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Wasted Votes and Political Representation: Analysis of the Implementation ofParliamentary Thresholds in the 2019 Legislative Elections

Silkania Swarizona[1], Agus Machfud Fauzi[2], dan Mochamad Arif Affandi[3]

[1]*Surabaya State University, East Java*
[2]*Surabaya State University, East Java*
[3]*Surabaya State University, East Java*

ABSTRACT :: As a country that adheres to a democratic system, Indonesia is faced with two major challenges simultaneously. On the one hand, as a nation, Indonesia must be able to act as a comfortable "home" for all existing diversity. Meanwhile, on the other hand, Indonesia must also be able to manage an effective (as well as efficient) political system institutionally. One way to ensure that pluralistic values remain but remain effective and efficient is to implement a parliamentary threshold of 4%. However, like a double-edged sword, the trend of increasing PT (2.5 to 4 percent) from election to election is feared to threaten the principle of political representation with high levels of wasted votes. Using qualitative methods, this research calculates the loss of votes as an impact of the implementation of the parliamentary threshold and also its impact.
KEYWORDS: Parliamentary Threshold; Scorching Voice

I.   INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a country with a pluralistic social and political context. Home to hundreds of different ethnic groups with a unique diversity of traditions, religions and cultural practices. Indonesia was also historically built from ideological discourse, which Herbert Feith and Lance Castles divided into 5 political streams, namely: Communism, Socialism, Islam, Nationalism (radical) and traditional Javanese (Feith & Castles, 2007). Even though communism/socialism became an ideology that was then prohibited from developing, the three ideological poles that existed (Islam, Nationalist, Ethnic/Tribal), were more than enough to bring about the potential for political instability which manifested in dozens of political parties in Indonesia.

Under these conditions, as a country that adheres to a democratic system, Indonesia is faced with two major challenges simultaneously. On the one hand, as a nation, Indonesia must be able to act as a comfortable "home" for all existing diversity. So normatively, the democratic political system that is built must be able to accommodate various differences in interests which are reflected in the political institutional structure (parliament and executive). Meanwhile, on the other hand, Indonesia must also be able to manage an effective (as well as efficient) political system institutionally. The need to accommodate diversity does not necessarily come at the expense of running a stable and accountable government system.

This is in accordance with the theory of political presence from Anne Philip (1995) which explains that the presence of every element in parliament is important. Because, without the presence of politics, there would be no ideas from these elements. Therefore, every element, whether based on ethnicity, religion, race, ethnicity, gender or age, must be present inparliament, because each element has a different point of view.

Referring to previous studies on democracy and political institutional engineering, the conditions faced by Indonesia can be bridged through two aspects of engineering. First, by designing a consociational democratic system. Second, by engineering an electoral system that is compatible with consociational democracy. Lijphart (1999), explains that consociational democracy is very suitable to be applied in countries that have multi-ethnic conditions or countries with a high level of social diversity. The higher the plurality thatexists in a society, the more important it is for that country to implement a consociational democratic scheme. Consociational democracy puts forward the principles of accommodation and consensus which are capable of becoming a glue for various existing social and political divisions. Meanwhile, at a more technical level, consociational democracy is translated through the implementation of a proportional electoral system (Proportional Representation/PR) to anticipate social and political diversity which could weaken the democratic government system that is being formed. Reilly (2002) emphasizes that the PR system is a key element in building Lijphart's consociational democracy.

In line with these empirical and theoretical realities, Indonesia implemented a PR election system from 1955 until the last election in 2019. The PR system was implemented in 2 schemes, namely Closed-list Proportional Representation (CPR) and Open-list Proportional Representation. /OPR). In the CPR system, voters do not know and cannot directly vote for elected legislative candidates (Caleg) who will become members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). The determination of elected legislative candidates is entirely in the hands of political parties. Meanwhile, in the OPR election, voters are allowed to choose the party and legislative candidates listed on the ballot. In the OPR model, the determination of elected legislative candidates is based on the majority of votes cast by the political parties that win seats in each electoral district. The CPR system was implemented in the 1955 to 1999 elections, while the OPR was in effect from 2004 to 2019.

The change from CPR to OPR is designed to ensure that social, cultural and political diversity can be represented proportionally in the parliamentary structure. In the OPR system, the number of seats obtained by parties/legislative candidates in the legislative body is proportional to the percentage of votes they obtain. This system allows small parties and their candidates to be represented in government, as they do not need to win a majority of votes in a single constituency to gain a seat. This approach has helped foster a more inclusive and diverse political environment in Indonesia, which has more than 300 ethnic groups and hundreds of different languages. This system also allows a wide range of political views to be represented in government, leading to greater transparency and accountability in the political process.

Apart from its positive function in accommodating various political interests proportionally, the OPR system is also not free from criticism. The implementation of OPR resulted in a multi-party system which resulted in the ineffectiveness of the political decision-making process in parliament. Moreover, in the Presidential System that applies in Indonesia, the face of a plural parliament is actually considered to weaken the presidential system, instead of strengthening it. The large number of political representatives in parliament is considered to contribute to political instability within the government. Based on this idea, in the 2009 election the electoral system in Indonesia implemented a parliamentary threshold (PT) policy. The implementation of PT is carried out to limit. Through Law Number 10 of 2008, PT applies to 2.5 percent at the DPR RI level. Subsequently, it increased to 3.5% in the 2014 election in accordance with Law Number 8 of 2018. And finally to 4% in the 2019 election in accordance with Law Number 7 of 2017.

Like a double-edged sword, the trend of increasing PT (2.5 to 4 percent) from election to election is feared to threaten the principle of political representation with high levels of wasted votes. Not only eliminating political parties that do not meet the minimum requirements for obtaining national votes, the high number of forfeited votes is not impossible as a cause of political instability at the local level. Due to the possibility that legislative candidates who win seats in the calculations at the electoral district level, fail to sit in parliament because their party does not pass the PT. If these conditions occur, then the aim of the OPR system to accommodate diversity while creating political stability is like "a firefar from a fire".

Therefore, the focus of the study in this research is to calculate the scorched sound as an impact of PT implementation in the OPR system in Indonesia. With the aim of finding out the real threat of PT implementation to the sustainability of political representation. By using the Sainte Lague Formula (SL Index) we will know the details of the forfeited votes in each electoral district, both those which have a direct impact on the loss of seats for political party candidates participating in the election, as well as indirect impacts on the potential forfeiture of voters' votes which is equivalent to the value of 1 DPR RI seat.

Based on the background and problems that have been described, this research aims to answer two research questions, namely, first, how many total wasted votes were lost at the national level and in each DPR RI electoral district as a result of the Parliamentary Threshold policy in the 2019 election? Second, what is the impact of the implementation of PT on political representation calculated from the loss of seats for elected legislative candidates and wasted votes equivalent to 1 DPR RI seat in the 2019 Election?

II. RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a quantitative descriptive approach. Quantitative descriptive research is a method that aims to create an objective picture or description of a situation using numbers, starting from data collection, interpretation of the data as well as the appearance and results. The data analyzed in this research is data on the 2019 Legislative Election vote results based on electoral districts in the DD1-DPR format from the Indonesian General Election Commission. After the data is collected, it will continue with analysis and presentation of numerical data to then be interpreted according to the research problem formulation.

Literature Review

This research is built on several studies that have been made previously. First, research from (Kholis, 2020) which explains that the implementation of parliamentary thresholds actually harms voters and election participants. Likewise, in the case of the 2009 election, the parliamentary threshold eliminated 29 political

parties from the 38 political parties participating in the election. Then in 2014, it eliminated 2 political parties that could not pass the parliamentary threshold. And in 2019, there were 16 political parties in the election, which brought down 3 political parties who were unable to sit in parliamentary seats due to the determination of parliamentary thresholds. The essence of Kholis's (2020) research shows that there are valid votes that go uncounted and are wasted when parliamentary thresholds are applied.

The second research, namely research from Diamantina (2021). Drawing from previous research, Diamantina (2021) took the example of a legislative candidate who was supposed to qualify for Parliament, but failed because of the implementation of parliamentary thresholds, namely Tsamara Amany from the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) in the 2019 elections.

The third research, research from Hadi & Brata (2021) focuses on the aim of establishing parliamentary thresholds. In this research, it is explained that determining parliamentary thresholds is used as an effectiveness in simplifying political parties in order to create a strong presidential system.

Apart from building on previous research, this research also uses several theories and concepts as analytical tools. First, constitutional democracy. Consociational democracy is a concept introduced by Lijphart (1999) who explains that consociational democracy can be applied to multi-ethnic countries or countries with a high level of social diversity. The higher the plurality that exists in a society, the more relevant the democratic model or political system is for the implementation of state life. Furthermore, according to Lijphart (1999), many explanations of the basic definition of democracy can be narrowed down to a government controlled by the majority community group. This condition illustrates that the majority people must rule while the minority people must act as the opposition.

Second, political institutional engineering. Reilly (2006) states that the problems underlying government stability and effectiveness in a democratic system can be overcome by the design of political institutions (parties, elections, president, parliament, and so on). What is meant by Reilly (2006) can refer to the next concept, namely parliamentary threshold.

Third, the parliamentary threshold. The parliamentary threshold is the minimum percentage of votes that a political party or coalition must receive in general elections in order to be represented in a legislative body, such as parliament or congress. In other words, this threshold is the minimum percentage of votes needed to get a seat in a proportional representation system (Marijan, 2011; Prihatmoko, 2005; Yuda, 2010).

This idea is seen as a tool to reduce the emergence of new political parties and narrow the ideological gap between political parties to increase the effectiveness of interest articulation and aggregation (Prihatmoko, 2008). The structure of the party system, including whether a two-party or multiparty system will result in an election, is theoretically influenced by parliamentary threshold settings (Reynolds & Mellaz, 2011). A political party must get a certain number of votes to meet the parliamentary threshold in order to get a seat in parliament. To send candidates to parliament under Indonesia's party system, political parties must win a certain portion of all valid votes cast.

However, critics argue that the high threshold could unfairly exclude smaller parties and limit political representation and diversity. As explained by Taufiqurohman (2021) who considers the electoral threshold to be an erroneous engineering choice for a proportional electoral system. This confirms that the electoral threshold is inappropriate and not effective when applied to the Proportional Election system. So in this case, Taufiqurohman (2021) suggests redesigning the size of electoral districts by reducing the number of seats that can be contested in each electoral district. By reducing the number of seats from three to ten seats in each electoral district to three to six seats in each electoral district, it will result in fewer political parties getting seats. Because the fewer the number of seats contested in each electoral district, it is hoped that it will be linear with the fewer number of political parties that will get seats. So that this will form a strong government as expected.

As is known, since it was first used, the parliamentary threshold has increased in terms of requirements. If you look at how it is used, the parliamentary threshold was initially used in the 2009 election with a parliamentary threshold of 2.5%, increased to 3.5% in 2014, and increased to 4% in 2019. In order to create a "simple multiparty" system in Indonesia , parliamentary threshold requirements were raised (Partono, 2008).

Keempat, suara hangus dalam Pemilu. konsep *wasted vote* atau suara hangus sebenarnya tidak terlalu relevan dikaji dalam skema pemilu proporsional. Hal ini dikarenakan, sistem pemilu proporsional didesain sebagai solusi terhadap tingginya suara hangus/terbuang yang muncul dalam skema *plurality/majority*. Namun dengan adanya penerapan ambang batas (*threshold*), sebagai upaya untuk mewujudkan pemerintahan yang efektif dengan mengurangi fragmentasi politik, justru menghasilkan ancaman konkret bagis sistem pemilu proporsional dengan tingginya suara hangus/terbuang yang berdampak negatif terhadap keterwakilan politik. Oleh karenanya, kebanyakan analisis *wasted votes* pada sistem pemilu proporsional cenderung lebih fokus pada jumlah suara hangus dengan potensi hilangnya keterwakilan di parlemen yang dhubungkan dengan aturan ambang batas parlemen.

III.   DISCUSSION

Recapitulation of Final Seat Votes, Wasted Votes and Percentage of Wasted Votes

Different from the previous election which used the Hare Quota model, the 2019 General Election (Pemilu) uses a vote conversion model resulting from the Legislative Election using the Sainte Lague Index calculation. In accordance with Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, namely in Article 414 Paragraph 1, it is stated that each political party participating in the General Election must meet the vote acquisition threshold of 4%. After meeting the parliamentary threshold, the party's votes will be converted into seats in the DPR RI in each electoral district (Dapil). In accordance with Article 415 paragraph 2 of Law Number 7 of 2017, party votes will be divided by vote share numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on.

In this sub-chapter, we will describe the recapitulation of the final seat value, the number and percentage of forfeited votes based on the SLI calculation in each DPR RI Electoral District.). The final seat value is obtained from the SLI calculation which refers to the votes of the political party that ranks at the bottom of the seat allocation in each electoral district. The number of forfeited votes is generated from the total vote acquisition of political parties that did not pass the PT in each electoral district. Meanwhile, the percentage of forfeited votes is calculated from the comparison between the number of forfeited votes and the total valid votes in each electoral district. The following is a regional recapitulation of the final seat values, number and percentage of forfeited votes in the 2019 election.

Table 1. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes in the SumatraRegion

NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
		SUMATERA		
1	ACEH I	94.194	120.842	8,7
2	ACEH II	91.787	108.557	9,2
3	NORTH SUMATERA I	105.054	214.721	9
4	NORTH SUMATERA II	119.968	217.044	9,9
5	NORTH SUMATERA III	101.951	265.591	10,6
6	RIAU ISLAND	101.265	83.281	9,1
7	RIAU I	92.157	200.805	11,8
8	RIAU II	111.991	101.801	8,4
9	WEST SUMATERA I	87.002	158.155	10,2
10	WEST SUMATERA I	78.378	94.890	7,5
11	SOUTH SUMATERA I	114.412	212.133	10,5
12	SOUTH SUMATERA II	124.052	253.025	10,9
13	LAMPUNG I	94.268	168.908	8
14	LAMPUNG II	93.759	211.184	9
15	BENGKULU I	121.990	121.866	12,3
16	BANGKA BELITUNG	83.447	88.926	13
17	JAMBI	120.092	186.597	10,4
	WASTED VOTES		2.808.326	

Table 1 above shows the distribution of data in the Sumatra region in the 2019 legislative elections. The final seats obtained, the number and percentage of forfeited votes for the Sumatra region in the table, there are several electoral districts that occupy the highest and lowest numbers in obtaining forfeited votes. The electoral district that had the highest number of lost votes was North Sumatra III with a total of 265,591. Apart from explaining the aggregate data on forfeited votes, the table also presents the percentage of forfeited votes. This data is important to know how big the impact might be on the potential loss of seats. The highest data was obtained from the Bangka Belitung electoral district at 13 percent.

Tabel 2. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes in the JavaRegion

		JAVA		
NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	BANTEN I	110.823	135.891	10,2
2	BANTEN II	114.668	163.963	12,2
3	BANTEN III	130.010	409.524	13
4	DKI JAKARTA I	114.596	218.936	12,6
5	DKI JAKARTA II	159.258	409.655	15,6
6	DKI JAKARTA III	133.666	377.728	16,5
7	WEST JAVA I	100.826	230.591	13,5
8	WEST JAVA II	144.416	271.882	9,7
9	WEST JAVA III	90.986	187.299	11
10	WEST JAVA IV	111.452	116.281	8
11	WEST JAVA V	134.107	246.841	9,4
12	WEST JAVA VI	161.405	205.498	9
13	WEST JAVA VII	147.717	316.581	9,9
14	WEST JAVA VIII	120.520	234.965	10,8
15	WEST JAVA IX	116.512	197.436	9,1
16	WEST JAVA X	116.840	113.411	7,1
17	WEST JAVA XI	125.658	190.386	7
18	CENTRAL JAVA I	138.626	229.692	10,8
19	CENTRAL JAVA II	129.121	101.959	5,9
20	CENTRAL JAVA III	122.290	203.260	9
21	CENTRAL JAVA IV	99.774	104.261	6,3
22	CENTRAL JAVA V	128.435	128.031	5,8
23	CENTRAL JAVA VI	120.020	130.866	6,1
24	CENTRAL JAVA VII	130.778	91.408	5,4
25	CENTRAL JAVA VIII	116.578	107.250	5,4
26	CENTRAL JAVA IX	95.727	105.406	5,7
27	CENTRAL JAVA X	111.655	87.776	5
28	EAST JAVA I	112.828	253.483	10,2
29	EAST JAVA II	106.775	161.978	9,6
30	EAST JAVA III	120.361	111.619	6,7
31	EAST JAVA IV	99.473	156.297	8,6
32	EAST JAVA V	112.043	183.356	9,2
33	EAST JAVA VI	128.363	153.366	6,5
34	EAST JAVA VII	139.147	130.281	6,3
35	EAST JAVA VIII	108.687	242.487	10,2
36	EAST JAVA IX	110.966	80.682	5,8
37	EAST JAVA X	128.578	61.096	4,4
38	EAST JAVA XI	212.081	55.509	2
39	DIY	152.903	162.029	7,4
	WASTED VOTES		7.068.960	

There are several provinces that received the highest number of forfeited votes, one of which is the DKI Jakarta II electoral district with a vote of 409,655. Table 2 also shows that the total number of forfeited votes was 7,068,960. The highest percentage of forfeited votes based on the table description shows DKI Jakarta III with a total percentage of 16.5 percent.

Table 3. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes in theSulawesi Region

		SULAWESI		
NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	WEST SULAWESI	83.499	63.470	9,1
2	SOUTH SULAWESI I	114.395	200.258	12,7
3	SOUTH SULAWESI II	102.505	137.552	8,1
4	SOUTH SULAWESI III	87.530	115.936	8,4
5	CENTRAL SULAWESI	96.004	256.527	16,5
6	SOUTHEAST SULAWESI	95.522	119.673	9,3
7	NORTH SULAWESI	82.889	153.844	10,4
8	GORONTALO	87.748	35.351	5,1
	WASTED VOTES		1.082.611	

Based on table 3 of the latest seat acquisitions, the number and percentage of forfeited votes for the Sulawesi region shows that the highest forfeited votes were occupied by Central Sulawesi Province with a figure of 256,527. Apart from that, the table above also shows the percentage of forfeited votes, as is the case in the Central Sulawesi electoral district which received a figure of 16.5 percent.

Table 4. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes in theKalimantan Region

	KALIMANTAN			
NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	WEST KALIMANTAN I	128.280	196.995	10,8
2	WEST KALIMANTAN II	82.273	89.439	9,8
3	SOUTH KALIMANTAN I	97.334	81.408	7,5
4	SOUTH KALIMANTAN II	79.021	83.728	9
5	CENTRAL KALIMANTAN	87.504	113.781	9,5
6	NORTH KALIMANTAN	37.616	30.786	9,4
7	EAST KALIMANTAN	111.135	182.116	10,5
	WASTED VOTES		778.253	

Based on table 4 of the latest seat acquisition, the number and percentage of forfeited votes in the Kalimantan region, the highest forfeited vote results were occupied by the West Kalimantan I electoral district at 196,995. The highest percentage of forfeited votes was occupied by West Kalimantan I Province with 10.8%.

Table 5. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes for Bali, WestNusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara Regions

	BALI, WEST NUSA TENGGARA AND EAST NUSA TENGGARA			
NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	WEST NUSA TENGGARA I	89.949	123.683	15,4
2	WEST NUSA TENGGARA II	113.428	302.822	16,2
3	BALI	114.326	232.723	10,1
4	EAST NUSA TENGGARA I	86.819	184.012	15,2
5	EAST NUSA TENGGARA II	78.451	276.820	20,3
	WASTED VOTES		1.120.060	

Based on the table of final seat acquisition, the number and percentage of forfeited votes for the Bali, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara regions, the highest forfeited vote acquisition was occupied by the West Nusa Tenggara II electoral district with 302,822 votes. Meanwhile, the highest percentage of forfeited votes was occupied by the East Nusa Tenggara II electoral district at 20.3 percent.

Table 6. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes in the MalukuRegion

	MALUKU			
NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	NORTH MALUKU	62.549	132.220	21,2
2	MALUKU	94.298	152.554	16,1
	WASTED VOTES		284.774	

Based on the latest seat acquisition table, the number and percentage of forfeited votes in the Maluku region includes the North Maluku and Maluku electoral districts. The largest number of forfeited votes was occupied by the Maluku electoral district at 152,554 with the final seat value being 94,298. Meanwhile, the number of forfeited votes obtained by the North Maluku electoral district was 132,220 but the final seat value was only 62,549 with a forfeited vote percentage of 21.2 percent. The total forfeited votes obtained overall was 284,774 votes.

Table 7. Final Seat Acquisition, Number and Percentage of Wasted Votes in the PapuaRegion

	PAPUA			
NO	SELECTED AREA	FINAL SEAT VALUE	NUMBER OF WASTED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	WEST PAPUA	101.713	64.594	10,7
2	PAPUA	147.798	368.801	11,1
	WASTED VOTES		433.395	

Based on the latest seat acquisition table, the number and percentage of forfeited votes for the Papua region in the table is divided into two electoral districts, including West Papua and Papua. As for those who received a higher number of forfeited votes, namely Papua with 368,801, however, the number of votes appears to be greater than the value of the last seat. This is because the final seat value was only 147,798 seats while the number of forfeited votes was very high. Likewise, the total score of 11.1 votes was considered higher than that of West Papua. West Papua has a total of 64,594 forfeited votes while the final number of seats is 101,713 seats with a percentage of 10.7. The total forfeited votes obtained overall was 433,395 votes.

Table 8. Recapitulation of Valid Votes, Forfeited Votes and National Percentage of Wasted Votes

NO	REGION	VALID VOTES	FORFEITED VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF WASTED VOTES
1	JAVA	80.572.157	7.068.960	8,77
2	SUMATERA	27.216.267	2.808.326	10,32
3	KALIMANTAN	8.019.396	778.253	9,7
4	SULAWESI	10.364.309	1.082.611	10,45
5	BALI, NUSA TENGGARA, MALUKU AND PAPUA	13.043.695	1.838.229	14,09
	TOTAL	139.215.824	13.576.379	9,75

Based on table 8, it is known that the total forfeited votes at the national level in the 2019 election was 13,576,379 votes or the equivalent of 9.75 percent of the number of valid votes. With a composition of 7,068,960 votes in Java, 2,808,326 votes in Sumatra, 778,253 votes in Kalimantan, 1,082,611 votes in Sulawesi, while Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua had 1,838,229 votes.

The Impact of Implementing the Parliamentary Threshold on Political Representation
Based on the description that has been carried out previously, with reference to the number and representation of forfeited votes in each electoral district and compared with the number of votes obtained in the last seat in each electoral district, it is clear that the forfeited votes in most electoral districts in Indonesia have the same number of vote conversions or even exceed final seat value. This indicates the impact of the number of wasted votes, where the lost votes represent a form of potential political representation that is also lost, which in this case is equivalent to one parliamentary seat.
Furthermore, nationally, the potential amount of loss of political representation due to wasted votes is equivalent to 83 parliamentary seats covering all electoral districts. Meanwhile, if we look at the composition of the number of forfeited votes against the value of the last seat in each electoral district, there are 61 electoral districts that have remaining votes that exceed the value of the last seat and 19 electoral districts that do not exceed that. As explained in the table below:

Table 9. Number of National Lost Political Representations Equivalent to Parliamentary Seats

NO	SELECTED AREA	NUMBER OF NATIONAL LOST POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS EQUIVALENT TO PARLIAMENTARY
1	JAVA	37
2	SUMATERA	19
3	KALIMANTAN	7
4	SULAWESI	5
5	BALI, NUSA TENGGARA, MALUKU AND PAPUA	15
	TOTAL	83

The two regions with the lowest loss of potential political representation are Sulawesi and Kalimantan. In Sulawesi, the total potential loss of political representation due to the accumulation of forfeited votes is equivalent to 7 parliamentary seats. And in Kalimantan, the total potential loss of political representation due to forfeited votes is the equivalent of 5 parliamentary seats. On the other hand, Java is the region with the highest total potential loss of representation.

IV.   CONCLUSION

Based on the description that has been carried out previously, this research produces at least two main conclusions. First, the determination of the Parliamentary Threshold in the 2019 election at 4% has contributed to the high number of wasted votes nationally, which reached a total of 13,576,369 votes or a percentage of 9.75% of the total national valid votes.

In the ranking between regions, Java has the highest number of votes among all other regions. It cannot be ignored that Java is the region with the largest number of voters and electoral districts. The electoral district with the highest number in the Java region is DKI Jakarta II Province with 409,655 votes. Meanwhile, the lowest electoral district in the Java region which had the lowest number of forfeited votes was East Java Province XI with a figure of 55,509 votes.

Meanwhile, in the context of electoral district ranking, it can be seen that the electoral district with the most forfeited votes in Indonesia is DKI Jakarta II Province with a total of 409,655 votes. This shows that the result of forfeited votes in an electoral district is in line with the high number of forfeited votes in a region. On the other hand, the electoral district with the lowest number of forfeited votes in Indonesia is North Kalimantan which only has a figure of 30,786 votes.

After finding out the total number of votes forfeited as a result of the Parliamentary Threshold policy in the 2019 election, this research also produced a second conclusion, namely that the PT had contributed to the potential loss of political representation equivalent to parliamentary seats in most regions in Indonesia. Nationally, the total potential loss of political representation due to forfeited votes is equivalent to 83 seats in parliament. This also means that the existing forfeited votes actually have the potential for new representation or representation of 14% of the total seats currently in parliament.

Based on these conclusions, this research recommends 2 institutional design options to accommodate two main issues, namely the issue of political representation and the effectiveness of government operations. First, remove the parliamentary threshold. Abolish the PT policy and give all political parties the opportunity to have representatives in parliament without a minimum vote limit, provided they meet the vote acquisition equivalent to 1 seat at the electoral district level (based on SLI). Concerns related to the ineffectiveness of decision making in parliament can be adjusted in the preparation of the Leadership Structure and Council Equipment, as well as the formation of Fractions with parliamentary seat limits. In the event that a political party has fewer representatives than the minimum requirements for forming a faction, the political party concerned can decide to join another faction in parliament.

Second, implementing a parliamentary threshold with affirmative action to increase seat quotas for political parties that do not pass PT under certain conditions. By considering the large social, economic and political "costs" of the PT abolition scheme through the revision of the Election Law, in the future moderate options are needed that are able to accommodate two conflicting opinions. On the one hand, the existence of parliamentary thresholds helps prevent parliamentary fragmentation and ensures the stability of the political system and prevents the formation of weak and unstable coalition governments. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a principle of justice is needed that strengthens the interest representation system, by minimizing forfeited and wasted votes due to the technical effects of the electoral system. One of these options is to allocate additional seats to political parties and/or legislative candidates.

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