is no rule to which one can refer to justify the truth of a judgment of taste, as there is for knowledge ([http:// www. Lumière.Org/aesthetics/philo-criticism.Part 2.Html.](http://www.Lumière.Org/aesthetics/philo-criticism.Part2.Html)).

They claim to possess a value for all must thus be linked to the judgment of taste and the consciousness of being free from any interest. Moreover, this universality is not subjective since, for Kant, "the claim to subjective universality must be linked to the judgment of taste" (Kant; 1989: 55). If I formulate a judgment, "this is beautiful," I implicitly refer to others whose opinion I assume to share since I assume it to be valid. From the preceding, it is necessary to draw out the ambiguity between the beautiful, the pleasant and the good from the point of view of quantity.

Of the pleasant, we know that, what matters, is the judgment based on personal feelings. It is to say that something is pleasant for someone. Under this logic, the principle "to each according to his taste" is valid. The sound of a stringed instrument is pleasant for some and unpleasant for others (Kant; 1989: 55).

The same cannot be said of beauty. One cannot have taste and try to prove it. It is madness to say "this is beautiful to me" because the statement is supposed to be universal. When something is beautiful, the one who makes the judgment automatically attributes the same satisfaction to others. He, therefore, does not judge himself alone but also others. If others believe otherwise, he is blameworthy because he denies the universal taste. Thus the principle "to each according to his taste" is never valid (Kant; 1989: 57). Kant distinguishes two types of taste. One is purely individual (and concerns the pleasant), and the other claims universality (concerning the beautiful).

As for the good, it is asserted that judgments also rightly claim to possess a value for all. However, the good is only represented as an object of universal satisfaction by a concept. This is not the case for the pleasant and the beautiful. Moreover, a universality that is not based on concepts of the object is aesthetic and not logical. They do not contain a subjective quantity which, for Kant, is the expected value of a representation arousing a feeling of pleasure (Kant; 1989: 58).

Suppose I see a rose. By judgment of taste, I emit this statement: "This rose is beautiful." Compared to the other singular reviews issued by comments like: "these roses are beautiful," here is not an aesthetic judgment but a logical judgment based on an aesthetic principle. As for the statement: "This rose is pleasant" (to the sense of smell), this judgment is aesthetically singular; it is not a judgment of taste because it results only from the sense. It differs from the first one in the sense that the judgment of taste includes an aesthetic quantity of universality, i.e., of value for everyone, which cannot be found in the judgment concerning the pleasant (<http://www.Lumière.Org/aesthetics/philosophy-criticism.Part.2.Html>).

3.3 According to the relation, beauty is the form of the purpose of the perceived object

Examined from the point of view of the relation, "beauty is the form of the finality of an object insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of end" (Kant; 1989: 63). Indeed, beauty supposes a finality without an idea of the end, that is to say without any other goal or benefit apart from the enjoyment of the object of beauty by the subject. The causality of a concept concerning its object is called finality. In short, the judgment of taste has, at its foundation, nothing else than the form of the finality of an object (<http://www.Philagora.Net/farfouineur.Html>).

Metaphysically, the object of a concept is an end, provided that this concept is itself a cause. Kant attests the following:

« In the determination of an object as beautiful, linked to the feeling of a pleasure, which is at the same time affirmed by the judgment of taste as valid for all: consequently, the pleasure accompanying the representation can no more contain the determining principle (the judgment of taste) than can the representation of the perfection of the object or the concept of the good. It can thus only be the subjective finality in the representation of an object without any end » (Kant, 1989: 64.)

Thus, as Kant considers, the judgment of pure taste is the one on which attractiveness and emotion have no influence. Therefore, it has simply for the determining principle the finality of the form (KANT, 1989: 66.). A natural beauty (a beautiful tree, for example) pleases by its form; it has a simple formal finality that invites an appreciative judgment through a feeling of pleasure: it is organized as if it had an end, but it is free. It has no objective end (<http://www.Philagora.Net/farfouineur.Html>).

Beauty is synonymous with harmony, that is to say, with conformity to the laws governing the world and man himself. Initiated by Pythagoras and inherited from Plato, the term harmony is meant to be the actual suitability of the parts to the whole. Harmony implies an organization or an arrangement that can be pre-established in nature (Lacoste, 1986: 12.) or that only the man can determine according to his ends and his reason - in the works of art, for example.

Man can correlate the ends with his existence to deduce aesthetic judgments of universal forms. Unfortunately, there is a temptation to place a concept in support of the judgment. If not, the man as being endowed with intelligence, estimates Kant, is capable of an ideal of perfection (Kant, 1989: 74).

The beautiful, far from being the fruit of an invention of the man, results instead from a slow discovery, and the aesthetic pleasure is found in the consent to the pre-established harmony. Thus, man draws his beauty criteria from nature, and it is his standard and his latent and exclusive reference table. Beauty can therefore be understood as the correctness, the proportion. It presupposes the unity of the whole, which is born of the subordination of the parts, and of this subordination is born the harmony. Undoubtedly the artist always waits "to make other" or "to make better" and not simply to imitate or reproduce. But he inscribes himself, to this fact, in the creative and harmonizing function of nature.

Let us note that to affirm that nature is the secret criterion of the beautiful is not equivalent to asserting that all is beautiful, even if naturally, one can say it because if all were beautiful, the man would not distinguish the beauty from the ugliness. However, if all is not that beautiful, it is that something is ugly.

The ugliness appears only when a being does not realize what it must be according to nature. This happens to the person who, being fallible when he creates, can fail when he wants to succeed. When an object does not realize the laws of harmony, it becomes ugly. Carvallo attests that the ugly is that which is not identified with the beautiful; it is the negation of the beautiful (Carvallo, 1996: 74). And, in the judgment, what is noted (that is, the beautiful and the ugly) is necessary or better determined by the modality.

3.4 Depending on the modality, the judgment of the taste is necessary

Any representation may be linked to pleasure. However, let us remember that aesthetic judgment is not logical and escapes all prior knowledge and practical experience. It cannot, therefore, be deduced from apodictic concepts. This judgment is reasonably necessary. However, it can be deduced from the universality of experience without basing it on any concept. The judgment of taste pretends not only to the universality but also to the necessity, that is to say, to any obligation. The beautiful possesses, thus, a necessary relation to satisfaction (<http://www.Lumière.Org/aesthetics/philosophy-criticism.Part2.Html>).

The necessity of this judgment remains subjective, although it pretends to obtain the adhesion of all and of each one by the one who emits it. Thus, we situate the modality of the judgment in that it can only be exemplary of a universal rule following the necessity of all. In short, according to the modality, "the beautiful is what is recognized without concept as the object of a necessary satisfaction" (Kant, 1989: 80).

Kant attests that everyone is animated by the same principle that allows the adherence to the same judgment of taste. From this fact, we support the hypothesis that when we say this thing is beautiful, we do not allow anyone to object or give a different opinion. It is to escape the concept and to remain in the feeling. Our judgment is an idea necessary to everyone and could induce unanimity of the different subjects. It is thus that the emitted judgment is considered exemplary. But still, the beautiful, the pleasant, and the good, although determined according to the quality, the quantity, the relation, and the modality, do not amount to the sublime. So what about this sublime?

IV. The Sublime

Emmanuel Kant is interested in the sublime as much as in the beautiful in his critique of the faculty of judgment because the sublime also pleases itself. Sublime as an adjective comes from the Latin "sublimis" and means very great or high. Taken as a noun, it identifies the perfection of the beautiful or what is most outstanding in feelings, actions, etc. Kant does not move away from this conception. For him, the sublime means "that which is absolutely great" (Kant, 1989: 87). Absolutely great notifies that which is great beyond all comparison. In other words, greatness only equals itself in a judgment of the sublime. It is therefore not allowed to look outside this great thing for one that would be appropriate. In short, "the sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small" (Kant, 1989: 89).

In his analysis of the sublime, Kant emphasizes that saying that a thing is great does not predispose one to a comparison in mind because the greatness of this thing is not determined. Thus, he says, the judgment: "man is great" and "man is beautiful" is an appreciation and requires the adhesion of each one. In other words, they are judgments of the reflection on the presentation of the object, which possesses a subjective finality (Kant, 1989: 89).

The sublime is also felt in front of the formless or the deformed, that is, the immensity or the power. In front of the immense, the imagination feels the insufficiency of this maximum. While it seeks to enlarge it, it falls back on itself (Deleuze, 2008). What about the satisfaction linked to the judgment of the sublime?

4.1 On the satisfaction of the judgment of the sublime

The feeling caused by the sublime is in some way a pain. In the analysis of the sublime, we can come to affirm the impotence of the human faculty for knowledge. Human nature is indeed fragile. Accepting this assertion proves a humble spirit that makes a provision against what bothers this nature. This is a sublime disposition of mind.

Kant proves that the feeling provoked by the sublime is a feeling of sorrow, given the insufficiency of the imagination in the aesthetic evaluation of greatness. The subjectivity is manifest in the sublime. Even between the faculties, the relations are subjective. Deleuze maintains on this subject that "the sublime relates to nature only by projection, and this projection is carried out on what there is of formless in nature" (Deleuze, 2008).

Some aspects of nature are worthy of the sublime qualification. Kant cites, among others, the rocks which detach themselves boldly, the thunderclaps, the volcanoes, the hurricanes, the immense ocean, its fury, and the falls of the mighty rivers. These things reduce the human power to resist. They are frightening. They are sublime because they raise the forces of the soul above the usual average and arouse in man an ability to resist (Kant, 1989: 99).

On the other hand, it is necessary to recognize the impotence and the incapacity of the man, despite this resistance, to seize the measure proportionate to the aesthetic evaluation of the greatness of his domain. However, this nature constitutes in the man an appeal to the force which allows him to see all that he cares about: life, health, goods. In short, Kant estimates that "the nature is thus called sublime, only because it raises the imagination to the presentation of those situations, in which the spirit can make itself sensitive what is properly sublime in its destination and superior even to the nature" (Kant, 1989: 100).

4.2 Relationship between the beautiful and the sublime

The beautiful and the sublime agree in this that they please by themselves. They are not related to the sense as one would say for the pleasant, nor beforehand to the concept as one would estimate it for good. Their satisfaction, far from being reported by concepts, is a simple representation. The judgments of the one and the other are singular and have a universally valid character concerning each subject. They reveal a claim that involves the feeling of pleasure or pain.

On the other hand, certain elements separate the beautiful from the sublime. The beautiful concerns the form of the object which carries the judgment, while the sublime relates to the informal things. The beautiful

pleases immediately, that is to say, provokes a feeling of blooming of life directly; the sublime is indirect, and the pleasure springs only indirectly (it is a kind of pain). The sublime is a serious thing in the occupation of the imagination. Only an object of nature but beautiful, even works of art, can be called sublime (Kant, 1989: 85).

V. CONCLUSION

In short, the aesthetic judgment of the type "it is beautiful" does not engage the reason to be stated. The faculties put in play are understanding and imagination. With Kant, we specified that is beautiful, what is recognized without concept like an object of disinterested satisfaction, universal, necessary, and which manifests a particular form of finality without any goal being for that presented.

In the originality, the judgment of the taste remains impartial because any interest would make him corrupt. It is the case for the judgment of aesthetic taste carried on a thing as it gives pleasure; the satisfaction remains universally valid. It does not imply either attractions or emotions. Kant proves that interests and emotions are not often credited to beauty as a contribution to universal aesthetic satisfaction (Kant, 1989: 87). They are an open door to interest. Moreover, whereas the feeling of the sublime is experienced in front of the formless or the deformed -the immensity or the power- the beautiful can be produced in nature or art.

Our approach in this scientific article has tried to show that the judgment of aesthetic taste is inherent to man. Only man can judge the beautiful or the sublime; in this sense, he is different from other beings.

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