

The Coordinating Role of The Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda) in Efforts to Deal with Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) in Papua (Case Study of Puncak Jaya Regency)

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ABSTRACT: This research discusses the coordinating role of the regional intelligence community (Kominda) in efforts to deal with armed criminal groups (KKB) in Papua. In detecting any potential threats to sovereignty, Kominda has a strategic value. This is based on Permendagri Number 16 of 2011 concerning changes to Permendagri Number 11 of 2006 concerning Regional Intelligence Communities. This study aims to find out and examine the extent of Kominda's coordinating role in handling KKB in Papua. The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative, based on criminal intelligence analysis, with a case study approach in Puncak Jaya Regency. The data obtained in this study were carried out through interviews, observation and literature studies. The results of this study indicate that efforts to deal with KKB in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, depend on the active role of all elements within Kominda as subjects of state intelligence administration from various threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances (ATHG) for national security stability in the region. Analytically, the coordinating role is classified into two parts. First, normative and consolidative role analysis. Second, the analysis of Kominda's role is based on empirical aspects regarding the meaning of security and criminal politics.

KEYWORDS : *regional intelligence community (Kominda), armed criminal groups (KKB), threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances (ATHG), Puncak Jaya Regency, Papua.*

I. INTRODUCTION

In response to threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances (ATHG) for national stability in the regions, especially through efforts to detect or early warning, intelligence is certainly one of the state tools prepared specifically to deal with the agenda. The regional intelligence community (Kominda) in this case represents the equipment (intelligence) of the country in question in the region as mandated in the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs (Permendagri) Number 16 of 2011 concerning amendments to Permendagri Number 11 of 2006 concerning the Regional Intelligence Community. Ramelan (2009) suggests that intelligent means intelligence, meaning that in the language of cipher tellers, intelligence is information that has been processed and matured by intelligence actors in an organization with special methods. Information that is ready to eat is called intelligence, then it will be devoured by the user. While Saronto (2008), states that from ancient times to modern times, both in situations of war and peace, every state intelligence organization functions to provide true, honest, precise, and fast intelligence information (*felox et exactus*), so that users have a rounded knowledge of a problem and have sufficient time before deciding policy. The users referred to in this context are certainly policymakers in the region or superiors of the intelligence apparatus.

Hierarchically, Kominda consists of several elements or state apparatus in the regions, both provinces and districts/cities Kominda at the provincial level is chaired by the Governor, while at the regency/city level, it is chaired by the Regent or Mayor. Armawi (2014) suggests that Kominda was formed in order to anticipate threats to national integrity and uphold state sovereignty, so it is necessary to carry out early detection and early warning in the regions. Kominda is supported by the intelligence apparatus as a forum for communication and coordination of intelligence elements and regional leaders in provinces and districts or cities with the task of planning, searching, collecting, coordinating, and communicating information and information materials from various sources regarding potential, symptoms or events that pose a threat to national stability in the region. Kominda is also tasked with providing recommendations as consideration for regional heads regarding policies related to early detection, early warning, and early prevention of threats to national stability in the regions. Haryata (2017) explained that Kominda's membership consists of several elements, namely the chairman

(Governor/Regent/Mayor), vice chairman (Vice Governor/Vice Regent/Vice Mayor), the daily executor (Head of the Regional State Intelligence Agency [Kabinda]), secretary (Head of the National and Political Unity Agency [Kakesbangpol]) and members consisting of intelligence elements from the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Indonesian National Army (TNI), the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia, High Prosecutor's Office, Immigration, Customs and Excise, Tax and Banking and other elements. The following is a chart of Kominda's membership structure based on Permendagri Number 16 of 2011.




Figure 1. Kominda Membership Structure

Source: data processed by researchers from Haryata (2013)

The Kominda structure chart explicitly emphasizes the coordination path, both top-down and bottom-up. Therefore, based on the role and coordination function among Kominda members, the realization of handling ATHG for the sustainability of national stability in the regions is still being carried out. One of the concerts of handling ATHG, in this case, is the handling of the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) in Papua which then specifically the handling is located in Puncak Jaya Regency, where some of the handling of KKB cases by the local government there can actually be observed as one of the models or examples of handling KKB. According to Alfriando (2018), KKB in Papua developed from the beginning as an organization that wanted to separate from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) into an organized separatist movement. Although the KKB in carrying out movements is more sudden and intermittent, it is the hallmark of the movements carried out by the KKB in Papua. Although on the one hand, Krisnata (2021) actually cited the change of KKB status to a Terrorist Separatist Group (KST) based on the statement of the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Law of the Republic of Indonesia (Menkopolhukam RI), Prof. Mahfud MD, immediately after the shooting by the KKB against TNI Brigadier General I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha as Kabinda Papua, in Dambet Village, Beoga District, Puncak Regency, on April 25, 2021. However, it does not necessarily change or at least reduce the efforts of the KKB or KST to continue to intensify threats to national stability in Papua.

II. METHOD


The method used in this study is descriptive qualitative based on criminal analysis with a case study approach in Puncak Jaya Regency.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overview of Puncak Jaya Regency

As reported on an official online page of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI) Papua Representative (<https://papua.bpk.go.id/kabupaten-puncak-jaya/>) that based on Law Number 7 of 2008, Puncak Jaya Regency was formed along with the establishment of five other regencies in Papua. The regency was formed on January 4, 2008 which was then inaugurated directly by Mardiyanto as Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Mendagri RI) on June 21, 2008. Meanwhile, based on a report by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) of Puncak Jaya Regency released in Puncak Jaya Regency in Figures 2022, astronomically, Puncak Jaya regency is located between $2^{\circ} 0' - 3^{\circ} 0'$ South Latitude and between $136^{\circ} 08' - 137^{\circ} 38'$ East Longitude. Based on its geographical position, Puncak Jaya district has boundaries: North with Mamberamo Raya Regency; South with Puncak Regency and Lanny Jaya Regency; West with Puncak Regency; Then east with Tolikara Regency. Then this district has 26 districts, namely: Fawi, Dagai, Kiyage, Mulia, Yambi, Ilamburawi, Muara, Pagaleme, Gurage, Irimuli, Mewoluk, Lumo, Molanikime, Yamo, Dokome, Ilu, Yamoeri, Waegi, Nume, Nioga, Gubume, Taganombak, Torere, Tiginambut, Kalome, and Wanwi. The following is a map of Puncak Jaya Regency:

Figure 2. Map of Puncak Jaya Regency



Source: BPS Puncak Jaya Regency, 2022

Looking at the strategic location of the Puncak Jaya Regency region, efforts to overcome threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances (ATHG) in this case such as the outbreak of the Armed Criminal Group (KKB) movement in Papua, especially those circulating in the areas of Puncak Jaya Regency are to understand precisely and measurably about the territorial (geographical) aspects of an area including the community or population (demographic) first. Then respond through actions or actions, especially preventive actions based on detection mechanisms or early warning of the ATHG. The description of these conditions precisely represents the duties, main roles and functions (tupoksi) of a regional intelligence community (Kominda) which is actually based in the region. The Kominda Poksi is certainly not without reason or legal provisions. Because hierarchically, in the framework of upholding defense and security sovereignty and maintaining national stability, these fundamental aspects of geographical and demographic matters have been arranged as juridical footing and are certainly instructional.

Kominda Puncak Jaya Regency

Kominda as mentioned earlier in the background section is one of the strategic containers of state intelligence which is structurally under the auspices of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN). Based on Permendagri Number 16 of 2011 concerning amendments to Permendagri Number 11 of 2006 concerning the Regional Intelligence Community which is the juridical basis for the implementation of state intelligence in the regions is a legal context regarding the handling of ATHG, in this case it is related to the handling of KKB in Papua. The Permendagri is based on its juridical position or hierarchy, of course under Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination, where through the Presidential Regulation the Head of BIN then stipulates the Regulation of the Head of the State Intelligence Agency (Perkabin) Number 01 of 2014 concerning the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) and the Regional Intelligence Committee (Kominda). The cabin explained related to the formation, position and coordination mechanism of Kominpus and Kominda at the provincial level. Meanwhile, at the regional level (regency / city) as explained in the cabin that the regional coordinator (korwil) is a BIN employee in the region who carries out intelligence coordination for several districts / cities. So there is no detailed explanation of coordination at the district / city level itself. Therefore, the matter of intelligence coordination at the district / city level until now still refers to the old or previous rules, namely Permendagri No. 16 of 2011 with the form of coordination embodied in the Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda) district / city.

Based on the explanation above, it is clear that the use of the acronym "Kominda" in this context refers to Permendagri No. 16 of 2011. So that the role of intelligence coordination in the regions, especially at the district / city level with Kominda (Regional Intelligence Community) as the marker, is something that is in accordance with applicable regulations. Given the urgency of the role of intelligence coordination in the district/city area, where precisely at these points there is often vulnerability due to the existence of ATHG. One of them is what happened in Papua by the KKB. The massive ATHG intensified by the KKB in Papua in recent times which has had an impact on efforts to increase community security guarantees in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, is certainly not without the active role of regional intelligence in carrying out the coordination process. This is not impossible to depart from legal or regulatory awareness to respond to ATHG from the KKB which at any time appears on the surface. The following table is an overview of the juridical hierarchy led by the state intelligence apparatus for the handling of ATHG, especially intensified by the KKB in Papua.

Table 1. ATHG Handling Regulations and Institutions

| Regulation | Institution | Information |
|--|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence Presidential Decree Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination Permendagri Number 16 of 2011 concerning amendments to Permendagri Number 11 of 2006 concerning the Regional Intelligence Community Head of BIN Regulation Number 01 of 2014 concerning Central and Regional Intelligence Committees Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2018 concerning amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law Minister of Defense Number 5 of 2011 concerning State Defense Policy on the Duty of the TNI in overcoming separatism movements. Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2012 concerning Social Conflict Handling Permensos Number 26 of 2017 concerning Guidelines for the Implementation of Social Conflict Handling in the Social Sector Permendagri Number 46 of 2019 concerning amendments to Permendagri Number 2 of 2018 concerning Early Awareness in the Regions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN) Komite Intelijen Pusat (Kominpus) dan Komite Intelijen Daerah (Kominda) Komunitas Intelijen Daerah (Kominda) Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia (Kemensos RI) Lembaga Non Pemerintah atau mitra pemerintah (CSO/NGO, Omas, OKP, dsb) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on Law No. 17 of 2011, it explicitly states the position of BIN as an official state agency tasked with carrying out roles and functions in the field of state intelligence. Presidential Decree No. 67 of 2013 is an affirmation of the coordinated position of the state intelligence apparatus at the center (Kominpus) with the regions (Kominda) Permendagri Number 16 of 2011 as the basis for implementing the role and function of state intelligence in the regions. Based on Law No. 5 of 2018, the countermeasures of KKB in Papua are designated as terrorism crimes. Minister of Defense Regulation Number 5 of 2011 which states that the confectionery of separatist movements, among others, is the duty of the TNI. Law No. 7 of 2012 affirmed in Permensos No. 26 of 2017, among others, concerning the prevention of social conflicts as stated in article 3 paragraph (2) point e. Then based on Permendagri No. 46 of 2019 concerning amendments to Permendagri No. 2 of 2018 which emphasizes early vigilance regarding ATHG (threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances). |

Source: data processed by researchers, 2022

In the table, it is outlined and explicit about the role of state intelligence institutions, including involvement or institutional participation by other institutions based on underlying regulations. Some of these regulations are certainly related to efforts to handle ATHG as in the case of KKB in Papua. Because the handling of KKB in Papua through the coordination role of Kominda can be effective, one of which is if it is based on aspects of practical implementation of regulations in the field. Regulatedly, Kominda in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency is one of the frontlines in handling KKB. Especially considering several incidents in the form of terror acts that occurred later in the region by the KKB, causing the death of TNI Brigadier General I Gusti Putu Danny Nugraha as the Head of the Regional BIN (Kabinda) Papua at that time. The evaluation of the unfortunate incident then continues to be intensified by the leadership and elements of Kominda in Papua, especially Kominda Puncak Jaya Regency. Kominda of Puncak Jaya Regency is chaired directly by the Regent of Puncak Jaya Regency, Dr. Yuni Wonda, S.Sos, S.IP, MM. While the secretary is the Head of the Kesbangpol Office of Puncak Jaya Regency. As reported by suaraindonesia.co.id, that the Regional Secretary of Puncak Jaya Regency, Tumiran S.Sos, M.AP, in a meeting across the security and public order apparatus (kamtibmas) consisting of elements of the TNI-Polri and intelligence apparatus, he conveyed the urgency of establishing the Puncak Jaya Regency Kominda as a breakthrough for the local government of Puncak Jaya Regency in maintaining synergy between related institutions or institutions in a joint effort to maintain regional security.

KKB at a glance

The Armed Criminal Group (KKB) is a group or group of Papuans who organize their own group as opponents of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia in the land of Papua. The existence of this group has certainly been at least since some time after Papua (formerly called West Irian or Irian Jaya) was officially declared part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. On July 26, 1965, there was a rebellion of the Free Papua Movement (OPM). Led by Sergeant Major Permanes Ferry Awom (former member of the Papuan Volunteer Battalion/Papua Vrijwilligers Corps). OPM began in Manokwari and then spread to all areas in West Irian such as Sorong, Fakfak, Paniai, Biak Numfor, Japen-Waropen, Jayawijaya and Merauke and Jayapura (Djopari 1993). OPM is a movement organization under the leadership of the sons of pro-West Papuan Irian Jaya that aims to secede from the Republic of Indonesia (Lorda 2001). The OPM since the 1960s has carried out many guerrilla actions in demanding secession from the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. OPM was formed as an expression of disappointment due to the injustice experienced by the people of Irian Jaya (Chaidar *et al.* 2000). The OPM also sought the support of the people of Irian Jaya, especially those who were anti-Indonesian. The community involved in OPM provides support in the form of basic necessities, equipment, medicines and funding for OPM. In addition, the OPM in achieving its goal of separating from the Republic of Indonesia, seeking foreign political support as it has been done by the OPM since 1951, seeking support for arms assistance (Tuhana 2001).

Krisnata (2021) noted that many actions carried out by the OPM, such as killing TNI and Polri officers, killing civilians, raping residents, burning schools and places of worship and ambushes of both TNI and Police officers. According to data from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University, in that period 2010-2020 there have been 146 cases of violence in Papua. About 80 percent of them are carried out by KKB. Based on the same study, the number of civilians who are victims of violence in Papua reached 356. This includes victims from the TNI and Polri (93%) and the rest from KKB (7%). Some records of acts of violence and killings that occurred throughout 2021 as conveyed by the Head of Public Relations of the Papua Police, Polri Commissioner AM Kamal, are the murder of a taxi driver's motorcycle in Ilambet Village, Ilaga on February 9, 2021; Stabbing of woman in Juguloma Village, Beoga on February 18, 2021; The murder of 2 elementary and junior high school high school teachers in Juguloma Village, on April 8, 9, 2021; The burning helicopter belonged to PT. Arsa Air at Aminggaru Airport, Ilaga on April 11, 2021; Burning from the house of the junior high school principal and DPRD members in Juguloma Village, Beoga on April 13, 2021; The murder of a motorcycle taxi driver in Eromaga Village, Omukia District on April 14, 2021; The murder of a high school student in Ilaga in Ulomi Village on April 15, 2021; The burning of the house of tribal chiefs and teachers in Dambet village, Beoga on April 17, 2021 and the shooting of the Head of the Regional Intelligence Agency (Kabinda) Brigadier General TNI I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, in Dambet Village, Beoga on April 25, 2021. So far, OPM has been referred to as the Armed Criminal Group (KKB). The status of KKB is considered by the government to be upgraded to a terrorist movement. OPM is considered to have often carried out acts of terror that damage the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The rebellion carried out by the KKB is always repeated and has caused many casualties, both civilian and military. The Government has confirmed it has categorized the Papuan KKB as a terrorist group.

Analysis of the Role of Kominda Coordination in Handling KKB in Papua

In this section, researchers present two things, namely related to the role of Kominda itself as a synergistic form of several state strategic institutions in order to maintain national security stability. Then an analysis of the mitigation of KKB in Papua with a case study approach in Puncak Jaya Regency. The analysis used is criminal analysis with qualitative methods based on models of nine types of criminal intelligence analysis techniques (see example table in Hanita, 2019: 139-140).

1. The Role of Kominda Coordination in Papua

The regional intelligence community (Kominda) in this case is the subject of efforts to maintain national security stability in the region. Of course, understanding the subject is inseparable from fundamental knowledge about what intelligence is or at least intelligence science itself. Zainal (2019) said that the term intelligence comes from the word intelligence which means intelligence. Therefore, everything related to intelligence work definitely requires intelligence. According to him, along with the development of science and technology, intelligence science has also undergone changes and developments. The development of intelligence science continues to lead to the development of a new paradigm, where intelligence values are formed which are constructed from the concepts of contributions of various disciplines, using interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches, so that new teaching materials related to intelligence are born. As a result of this cross-disciplinary approach between intelligence science and other disciplines, several of them can be mentioned: Battle intelligence; Signal intelligence (Sigint); Territorial intelligence; opensource intelligence (Osint); Defense intelligence; Image intelligence (Imint); Economic intelligence; Cyber intelligence; Geospatial intelligence (Geoint); Strategic intelligence; and others. Zainal (2019) also explained that ontologically, the focus of interest or subject matter of intelligence science is information that has been assessed or interpreted that is useful for solving problems obtained quickly (*velox*) and precisely (*exactus*). While epistemologically, intelligence science is obtained from empirical field data, starting from ancient Greece to the present, where the research methods used can be in the form of deductive, descriptive inductive and historical methods. Then axiologically, intelligence science can be used to reduce uncertainty and thwart to eliminate threats to state sovereignty, national safety and state territorial integrity. This concrete form of intelligence science axiology is "early warning" through continuous and systemic observation that forms "early response" actions.

Based on the classification of intelligence science, especially regarding the concrete form of the axiology of intelligence science, in the regulatory context, the form has been regulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Permendagri RI) Number 46 of 2019 concerning Amendments to Permendagri Number of 2018 concerning Early Vigilance in the Regions. In addition, it is also explicitly mentioned in Law No. 7 of 2012 concerning Social Conflict Handling which is affirmed in Permensos No. 26 of 2017, among others, regarding the prevention of social conflicts as stated in article 3 paragraph (2) point e (see table 1. Regulations and Institutions for Handling ATHG). The Ministerial Regulation on early vigilance in the area is combined with the regulation on the regional intelligence community (Kominda) which is the subject of discussion in this study. Therefore, the discourse on the role of Kominda coordination should begin with this normative provision, then be weighted with consolidative efforts that are empirical as a case study itself. First, normatively, Kominda in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency has existed as an integral part of the process of implementing national security by carrying out instructions and mandates of applicable laws, regulations or policy products. This normative provision is intended as a foothold in carrying out institutional roles and functions collaboratively, where in the Kominda consists of several strategic elements of state intelligence. Therefore, the role of each strategic element of intelligence in the Kominda, which is coordinating or collaborative, is based primarily on normative provisions related to the implementation of national security. The normative provision also targets the urgency of early vigilance as mentioned in Permendagri No. 46 of 2019 above. Right here, the explicit mention of ATHG is explained, namely in Article 1 number 5 which reads:

"Threats, Challenges, Obstacles and Disturbances hereinafter abbreviated as ATHG are any efforts, works, and actions, both from within the country, which are assessed and / or proven to endanger the safety of the nation, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and national interests in various aspects, both ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural, as well as defense and security."

This ATHG then became the most decisive basis for the implementation of early vigilance in the regions. Of course, Kominda in this case is an entity or tool for national security in the region that is very interested in responding to these conditions. Because it is directly related to vital aspects in state administration such as aspects of national security, security, sovereignty to the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Although in the next elaboration of Permendagri No. 46 of 2019 that the existence of the Community Early Awareness Forum (FKMD) as mentioned in Article 1 number 7 as a forum to maintain early vigilance (through a response to the ATHG) in the community, however, according to researchers related to some of the vital aspects above it

not only represents the duties and authorities of certain groups. Moreover, structurally, as stated in Article 11 paragraph (1) that membership of the Early Alert Team in the City/Regency Area can also involve state intelligence providers. Then it is detailed in Article 11 paragraph (2) that the intelligence organizers mean, among others: BIN; TNI Intelligence, Police Intelligence; Intelligence of the Indonesian Prosecutor's Office; Intelligence Ministries/Non-ministerial Government Agencies.

At first glance, the FKMD structure (if in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 paragraph (1) in question), actually resembles the Kominda structure building. Moreover, at the same time, both in FKMD and Kominda, the position of secretary is occupied by the head of the regional national and political unity agency (kabakesbangpol). So that the difference between these two forms of institutions is only in the context of both being products of regulation or Permendagri RI. Second, consolidative the coordinating role of Kominda in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, is an empirical situation on the ground. This role is certainly more than a question of understanding the position in normative provisions as stated earlier. Consolidative efforts made by Kominda in Papua, especially after the death of Kabinda Papua, Brigadier General of the TNI I Gusti Putu Danny Karya Nugraha, in Dambet Village, Beoga, Puncak Regency on April 25, 2021. After several similar incidents in Nduga Regency in 2018. Consolidative efforts towards these coordinating roles are increasingly being intensified by Kominda in Puncak Jaya Regency at this time as an early vigilance response for ATHG which can occur at any time in Puncak Jaya Regency. Some of the current consolidative efforts of the Kominda of Puncak Jaya Regency are, in addition to intensifying coordination meetings across state intelligence providers, another practical thing that is sought is to actively participate in encouraging local governments, in this case represented by the Regional Leaders Coordination Forum (Forkopimda) of Puncak Jaya Regency to carry out security and welfare protection programs for former KKB actors who choose to submit self to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

2. Criminal Intelligence Analysis

Criminal is a form of crime or violation of the law. In the Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI), criminal is defined as something related to a crime (violation of the law) that can be punished according to criminal law. Criminal crimes can certainly be motivated or motivated by various reasons. Starting from local, regional to global. Before discussing the specifics of crime, especially criminal intelligence and its analysis, it is important to first give a glimpse of crime. At least, according to Muryanti (2020) in "Sociology of Law and Crime" states that the causes of crime can be seen from various aspects, namely: physical aspects (criminal biology); psychological and psychiatric aspects (criminal psychology); cultural sociological aspects (criminal sociology). The three levels of crime certainly have their own basis for argumentation. According to Muryanti, physical relationships and crimes can involve both men and women. This view was influenced by Aristotle's (384 BC-322 BC) opinion on the theory of Nature and Nurture. Then Muryanti cites Enrico Ferri who states that evil is the resultant of individual, physical and social circumstances as he describes it as follows:

$$\text{Crime} = \text{Individual} + \text{Social} + \text{Physical}$$

Furthermore, from a psychological and psychiatric aspect, crime can be caused by people who have different psychics from people who are not criminals, whose psychic characteristics lie in their low intelligence. Based on the understanding of psychology, he then divided these psychic characteristics into several categories, namely: Psychoses; Neuroses; and Mental Disability. Finally, sociological aspects of culture or criminal sociology. At this stage a criminal crime can be referred to as a form of criminal crime that is driven collectively or in groups with a certain cause, motivation or background. Muryanti said that in this aspect, the occurrence of crime can be caused by two things: Class and outside class issues such as environment, conflict, economy, and others. As an "extraordinary crime" or extraordinary crime, the criminal act of terrorism is a crime that according to its level is in the sociological aspect of culture or criminal sociology. So that the impact of ATHG that it produces for a community certainly has great destructive power. KKB in this case is an open example of the criminal act of terrorism. Because KKB through the counter- or anti-NKRI movement is certainly a collective threat to the security of the Indonesian people in Papua. Security threats through criminal acts of terrorism are often known as "crimes against humanity" or crimes against humanity.

In dealing with these conditions, analytically strategically, the coordinating role of Kominda, especially Kominda in Puncak Jaya Regency is precisely based on collaborative collective efforts in responding to ATHG with its various dimensions in order to realize national security, defense and resilience stability in the region. Based on a study in Puncak Jaya District, it can specifically be argued that the model of handling KKB in Papua analyzed through a criminal intelligence analysis model shows that there are two fundamental aspects that arise there. First, the definition of security itself as an inherent part of the discourse on Early Vigilance for ATHG. Security-related meanings have an important position in order to respond to the threat. Security in this context, borrowing Buzan and Weaver (1983) who criticize traditional security paradigms that are too state-centric and

military-centric, is something that is also nonmilitary or nonmilitary. That is why, Buzan and Weaver then focused on the aspect of meaning about security that along with its development, security undergoes an expansion and deepening of meaning. "Expansion" means that security is no longer talking about the military alone, while "deepening" is that security no longer places the state as the main actor. Security also involves actors other than the state or representatives of certain individuals or groups in society. In Puncak Jaya Regency, the form of Kominda's coordination role in mobilizing security in the region, especially in early vigilance, has been running as something empirically considered effective. The involvement of certain individuals or groups from the community to actively participate in improving public security and order (kamtibmas), especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, is a form of expanding and deepening the meaning of security.

KKB, which has been categorized as a terrorism crime, is certainly integrated into the form of non-military threat vulnerability (asymmetric). In addition to several categories that had been mentioned directly by Ryamizad Ryacudu as the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia at that time based on the release of the Kompas daily in 2016. According to Ryacudu, in addition to terrorism, other non-military threats are: Natural disasters; Border violations; Separatism; Infectious diseases; Cyberattacks; Drug; and Cultural Infiltration. Therefore, in the case of the KKB in Papua, non-military threats can be referred to in addition to being a crime of separatism, it is also a crime of terrorism itself. So that the form or model of handling should not only rely on state actors or in this case state intelligence providers in the regions, but allow the involvement of individuals or community groups as non-state actors. Moreover, given that the identity of KKB crimes as terrorism crimes or "extraordinary crimes", which is certainly different in context from corruption, the coordination role of Kominda based on connections between actors (non-state) is an option that can be considered applicable to the handling of KKB in Papua. Second, countering crime (terrorism) or also known as "criminal politics". The term is as stated by Arief (2015) which aims at community protection to achieve community welfare. Criminal politics allows for a judicial scheme against terrorism crimes that is not only through juridical normative provisions (penal), namely criminal law channels. However, at the same time through channels outside the criminal law (non-penal). Criminal politics is part of criminal law politics itself. Aditama (2019) suggests that in essence criminal law politics is part of law enforcement efforts (especially criminal law enforcement), so it can also be mentioned that criminal law politics is part of law enforcement policy. So according to Aditama, in the context of penal, for example, being arrested and then convicted of perpetrators of terrorism crimes such as KKB in Papua by the government does not mean that the government has been really successful and without obstacles in carrying out preventive or preventive measures (early vigilance) as a form of criminal political effectiveness. So at this point, non-penal measures are needed as a driver of increasing the effectiveness of a criminal political effort or preventive measures for handling terrorism cases, including KKB in Papua.

An explanation of two empirical aspects related to the model of handling KKB in Papua, namely: the meaning of security and criminal politics, then analytically theoretical researchers can contextualize then into a picture of what Hanita (2019) calls criminal intelligence. Hanita explained that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has formulated concepts on criminal intelligence. According to UNODC, the term criminal intelligence conjures up images of colorator-style systems used to store and retrieve information gathered about crimes and criminals. UNODC adopted the concept of criminal intelligence products used by the UK's National Criminal Intelligence. These intelligence products help law enforcement efforts to reduce crime, disrupt security and improve public safety. Intelligence products are the result of collaboration between analysts and intelligence officers where raw information is collected, analyzed and interpreted, as well as represented with recommendations on necessary decisions or action options (Hanita 2019). The statement certainly confirms both empirical aspects, especially regarding criminal politics which emphasizes its goal on efforts to protect society. So that the form of handling KKB in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, through the role of intensive coordination within Kominda which is projected to achieve its formulation as a role model for countering terrorism crimes (KKB). This condition is something that is not impossible to be attached as an identity or characteristic of handling terrorism crimes or KKB in Papua. Of course, this is very dependent on Kominda, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, as the subject of state intelligence in the region. Therefore, regarding the rigor of affirming these empirical aspects as new knowledge in terms of countering terrorism crimes, it should be the focus of carrying out the coordinating role among the leadership and members in the Kominda. As an analytical overview, the following is an example of a criminal intelligence analysis technique (British model) that researchers extract from the book Strategic Intelligence Thoughts by Margaretha Hanita. The analysis technique is displayed in the form of a table titled "Nine Types of Criminal Intelligence Analysis Techniques (British Model)." Researchers in this case display only seven of the nine analytical techniques that researchers can selectively refer to as parts or stages of analysis.

Table 2. Criminal Intelligence Analysis Techniques (British Model)

| Product | Description | Purpose |
|--|--|---|
| Analysis of Results | Assess the impact of : Patrol Strategy and Tactics; Reactive investigation; Proactive investigation; Crime reduction initiatives; Other law enforcement policies and techniques | Help identify best practices; Areas for improvement; Post hoc debriefs of incidents and investigations as an aid to professional development |
| Crime Pattern Analysis | Identification of crime series; Identify crime trends; Hot spot analysis; General profile analysis. | Management decisions on prioritization in the "tactical menu" of : "Hot spots"; "Identification of crime series"; "Crime and disruption prevention and diversion initiatives"; Operationally, they are an aid to investigators and others in identifying new emerging trends and requirements for further analysis . |
| Demographic Trend Analysis | The nature of demographic change; Impact on criminality or apparently related criminality; A more in-depth analysis of social factors that may underlie the changes or tendencies of offenders or offending behaviors; May support crime and disruption audits or research into known or predicted social or demographic changes. | Strategic decisions about resources and priorities in law enforcement; Illuminate possible future pressures and notify partners; Use in planning seasonal or other tactical operations in response to emerging social phenomena or the movement of people. |
| Network Analysis | Key attributes and functions in the network; Associations inside/outside the network; Network strengths and weaknesses; Financial analysis and communication data; Conclusions about criminal behavior related to the target profile. | Strategically : Demonstrate to management the seriousness of related crime for strategic considerations . Tactically and operationally : Informing the operation of the target; Suggest effective lines of inquiry and opportunities for disruption; Highlighting gaps in intelligence that encourage the dissemination of sources . |
| Risk Analysis | Analysis of comparative risks posed by individual actors or organizations to: Individual potential victims; Society at large; Law enforcement agencies . | The compilation of risk assessments as a prelude to prioritizing intelligence or law enforcement work at strategic and operational levels leads to the completion of a risk management plan . |
| Profile Target Analysis | Describe criminal capabilities and include information about : Association; Lifestyle; Operational modality; Financial data; Strengths and vulnerabilities; Techniques that have succeeded or failed against targets in the past; Can include all forms of violations, but not limited to pure criminal activity | Support target operations with : Informing the selection of targets; Identify intelligence needs; Shows how resources and resources can be used targets . |
| Operational Intelligence Assessment | Real-time evaluation and research in : Credentials about associations; Other phenomena surrounding the suspect in the current operation; It may or may not be entirely the responsibility of an analyst | Prevention of "mission creep" and prioritization of investigation needs arising from incoming intelligence during current operations, along with identification of resulting priorities for ongoing intelligence work. |

Source: Hanita, 2019

IV. CONCLUSION

The regional intelligence community or abbreviated as Kominda is a product of regulation based on the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 16 of 2011 concerning amendments to Permendagri Number 11 of 2006 concerning the Regional Intelligence Community. Kominda includes or is based in the provincial area called Kominda Province and the City/Regency area called Kominda City/Regency. The enactment of the Permendagri on Kominda is a constitutional basis in addition to Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination, where through the Presidential Regulation the Head of BIN then stipulated the Regulation of the Head of the State Intelligence Agency (Perkabin) Number 01 of 2014 concerning the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) and the Regional Intelligence Committee (Kominda). Because Kominda based on cabin is certainly not based on the City / Regency area, so what applies is Kominda based on Permendagri. The handling of Armed Criminal Groups (KKB) in Papua, especially in Puncak Jaya Regency, which is based on the coordinating role of Kominda elements as subjects of state intelligence administration continues to be optimized to respond and maintain state sovereignty from various threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances (ATHG) that whenever and wherever can occur. The mention of ATHG is based on Permendagri Number 46 of 2019 concerning changes to Permendagri Number 2 of 2018 concerning Early Vigilance in the Regions. The analysis of the handling of KKB in Papua with the case study of Puncak Jaya Regency was contextualized to the analysis of Kominda's

coordination role which was analyzed qualitatively using criminal intelligence analysis. The analysis is classified into two parts. First, an analysis of the role of Kominda both normatively and consolidatively. Second, the analysis of Kominda's role based on empirical aspects, namely the meaning of security and criminal politics aimed at protecting the community from KKB crimes (terrorism) in Papua. These two empirical aspects are the initial ideas for criminal intelligence analysis described in a table of criminal intelligence analysis techniques.

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